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Preface
This book began as a history of the Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide 
Reactor (SEFOR). Our research led us to additional goals—to inform 
the public generally about the risks attending a national commitment 
to utilize fast nuclear reactors for electric power generation, and perhaps 
most importantly to us in the end, to consider carefully the risks of a 
worst-case accident that were taken during the experiments conducted 
in the SEFOR 20 megawatt (thermal) plutonium-fueled fast-neutron 
reactor during the period 1969–71 in the rural Ozark Mountains of 
Arkansas. The book is dedicated to:
Richard E. Webb, 1939–
and
David Okrent, 1922–2012
Whom we consider pioneers in fast-reactor safety engineering.
Drs. Webb and Okrent, practicing nuclear engineers with exten-
sive experience in fast-reactor safety research and development, were 
deeply involved in the debates regarding fast-reactor safety during the 
period 1960–80 when major commitments to a liquid metal fast breeder 
reactor (LMFBR) based electric power production program were high-
priority goals for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). We 
considered the AEC’s response to Webb’s and Okrent’s officially docu-
mented advice regarding the risks of accidental explosions in fast reac-
tors that could fail the containment structures provided. It appears, 
as the United States considers proposals to initiate a fast-reactor-based 
program for electric power production as a means of dealing with the 
climate change threat, that there are critically important lessons here in 
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“If something seems too good to be true, it probably is.”
During the 1960s, there arose a promise of electric power production 
so cheap that it might not even have to be metered. And it arose as 
the result of the United States entering the nuclear age via the atomic 
bomb destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the ultimate swords-
to-plowshares project, it was theorized that it is possible to design a 
nuclear reactor that actually produces more nuclear fuel than it con-
sumes in the process of generating heat to boil water to provide steam 
to drive large generators of electricity. Ignoring the problem of residual 
radioactive waste generated by the operation of any nuclear reactor, 
this proposed reactor would have to be a “fast” reactor in order to actu-
ally produce more fuel than used. The fuel produced by these “breeder 
reactors” would be plutonium. A number of individuals raised concerns 
about the advisability of developing fast reactors in general, the concern 
being the safety of such reactors. But nuclear physics had predicted a 
self-regulation mechanism inherent in such reactors called the Doppler 
effect that could possibly remove concerns about safety.
At this time in American history, the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) was in control of the nuclear programs in the United States. The 
AEC was unique in that it not only regulated nuclear activities, it also 
promoted those activities, and it had a desire to experimentally test the 
effectiveness of the Doppler effect in an effort to promote breeder reac-
tor development. One would suppose a national laboratory would be 
charged by the federal government with designing such an experiment. 
However, this was not the case. A consortium of energy- producing 
industries and foreign governments called the Southwest Experimen-
tal Fast Oxide Reactor (SEFOR) Consortium officially initiated the 
construction of a 20-megawatt reactor to test the Doppler effect, and 
that reactor would be sited within twenty miles south and west of 
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Fayetteville, Arkansas, the home of the University of Arkansas. The 
AEC provided the nuclear fuel for this reactor. That fuel was pluto-
nium, and the amount was sufficient to build some one hundred atomic 
bombs of the size of those used on Japan if one desired to do so. The 
actual design and operation of the reactor and the actual experimental 
procedures were accomplished by General Electric.
The experiments were simple: have the reactor operating in a man-
ner capable of generating enough heat to generate up to 20 megawatts 
of thermal power; then remove the control mechanism that maintained 
that level of operation and see if the Doppler effect would actually slow 
the now out-of-control reactor. General Electric did an excellent job of 
designing the reactor and process as the reactor was brought back under 
control in a series of experiments, each exceeding the previous as to the 
level of “out-of-control” that occurred. In the last test, conducted with 
the reactor operating at 8 megawatts power, the amount of heat pro-
duced rose to nearly 10,000 megawatts, an increase by a factor of more 
than a thousand, before the reactor was brought back under control.
As this book shows, this SEFOR experiment was hailed by the 
nuclear industry as one of several demonstrations that fast reactors 
could be controlled. The project was terminated at the end of that 
month (December 1971), and the site closed in early 1972. In 1975, 
the SEFOR Consortium donated the SEFOR site to the University of 
Arkansas.
The question this book explores is: just exactly what did SEFOR 
prove? Since there was no runaway nuclear reaction, the experiment 
was a success, but just how controlled was the actual experiment? To 
further raise questions, remember that the fuel was plutonium, which 
causes radiation poisoning and persists for thousands of years. Also 
consider the amount present in the small SEFOR reactor. And finally, 
consider that fast reactors require a more concentrated form of nuclear 
fuel (approaching weapons grade) than the less concentrated fuels in 
today’s nuclear reactors used for electric power generation.
In the global warming concerns of today, one again hears that 
nuclear should be pushed to the forefront, and breeder reactors are the 
way to go. This book provides details of exactly what SEFOR accom-
plished and why those in positions of authority should very carefully 
consider exactly what we know about the safety of fast reactors.
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The authors were faculty at the University of Arkansas for a com-
bined total of more than eighty years of service. Both were actively 
involved in the process of obtaining the data on the creation and func-
tion of SEFOR in preparation for seeking federal funding in totally 
dismantling the site. Our first approach to federal funding was rebuffed 
because the federal government claimed no function in the creation of 
SEFOR. Thanks to many years of Arkansas legislators working for this 
goal, federal funding was finally obtained, and the site is now a green-
field available for general use.
It is of interest to note that the AEC was abolished in 1974 due to 
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There is an understandable drive on the part of men of good will 
to build up the positive aspects of nuclear energy simply because the 
negative aspects are so distressing.
Alvin M. Weinberg, 1915–2006
Until late 2018, the remains of the SEFOR reactor rested in a 114.5-feet-
high, 50-feet-diameter, steel cylinder intended as a final barrier to pre-
vent catastrophic release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere if 
the reactor inside were ever breached by explosion. The top half of the 
rusting containment vessel protruded from a hayfield in the rural Ozark 
Mountains nineteen miles south-southwest of Fayetteville, Arkansas, 
the home of the University of Arkansas.
SEFOR’s construction was completed in the late 1960s, and the 
research reactor was operated by the General Electric Company for the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for about three years. The authors, 
now retired professors at the university, were involved in one way or 
another with the reactor site for most of our careers. Our involvement 
enabled our access to the reactor’s history; we believe that history is 
unique in the development of the nuclear power generation industry.
SEFOR was closed in early 1972 following a multiyear reactor-
safety research program. The idle reactor site was deeded in 1975 to 
the university by the Southwest Atomic Energy Associates (SAEA), a 
consortium of electric power utility companies in the area. The SAEA’s 
promotional literature implied that completion of a large array of fast-
breeder reactors “burning” plutonium fuel would ensure production 
of electric power almost “too cheap to meter” and described SEFOR 
Introduction
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as “the most significant single reactor-safety experiment in the western 
world.” In recognition of the importance of the reactor-safety research 
completed at the site, the American Nuclear Society in 1986 designated 
SEFOR a Nuclear Historic Landmark. In the Mechanical Engineering 
Building at the university, which earlier housed its nuclear engineering 
program, a plaque read:
SEFOR
Resolved a key LMFBR safety issue by demonstrating the 
inherent negative prompt-Doppler power coefficient in mixed 
plutonium-uranium oxide fuel.
As this book went to press, forty-eight years after the reactor was 
closed and placed in temporary “SAFSTOR” condition, the Univer-
sity of Arkansas had received congressional authorization, backed by 
funding of approximately $28 million, to complete a decommissioning 
process that would return the site to “greenfield” condition. By late July 
2019, the reactor vessel had been removed from its containment, placed 
in a special protective vessel, and trucked to a Nevada disposal site.
But already by the time SEFOR commenced operation a poten-
tially serious nuclear explosion risk had been identified, and it appears 
now that the principal purpose for SEFOR was to demonstrate evidence 
of a theoretically predicted safety factor that could provide an answer 
for that concern. Up to this time (around 1960), commercial nuclear 
electric-power reactors, operating with fissile fuel concentrations of 
less than about 3%, had been accepted as having an inherent safety 
characteristic—there appeared to be no way the position of the fuel 
could be rearranged by accident that could cause a nuclear-bomb-like 
explosion. SEFOR, in contrast, required nearly a tenfold enrichment of 
its plutonium fuel, and such enrichment had been predicted to enable 
fission reaction rates that could result in nuclear explosions powerful 
enough to destroy the reactor-containment systems. Dealing with this 
potentially dire safety problem remains today a critically contentious 
proposition.
Almost half a century later, there are renewed calls for a fast- 
neutron fission reactor program for electric power generation; pro-
ponents claiming that fast-neutron reactors are the best solution 
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available to meet the country’s electric power energy needs while simul-
taneously reducing carbon dioxide additions (from burning fossil fuels) 
to the atmosphere. However, this book shows that very serious additional 
concerns remain about the hazards attending operation of fast- fission 
nuclear reactors, even now when we are not confident of our ability to 
“engineer” our current aging fleet of water-cooled (thermal) nuclear 
power reactors to provide satisfactory safety to the public in the event 
of “highly unlikely” events such as are history now (several times over).
We believe this book presents a convincing argument that the 
SEFOR sodium-cooled-enriched-plutonium reactor was an important 
step in the development of reactors driven by fast neutrons capable 
of reaching, in accident conditions, fission rates approaching nuclear 
bomb capability. While the nuclear explosions that became possible 
in such reactors would be extremely “inefficient” compared to a well-
designed bomb, their potential to catastrophically rupture any contain-
ment structure that could be economically provided could be so high as 
to be deemed completely unacceptable. Indeed, we do not take lightly 
our belief that such an explosion as could rupture its containment struc-
ture and release a large fraction of plutonium into the environment is 
a very real example of the “dirty (radioactive) bomb” fear that worries 
authorities so seriously.
SEFOR successfully demonstrated the inherent (Doppler) safety 
effect in a fast reactor using enriched plutonium-oxide fuel. The reac-
tor site was closed in early 1972, and the AEC stepped up research and 
development programs to support building a large fleet (roughly a thou-
sand were planned) of liquid-metal-cooled, plutonium-oxide-fueled, 
fast-breeder reactors (LMFBRs) to meet the energy needs of the country 
projected for the year 2000. But those plans received much less atten-
tion following the landmark decision in 1983 to abandon the Clinch 
River (Tennessee) Breeder Reactor (CRBR) Demonstration Plant. The 
reasons for the CRBR’s cancellation continue to be debated, but there 
is little doubt that the cancellation resulted at least partly from two 
developments: a less pessimistic outlook for fissile uranium availability 
and remaining questions of public safety associated with the heightened 
nuclear explosion risk. It seemed clear that the uncertainties in cost of 
ensuring public safety by building fast-reactor containment structures 
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sufficiently strong to confidently prevent catastrophic accidental releases 
of radioactive materials to the environment importantly worsened the 
economic outlook.
SEFOR was closed during the period when the LMFBR program 
had achieved highest priority with the AEC. But the sufficiency of the 
SEFOR-demonstrated Doppler effect to ensure prevention of runaway 
nuclear explosions in fast reactors was still being questioned by experts. 
The importance of such questions had been highlighted by accidents 
resulting in a partial meltdown in the EBR-I fast-breeder experimental 
reactor in 1955 and a partial meltdown/explosion in the SL-1 fast reac-
tor in 1961, both at the AEC’s National Reactor Test Station in Idaho, 
and in the partial meltdown in 1966 of the FERMI-1 fast-breeder dem-
onstration reactor constructed by Detroit Edison on Lake Erie about 
twenty miles from Detroit. The accidents at SL-1 and FERMI-1 have 
been described for the lay reader in the books Idaho Falls1 and We 
Almost Lost Detroit,2 respectively
Today, despite claims that SEFOR provided a “positive” answer to 
the nuclear-explosion-critical-safety question, it appears that the possi-
bility of an uncontrolled nuclear explosion that could fail any contain-
ment that could be practicably and economically provided still exists. 
At the same time, many experts contend that the consequences of even 
a very weak nuclear explosion in a large fast reactor sufficiently powerful 
to vaporize and release a substantial fraction of its fissile fuel along with 
the radioactive components of the spent fuel to the atmosphere would 
be so severe as to be deemed a completely unacceptable risk.
Much has been written about the AEC’s structuring of the nation’s 
nuclear weapons program and its connection with the nuclear power 
industry. Our interest was sharply piqued in such matters following the 
transfer of ownership of the SEFOR site to the University of Arkansas 
in 1975. By that time, SEFOR was becoming viewed as a potentially 
hazardous nuclear/chemical waste site, and the university learned that 
the federal government was not disposed to accept any responsibility 
for the government-required cleanup operations that were mandated. 
Then our research on the history of the SEFOR project produced, 
in Appendix G of Thomas Cochran’s The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder 
Reactor: An Environmental and Economic Critique,3 excerpts from testi-
mony in 1972 of Dr. Richard E. Webb before the Joint Committee on 
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Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress4 regarding the explosion poten-
tial of fast reactors. Dr. Webb received his PhD in nuclear engineer-
ing from Ohio State University in 1972 with his dissertation entitled 
“Some Autocatalytic Effects during Explosive Power Transients in Liq-
uid Metal Cooled Fast Breeder Nuclear Power Reactors (LMFBRs).”5 
Dr. Webb testified (in part) that “With one-half ton of Plutonium 
in the SEFOR reactor, it appears that the AEC simply took a chance 
with the public safety by purposely causing power excursions, which 
one tries normally to prevent in power reactors, to test a safety effect 
(Doppler feedback) that was not beforehand demonstrated in a fast-
reactor power excursion.”
This book focuses on Dr. Webb’s documented statements about 
SEFOR along with other material that he submitted to the AEC on the 
subject of “runaway” nuclear explosion risks attending the operation 
of fast reactors. We have also relied on Dr. Webb’s book The Accident 
Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants,6 published by the University of Mas-
sachusetts Press in 1976. It appears that the AEC failed to give serious 
consideration to Dr. Webb’s science-based advice to Congress’s Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy on the explosion potential attending 
operation of fast-breeder reactors.
Our research revealed the international significance of the safety 
experiments conducted quietly in the rural Ozark Mountains of north-
west Arkansas. The SEFOR research project resulted from international 
agreements, backed by financial assistance, among the United States, 
Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. A series of difficulties 
beset the project due to U.S. laws that prohibited the authorization of 
atomic projects in the United States that could be controlled or domi-
nated by a foreign power, and the details of resolution of such disputes 
clearly indicated the power that could be brought to bear to ensure 
continuation of the SEFOR project. SEFOR was highly important to 
the AEC and the representatives of government organizations then pro-
moting nuclear power in Europe, particularly Germany.
The AEC was abolished in 1974. The United States’ Clinch River 
Breeder Reactor (CRBR) was canceled, uncompleted, in 1983. Germany’s 
SNR-300 breeder reactor (Germany’s demonstration breeder reactor) 
was completed and fueled for operation in 1985. Never operated, the 
SNR-300 was officially canceled in 1991. Both the CRBR and the 
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SNR-300 received approvals for construction that were likely justified 
in part by the successful completion of the SEFOR program.
The strident debates ongoing today worldwide regarding our stew-
ardship of the planet, the threats of numerous “tipping points” being 
reached in that stewardship, and a tendency for economic interests to 
trump science-based recommendations for managing such stewardship 
suggest that the United States faces problems of our own making that 
exceed any we have faced previously. These problems, ranging from 
global warming concerns to ineffective management of the catastrophic 
risks of intentional or accidental explosions of nuclear weapons and 
the effectively out-of-control nuclear waste products that have resulted 
(for which there appear to be few if any effective management options 
in sight), are of such magnitude that a much more effective manner 
of addressing them is required; otherwise we face extremely severe 
consequences.
In consideration of industry claims for greater safety of the pro-
posed new fast-reactor fleet, this book was planned to provide a history 
of the remarkable decision in the 1960s to site a fast-neutron reactor 
fueled with nearly a half-ton of plutonium in the rural Ozark Moun-
tains for the stated purpose of demonstrating a theoretically predicted 
“inherent safety” feature that would prevent a potentially containment-
failing nuclear explosion in the reactor resulting from accident or natu-
ral disaster. Despite their acknowledged importance, it appears that the 
results of the SEFOR experiments did not then, and do not now, carry 
the message of guaranteed safety that the public was left to believe. 
There is still no consensus among scientific experts regarding the poten-
tial for a nuclear explosion in a fast-neutron reactor that could overcome 
the containment systems designed to prevent a catastrophic release of 
radioactive materials to the environment; but there is no doubt that 
even a very “inefficient” one could be disastrous.
The information becoming available about the Fukushima multiple-
reactor meltdowns, the releases of radioactivity that occurred, and the 
fearsome potential for even more catastrophic releases to occur from the 
terribly damaged plants in Chernobyl and Fukushima are sobering. But 
while many scientists and engineers remain concerned that the threat of 
future disasters involving the aging thermal (slow) neutron fleet is very 
real and growing, it is becoming clear that adoption of a fast-neutron 
Introduction | 7
reactor power program, which portends risks of nuclear explosions that 
are largely obviated in thermal reactors, is a step that must not be taken 
before subjection to rigorous and transparent science-based evalua-
tion. Society’s reliance on a new class of fast-neutron reactors requires 
the most careful and sober consideration of the risks of catastrophic 
releases of highly radioactive materials—no degree of wishful thinking 
is acceptable.
The Department of Energy’s predecessor, the AEC, was a principal 
driver in siting and operating SEFOR, providing more than half a ton 
of plutonium fuel for the SEFOR experiments. That much plutonium, 
sufficient in quantity for more than a hundred nuclear fission weapons 
with nominal 15 to 20 kiloton explosive yields (Hiroshima/Nagasaki), 
had never been placed in a reactor anywhere in the free world, much 
less on public land in a rural setting with nil security. As the risks to the 
public attending the use of that much plutonium in a reactor so sited 
would appear now to be so controversial as to be completely unaccept-
able, a history of SEFOR that describes the uncertainties accepted and 
the risks taken fifty years ago is timely.
The five-decades-old tale of the SEFOR reactor “inherent safety 
experiment,” now almost forgotten by the local population as well 
as the twenty-eight-thousand-plus University of Arkansas student 
body, contains a prescient warning. The rapidity with which we have 
advanced our understanding of nature in the past century has acceler-
ated dramatically since SEFOR was closed. There is great danger that 
such exponential growth in scientific information has surpassed the 
ability of the public to be able to understand it meaningfully enough 
to participate in our democratic governmental process. There are now 
many ways that we can destroy ourselves and our world if we continue 
to ignore the limits to which nature can be pushed sustainably. The 
principal purpose of this book came down to an attempt to simplify 
the known scientific information about the SEFOR experiments and 
fast-reactor hazards that should be understood by the public. The clear 
coupling between nuclear power and global warming/climate change, 
both scientific issues challenging the limits to which the public has 
information at hand to participate effectively in the governmental 
decision process, provides compelling reasons to pause for careful 
evaluation.
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Note to Readers
A primary goal of this book began as an appeal to three very different groups of 
people to think critically about a major risk to which they are considering a com-
mitment. That commitment is the adoption of fast nuclear reactor technology 
for generating electric power—buttressed with the argument that the “nuclear” 
approach is the best means of addressing the climate change threat of increasing 
carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere. The groups of people are (a) experts, 
(b) students, and (c) the general public. We suspect it’s unlikely that those pro-
fessing expertise in fast-neutron nuclear electric power generation as well as cli-
mate change will all be convinced by the arguments presented, but we are hope-
ful of their careful consideration. While the public, if only due to their number, 
will ultimately decide these questions if democratic choices prevail, a special 
obligation was felt to address the university student population. It appears that 
students of all ages have insufficient knowledge to decide such issues on their 
own, or perhaps more importantly, to meaningfully influence the general pub-
lic in that regard. We received a barrage of warnings that we had little chance 
of reaching all three such disparate groups—the concern was that some of the 
material presented was simply too technical for all but those expert in nuclear 
science. We have tried to present a reasonably clear picture of the risks attending 
the use of fast-neutron reactors for electric power generation with a minimum of 
nuclear science theory. Where this was simply not practical, we have collected 
the required “technical” material largely in chapter 5. For those mathematically 
less inclined and hoping primarily to equip themselves with important infor-
mation to help decide the issue of risk attending fast-neutron fission generation 
of electrical power, the heavy sledding involved in chapter 5, although critically 
important to the expert community, is not absolutely required. But please, if 
you do skip chapter 5, do not miss the facts presented therein for the record by 
Dr. Richard Webb to the AEC regarding the risks taken in the SEFOR experi-
ments. We believe Webb’s admonitions to the AEC about the risks associated 
with LMFBR operations were never nearly sufficiently considered. We hope 
that the information presented here, some of which is not easy to obtain from 
the popular literature, has been reduced to a level simple and straightforward 
enough to be appreciated by all three groups and that all will find it useful.
Notes
1. William McKeown Idaho Falls: The Untold Story of America’s First Nuclear 
Accident, ECW Press, 2003.
2. John G. Fuller, We Almost Lost Detroit, Reader’s Digest Press, 1975.
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3. Thomas B. Cochran, The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: An Environmental 
and Economic Critique, Resources for the Future, distributed by Johns Hopkins Press.
4. “Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) Demonstration Plant,” Hear-
ings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress, 92 Congress 
(Sept. 7, 8, 12, 1972), pp, 179–187.
5. Richard E. Webb, “Some Autocatalytic Effects during Explosive Power Tran-
sients in Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast Breeder Nuclear Power Reactors (LMFBRs)” 
(PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1971).
6. Richard E. Webb, The Accident Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1976.
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After almost two years of preparatory experiments, the General Elec-
tric Company was confident that the theory underlying the reactor’s 
design was correct and the experiments beginning in December would 
demonstrate that SEFOR, fueled with plutonium oxide instead of pure 
metallic plutonium used in some fast reactors (and in atomic bombs), 
would respond to a planned /intentional upset (reactivity increase) con-
dition with a sufficient time lag that would allow the reactor’s energy 
output to be slowed and stopped without suffering an explosion that 
could endanger the reactor’s containment structure.
The demonstration of the “inherent Doppler safety” effect in a fast 
plutonium-oxide-fuel reactor that was super-prompt-critical (chain-
fission-reacting at nuclear bomb rates) was the principal purpose of 
SEFOR’s construction and operation. The company’s reactor designers 
appear to have planned carefully. In addition to their confidence that 
the Doppler-theory-predicted time lag would be observed, the experi-
ment was designed so that even if the anticipated (Doppler) time lag 
were not of the magnitude anticipated by theory predictions, the poten-
tial for the reaction to heat the fuel sufficiently to melt in amounts 
sufficient to cause severe explosion damage was not thought to be there 
anyway, obviating an explosion that could not be contained.
It was extremely important to be sure that no detail had been 
overlooked. The reactor fuel comprised approximately 900 pounds 
of plutonium, a quantity sufficient in purified form to build approxi-
mately one hundred atomic bombs each with the explosive power of 
the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ending World War II. 
More importantly to Arkansas and the adjacent states of Oklahoma, 
Kansas, and Missouri, if it were possible for an explosion to vaporize a 
substantial amount of the plutonium in the reactor, and that plutonium 
c h a p t e r 
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escaped the containment into the atmosphere in the form of an aerosol, 
the surroundings extending to distances of many miles could be cata-
strophically affected, even forcibly abandoned.
Six experiments were completed during the coming week; in each 
succeeding experiment, an increased amount of positive reactivity was 
introduced into the reactor’s core. The amount of reactivity inserted 
increased from amounts sufficient to produce sub-prompt criticality to, 
and slightly beyond. the amount that enabled super-prompt-criticality, 
the condition required to achieve reaction speeds with nuclear bomb 
explosion potential.
The experiments appear to have been planned to introduce in 
each successive experiment an additional amount of reactivity that was 
sufficiently small to be canceled by the predicted Doppler effect, thus 
preventing the melting temperature of the plutonium-oxide fuel from 
being reached.
The ramp reactivity insertion in each of the six experiments was 
intentionally short-lived, intended to be limited to 0.1-second duration. 
Following the reactivity insertion, each experiment was terminated 
with a time-delayed negative-reactivity insertion (reactor SCRAM) 
initiated approximately 0.35 seconds after the transient reactivity inser-
tion. The SCRAM delay time following the reactivity insertion was 
planned to allow time for the demonstration of the Doppler effect to 
cause the extremely rapidly rising reactor power rate to be halted and 
proceed downward to a level where the reactor could be SCRAMMED.
The entire “business” of each of the six final experiments of the 
program, including the super-prompt-critical experiments, was thus 
completed in less than one second. In the last test, No. 6, the reactor 
was steady at about 8 million watts (thermal power) when the reactivity 
insertion was made. During the 0.1-second-duration reactivity inser-
tion, the reactor power rose to almost 10 billion watts (more than a 
thousand-fold increase) before descending rapidly to about 200 million 
watts by the time the SCRAM (chain reaction stoppage) was actuated.
If, in Test No. 6, the increase in SEFOR’s power level caused by the 
positive reactivity insertion had not hesitated as predicted by the Dop-
pler effect; if the reactivity insertion had been accidentally maintained 
longer than the planned 0.1-second duration; and if the SCRAM pro-
cedure had accidentally failed—there was the real possibility that the 
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power level might have increased to levels with the potential to rupture 
the containment. If that were to occur, there was the potential for some 
considerable fraction of the 900 pounds of plutonium to be released in 
aerosol form into the atmosphere.
There was no explosion, and the data obtained from the six experi-
ments that week in December 1971 were considered a demonstration 
that the Doppler effect could provide an important safety margin for 
fast-breeder reactors using plutonium-oxide fuel. Within a month, 
the reactor was closed and placed in SAFSTOR condition (partially 
decommissioned).
In the concluding chapters, this book considers the “What if” ques-
tions posed two paragraphs above. We believe the book provides evi-
dence that the Doppler effect demonstrated by the reactor’s plutonium-
oxide fuel might have been overridden by autocatalytic effects following 
fuel melting if the accidental events postulated above occurred in com-
bination during the prompt-critical transient tests concluding with Test 
No. 6 in December 1971.
We provide documented evidence in chapter 6 that SEFOR suf-
fered a partial SCRAM failure during an experiment in 1970. That 
SCRAM system failure probably did not seriously endanger the reactor, 
due to the smaller amount of positive reactivity that had been inserted 
into the reactor core in that experiment.
We believe that the SEFOR test program provides reasons to seri-
ously consider what might have happened if an identical partial SCRAM 
(as occurred in 1970) had occurred in any of the prompt- critical tran-
sient tests that concluded with Test No. 6 in December 1971.
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c h a p t e r 
3 Nuclear Fission Bombs and Reactors
Nuclear Energy
In the molecules of substances the atoms are held together by electric 
forces, and the potential energy stored by these forces is known as 
chemical energy . . . it can be helpful to imagine that an atom consists 
of a very compact kernel, called the nucleus, which is surrounded by 
shells of electrons. The nucleus contains particles called neutrons, 
which are not electrified, and others called protons which carry posi-
tive electricity. Neutrons and protons are roughly equal in weight 
and are nearly 2000 times heavier than electrons. The whole atom is 
tiny; so tiny than an ordinary person can hardly imagine that it has 
any size at all. A sheet of paper is about a million atoms thick. The 
nucleus is very much smaller: it would take about 100,000 nuclei 
to stretch across one atom. . . . The forces between the protons and 
neutrons inside an atomic nucleus are millions of times stronger than 
those between the atoms in a molecule. And so the potential energy 
due to nuclear forces is very much greater than that due to chemical 
forces. When one pound of carbon burns it produces 14,500 BTU of 
heat energy, but its nuclear energy is 39 million million BTU. This 
vast store of energy in a pound of carbon corresponds to about ten 
thousand million KWH of electrical energy, which is roughly equal to 
the entire output of a very large power station in a year.
F. J. M. Laver, 19621
Nuclear Bombs
The object of the project is to produce a practical military weapon in the 
form of a bomb in which the energy is released by a fast neutron chain 
reaction in one or more of the materials known to show nuclear fission.
Robert Serber, 19432
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Thermal (Slowed) Neutron Fission Reactor
Average Neutron Speed ~2,000 meters/second (~4,500 miles/hour)
Fast Neutron Fission Reactor
Average Neutron Speed ~20 million meters/second (~45 million miles/
hour)
A Nuclear Fission Primer
The principal purpose of the SEFOR experiments was to provide 
data that would demonstrate a theory-predicted nuclear reaction effect 
that could be important for a fast-neutron reactor’s safe control and 
 shutdown—even under accident conditions. SEFOR did demon-
strate the inherent capacity of its plutonium-oxide fuel arrangement to 
decrease, due to the Doppler effect, the severity of a potential runaway 
nuclear power excursion (explosion). However, it does not appear to 
have been the end-all answer to the nuclear explosion hazard that was 
implied in the public announcements of the experiments.
A satisfactory answer to the question of whether an accidental 
nuclear explosion could occur in a fast-neutron fission reactor that could 
release enough energy to fail the containment depends on two primary 
factors: the explosion magnitude that is possible, and the explosion 
magnitude required to fail the containment. To consider the question of 
the explosion magnitude that is possible, either at an experimental reac-
tor similar to SEFOR or in a larger commercial fast reactor that might 
be proposed for electric utility service, we must provide the reader with 
an understanding of certain nuclear reaction facts.
Atoms
The idea that all forms of matter are different arrangements of point-like 
particles separated by space was proposed centuries ago by the Greeks, 
but evidence for such an understanding of the nature of things only 
gained scientific acceptance about a hundred years ago. Most important 
to the arguments in this book, we now know that all mass, whether gas, 
liquid, or solid form, is composed of such “particles.” All such particles, 
which the Greeks called “atoms” (meaning indivisible), are extremely 
small, very sparsely separated in space, and in constant motion.
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Einstein provided the scientific argument for the existence of atoms 
in 1905 by explaining the rapid motion of plant-pollen particles sus-
pended in water and observed with a microscope in 1827 by Robert 
Brown. Einstein showed that the motion of the suspended (pollen) par-
ticles, called Brownian motion, was the result of extremely large num-
bers of collisions of (atomic) “particles” of liquid water with the much 
larger suspended pollen particles. We now know that the “particles” of 
water were actually molecules—each consisting of two hydrogen atoms 
combined with one oxygen atom.
Structure of Atoms
By about 1900 (consider how recently!), we had learned that all matter is 
composed of approximately 100 different atoms, called the “elements,” 
displayed to all chemistry students in the periodic table. And we soon 
learned that all of the elements are different combinations of just three 
“elementary” particles:
• Electrons—negatively charged particles with a mass of 9.11 × 10−31 kg, 
discovered in 1897
• Protons—positively charged particles with a mass of 1.675 × 10−27 kg, 
discovered in 1920
• Neutrons—neutrally charged particles with a mass of 1.673 × 10−27 kg, 
discovered in 1932
Atoms are differentiated by the number of protons they contain. 
The number of electrons is normally equal to the number of protons, 
so that the atom is neutrally charged; the balance of 
the atom’s mass is comprised of neutrons. This men-
tal picture of the atom is referred to as the planetary 
model; although now considered to be unrealistic, it 
will aid our “visualization.” We know that the size of 
the nucleus, which is a very densely compacted col-
lection of protons and neutrons at the center, is an extremely small frac-
tion of the size of the atom (picture a “cloud” of electrons with an outer 
boundary defining the size of the atom). The diameter of the nucleus 
(of any atom) is about 100,000 times smaller than the atom’s diameter. 
Consequently, any atom is mostly space. We turn our attention now to 
nuclear explosions.
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Explosion in (or of) a material is defined as the disassembly (fly-
ing apart) of the material that results from very rapid expansion due to 
increase in temperature (heating) and pressure. Chemical reaction explo-
sions are the result of rearrangement of the electrons of the atoms. The 
nuclei of atoms are not affected in such reactions. This picture is simpli-
fied, but it aids us in focusing on reactions that result in changes in the 
nucleus, specifically the nuclear fission chain reaction. The discovery of 
this type of reaction started the world down the path of investigating 
the potential for making “super” bombs with thousands of times the 
damage potential of bombs based on chemical reactions. A parallel path 
of investigation soon appeared in which the goal was to control the rate 
of nuclear fission reactions to allow the potential release rates of energy 
to be harnessed for “peaceful” purposes, such as to generate electricity. 
So began the eventual path to SEFOR.
Nuclear Fission
The nuclear fission reaction was discovered in the laboratory in late 
1938 in Germany by Hahn and Strassmann. They were studying ura-
nium to understand what happened if neutrons collided with uranium 
nuclei. The experimental results indicated that some of the nuclei of 
uranium atoms were somehow splitting (later called fissioning) and 
forming two new elements that Hahn and Strassmann identified as 
barium and krypton. This contradicted their expectation that the strik-
ing of the uranium atoms by neutrons would either result in the absorp-
tion of the neutron or “chip off” small parts of the atoms, changing the 
makeup of the uranium only slightly. Instead, they were observing the 
uranium atoms to be splitting into roughly equal parts! Before the year 
1939 ended, scientists around the world agreed that the reaction Hahn 
and Strassmann had observed was explained by the following formula:
1 uranium atom + 1 neutron = 1 barium atom  + 1 krypton atom  
+ 2 neutrons
It was soon learned that the atoms formed in a uranium fission 
event would not always be the same; many other pairs of elements 
than barium and krypton can result. In fact, a large number of fission 
products are produced, many of which are dangerously radioactive. We 
know that production by a bomb of such radioactive products results 
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in a severe hazard to life that unavoidably accompanies the destructive 
blast and heat effects of the bomb. We know as well that nuclear reac-
tors produce copious amounts of highly radioactive products as the fuel 
fissions. The primary hazard considered in this book is the potential 
for a relatively minor (compared to a bomb) nuclear explosion in a fast 
reactor that could completely fail the containment and release large 
amounts of radioactive aerosolized fission products and fuel compo-
nents (principally uranium and/or plutonium) into the environment.
Scientists soon realized that the combined masses of the fission-
product atoms formed is slightly less than the mass of the “parent” 
uranium atom, and the “missing” mass is converted to energy via Ein-
stein’s famous equation, E = mc2. This knowledge continues to haunt the 
world. The nuclear fission reaction results in the conversion of this “lost 
mass” to kinetic energy (speed) of the products of the reaction—the fis-
sion products and the neutrons. The realization quickly followed that 
if a uranium nucleus were fissioned by a single neutron, and the fission 
reaction produced two (or more) new neutrons, a “chain reaction” could 
occur with an exponentially increasing rate (doubling the reaction rate 
at each step). The time step for the doubling would be related directly 
to the speed of the neutrons producing the chain  reaction—the faster 
the neutrons, the shorter the doubling time (the faster the reaction 
rate), and the more powerful the explosion. SEFOR was a fast-neutron 
reactor.
The idea of a fast-neutron fission chain reaction is not complicated. 
Assume that each fission generates exactly two neutrons, each of which 
can cause a subsequent fission that generates two more neutrons. The 
number of neutrons produced at each chain reaction step then increases 
as two raised to the step number N, or 2N. Scientists quickly realized 
that a chain reaction completing eighty such nuclear reaction steps could 
occur in less than 1 microsecond (1 millionth of a second) and could lib-
erate (explosion) energy equivalent to approximately 20,000 tons of TNT 
(trinitrotoluene, a chemical explosive). The number of neutrons formed 
in eighty such steps can be calculated with your iPhone: 21 = 2  22 = 4 
23 = 8  24 = 16  … 280 = 1,208,925,819,614,600,000,000,000.
Eighty such steps of nuclear chain reaction would require fission-
ing of only about 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds) of uranium, or a sphere 
with diameter about 3 inches (baseball size). The largest bomb in the 
20 | Thin Safety Margin
arsenals of any nation at that time, their size limited usually by the car-
rying capacity of the largest military aircraft available, had an explosive 
yield equivalent to about 6.5 tons (more than 3,000 times smaller) of 
TNT. The race was on to build an atomic bomb.
It has been almost three-quarters of a century since that race began. 
In many ways, the race to develop controlled nuclear reactors for “peace-
ful” purposes began at the same time. But those seventy-five years seem 
in the dim past to the students who are studying at the University of 
Arkansas today; most of them were born fifty years after the discovery 
of fission and twenty years after SEFOR had closed. Although most of 
the students today have “heard of” nuclear reactions, they appear for 
the most part ignorant of the scientific knowledge required to decide 
whom to believe on questions as basic as how to maintain the nuclear 
weapons arsenal in “safe” condition or how to “safely” utilize nuclear 
power reactors to generate electricity. Both of these questions are at the 
top of the list in importance to our society today. To begin meaning-
ful consideration of the relevance and importance of the results of the 
SEFOR experiments, we require an understanding of the basic science 
differentiating nuclear fission reaction rates that occur in bombs and in 
nuclear power reactors.
Nuclear Fission Bombs
To provide a brief introduction to the physics of nuclear fission bombs 
we defer to Robert Serber’s The Los Alamos Primer.3 The primer contains 
the lecture notes prepared for presentation to the Manhattan Project sci-
entific staff assembled at Los Alamos with the mission to build a nuclear 
fission bomb that could be delivered to its target by military aircraft. 
The lecture notes, later published as The Los Alamos Primer, were written 
in April 1943 and classified top secret until released to the public in 1965.
In twenty-one succinct parenthetical statements, the primer spells 
out what we need to know about fission bombs to begin our consider-
ation of the relevance of the SEFOR experiments to the question of the 
nuclear explosion potential attending operation of fast-neutron reac-
tors. The following numbered statements are direct (partial) quotes 
excerpted from the primer. As some of the statements of the primer 
are not required for our purposes, and as our goal here is to reduce 
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the information presented to the minimum required to quantify the 
potential for explosive energy release in fast reactors, we have empha-
sized selected statements, some of which are abbreviated. The quota-
tions presented below (with brief explanatory remarks following) are 
the most important for our purposes. The titles of the remaining state-
ments are included so that the heading numbers correspond directly to 
the twenty-one numbered statements in the primer.
1. The Object
The object of the project is to produce a practical military 
weapon in the form of a bomb in which the energy is released 
by a fast neutron chain reaction in one or more of the materials 
known to show nuclear fission. 
The focus is on the fissile (capable of being fissioned) materials U235 
(uranium isotope 235) and Pu239 (plutonium isotope 239). The scien-
tists at Los Alamos in the spring of 1943 anticipated that realization of 
a practical bomb would require fast-neutron reactions. SEFOR was a 
fast-neutron reactor fueled with plutonium.
2. Energy of Fission Process
The direct energy release in the fission process is of the order 
of 170 million electron-volts (MEV) per atom. This is consid-
erably more than 107 times the heat of reaction per atom in 
ordinary combustion (chemical burning) processes. . . . 1 kg of 
25 (fished) is equivalent to about 20,000 tons of TNT.
The physicists at Los Alamos had code expressions for key words 
and phrases: “fissioned” became “fished,” 25 stands for U235, 28 for 
U238, and 49 for Pu239. 10
7 is ten million. The final sentence changed 
forever the prospects of military conflict; nuclear fission weapons would 
be thousands of times more powerful on a weight-for-weight basis than 
chemical-based bombs.
Release of this energy in a large-scale way is a possibility 
because of the fact that in each fission process, which requires 
a neutron to produce it, two neutrons are released. Consider 
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a very great mass of active material, so great that no neutrons 
are lost through the surface, and assume the material so pure 
that no neutrons are lost in other ways than by fission. One 
neutron released in the mass would become 2 after the first 
fission, each of these would produce 2 after they each had 
produced fission so in the nth generation of neutrons there 
would be 2n neutrons available. Since in 1 kg of 25 there are 
5*1025 nuclei, it would require about n = 80 generations to fish 
the whole kilogram.
The original primer notes gave the number of nuclei in 1 kg of U235 
as 5*1025. Serber changed this number when the primer was published 
to the correct value—2.58*1024. 2.58*1024 (2,580,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000) is 2.58 million million million million, a number so large as 
to be difficult to provide meaningful illustration. This point is key to 
our discussion; the rapid fissioning of 1 kg of U235, which is 2.58*10
24 
atoms, would cause an explosion with an energy release equivalent to 
about 20,000 tons of TNT. It follows directly that if the fissioning 
process is limited to smaller fractions of 1 kg, the energy release would 
be proportionally smaller:





 .01  2
  .0025 (1/4 of 1/100 of 1%) 0.5 (1,000 pounds TNT)
The estimated maximum nuclear explosion that could be economi-
cally/practically contained for a commercial-size (electric) fast-breeder 
reactor at the time the Clinch River Demonstration Plant was being 
considered was equivalent to about 1,000 pounds of TNT. It follows 
that a fast-neutron fission chain reaction of U235 of ¼ of 1/100 of 1% of 
1 kilogram of U235 (0.025 grams) would release approximately the same 
amount of energy as the maximum explosion energy yield that could 
be realistically (economically) contained.
While this is going on the energy release is making the mate-
rial very hot, developing great pressure and hence tending to 
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cause an explosion. In an actual finite setup, some neutrons are 
lost by diffusion out through the surface. There will be there-
fore a certain size of say a sphere for which the surface losses 
of neutrons are just sufficient to stop the chain reaction. This 
radius depends on the density. As the reaction proceeds the 
material tends to expand, increasing the required size faster 
than the actual size increases. The whole question of whether 
an effective explosion is made depends on whether the reaction is 
stopped by this tendency before an appreciable fraction of the active 
material has fished. (emphasis added)
We have previously defined explosion as the disassembly of the mate-
rial that results from very rapid expansion due to increase in temperature 
and pressure. The rapid release of energy (as heat) of the fission chain 
reaction causes the temperature and pressure to rise rapidly (measured in 
millionths of a second). The material expands correspondingly rapidly, 
but precise prediction of the rate of expansion is difficult and uncer-
tain. As the material expands, the density decreases (more space between 
atoms), and the number of neutrons escaping through the expanding 
surface increases. If the loss of neutrons by escape through the surface 
grows too large, the nuclear fission reaction stops. So, an effective explo-
sion requires (1) assembly of a fissile material in an amount sufficient to 
sustain a chain reaction and (2) holding it together for a period sufficient 
to cause the desired number of fission chain reaction steps to occur (here 
illustrated as eighty) before the expansion shuts down the process.
Note that the energy released per fission is large compared to 
the total binding energy of the electrons in any atom. In conse-
quence, even if but ½% of the available energy is released . . . 
the temperature is raised to the order of 40*106 degrees. . . . 
Expansion of a few centimeters will stop the reaction, so the 
whole reaction must occur in about 5*10-8 sec, otherwise the 
material will have blown out enough to stop it. Now the speed 
of a 1 MEV neutron is about 1.4*109 cm/sec and the mean free 
path between fissions is about 13 cm so the mean time between 
fissions is about 10-8sec. (emphasis added)
If only one-half of 1% of the energy is released, the tempera-
ture of the material rises to about 40 million degrees (centigrade), a 
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temperature more than sufficient to turn any material known to gas. 
The speed of a 1 MEV neutron is about 1.4 billion cm/s (14 million 
m/s) or about 4.7% of the speed of light. These neutron speeds, coupled 
with the distance traveled between fissions, indicates a measure of the 
average time between fissions. It is about 1/100th of a microsecond, or 
1/100 millionth of a second. Neutron speeds of this magnitude are also 
possible in fast reactors, whereas neutron speeds are about a thousand 
times slower in thermal (moderated) reactors. This is another key point.
Since only the last few generations will release enough energy 
to produce much expansion, it is just possible for the reactions 
to occur to an interesting extent before it is stopped by the 
spreading of the active material.
Crucial points are coming fast now. The material must be held 
together (continually squeezed) for a sufficiently long period (extremely 
small fraction of a second) for the chain reaction to release sufficient 
energy to cause the desired damaging effect of the bomb. Serber’s 
phrase “interesting extent” refers to the expected damage potential 
(20,000 tons TNT equivalent). Holding the material together long 
enough to get the desired energy release was a major challenge facing 
the bomb designers. This point is also relevant to fast-reactor explosion 
hazards, because even though the balance between the rate of energy 
liberation (by fission) and the “shutting down” of that energy release 
by expansion is expected to result in much less explosion damage than 
could occur in a nuclear weapon, the question becomes one of whether 
the amount of energy yield that would be possible during credible acci-
dent conditions could exceed the explosion confinement capability. As we 
mentioned, we will see that economic limits are reached for confine-
ment of about 1,000 pounds TNT equivalent yield. Thus, even a very 
inefficient explosion yield (from as little as 1/400 of 1% of 1 kilogram, or 
0.025 gram) of fissile material could exceed the economic limit for contain-
ment construction.
3. Fission Cross Section
The materials in question are U235, U238, and Pu239 and some 
others of lesser interest. Ordinary uranium as it occurs in 
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nature contains about 1/140 of 25, the rest being 28 except for a 
very small amount of 24. . . . We see that 25 has a cross-section 
of about 2.5*10-24 cm2 for neutron energies exceeding 0.5 MEV 
and rises to much higher values at low neutron energies. For 
28, however, a threshold energy of 1 MEV occurs below which 
the cross-section is effectively zero. Above the threshold the 
cross section of 28 is fairly constant and equal to 0.7*10-24cm2.
Serber is focusing on the uranium isotopes—we will return to plu-
tonium later. The cross sections can be thought of as measures of the size 
of the nucleus of a fissile atom, and the size as a measure of the prob-
ability that a collision will occur between that nucleus and a neutron 
passing through the atom (mostly space)—the “bigger” the nucleus of 
the fissile atom, the more probable that a collision resulting in fission 
will occur. It was learned soon after fission was discovered that the cross 
section of U235 (a measure of the probability of collision with a neu-
tron) is approximately 2.5*10-24 cm2 for neutrons with energies above 
0.5 MEV (speed approximately 7 million m/s), but it increases greatly 
at slower neutron speeds. However, the cross section of U238, which 
comprises about 99.3% of natural uranium, is about 0.7*10-24 cm2 for 
high neutron speeds and is effectively zero for low neutron speeds. The 
result is that significant amounts of energy release by chain reaction of 
U235 in (natural) uranium fuel (0.7% U235 and 99.3% U238) can only 
occur if the neutrons produced by fission are slowed to speeds of about 
2000–4000 m/s (so-called thermal neutrons). At such neutron speeds, 
very little fissioning of U238 occurs. This is a critical point in our dis-
cussion. This fact provides the basis for the oft-repeated statement that 
“nuclear reactors cannot explode like a nuclear bomb.” Reactors fueled 
with natural uranium cannot be made to provide fission reaction rates 
suitable for electrical power generation unless the neutrons produced by 
fission (and continuing the chain reaction) are slowed to the so-called 
thermal level. The italicized statement does not apply to reactors that have 
significantly enriched fissile content, like SEFOR.
4. Neutron Spectrum
In Fig. 2 (not included) is shown the energy distribution of 
the neutrons released in the fission process. The mean energy 
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is about 2 MEV, but an appreciable fraction of the neutrons 
released have less than 1 MEV energy and so are unable to 
produce fission in 28.
The important point here is that neutrons with energy less than 1 
MEV produce very few fissions of U238, but slow neutrons, on the other 
hand, readily fission U235 (and very importantly, we will see that slow 
neutrons even more readily fission Pu239).
5. Neutron Number
The average number of neutrons produced per fission is 
denoted by ν. It is not known whether ν has the same value for 
fission processes in different materials, induced by fast or slow 
neutrons or occurring spontaneously. The best value at present 
is ν = 2.2+/–0.2 although a value ν = 3 has been reported for 
spontaneous fission.
More is now known about the neutron number for uranium and 
plutonium. It is greater than 2 for both, and it is greater for plutonium 
than uranium. Our use of a value of 2 for purposes of estimating fis-
sion reaction rates is too low, but will serve our purposes of illustration 
here.
6. Neutron Capture
When neutrons are in uranium they are also caused to disap-
pear by another process represented by the equation 28 + n = 
29 + X. The resulting element 29 undergoes two successive beta 
transformations into elements 39 and 49. The occurrence of this 
process in 28 acts to consume neutrons and works against the 
possibility of a fast neutron fission chain reaction in material 
containing 28. It is this series of reactions, occurring in a slow 
neutron fission pile, which is the basis of a project for large scale 
production of element 49.
Another critical point. Plutonium (element 49) is formed in nuclear 
reactors by this reaction. Plutonium can be made most expeditiously 
in fast-neutron reactors—under some circumstances sufficiently fast 
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to produce more fissionable (plutonium) fuel than was used from the 
beginning of the reaction. Such a process, called “breeding,” became a 
primary goal of the reactor designer, since it would allow the uranium 
238 isotope to be converted to plutonium, thus offering the possibility 
of extending available energy of uranium found in the earth by perhaps 
a factor of a thousand, stretching the available fissionable fuel supplies 
from a few decades to several centuries.
7. Why Ordinary U Is Safe
Ordinary U (meaning as-mined), containing only 1/140 of 25, 
is safe against a fast neutron chain because, (a) only 3/4 of the 
neutrons from a fission have energies above the threshold of 28, 
(b) only ¼ of the neutrons escape being slowed below 1 MEV, 
the 28 threshold before they make a fission. So the effective 
neutron multiplication number in 28 is ν = ¾ x + ¼ x + 2.2 
= 0.4. Evidently a value greater than 1 is needed for a chain 
reaction. Hence a contribution of at least 0.6 is needed from 
the fissionability of the 25 constituent. One can estimate that 
the fraction of 25 must be increased at least 10-fold to make an 
explosive reaction possible.
This paragraph further explains the “impossibility” of a reac-
tor fueled with natural uranium (1/140 isotope 235, the balance 238) 
exploding like a bomb. The last sentence is particularly important to 
us; it states that the fraction of the 235 isotope in (uranium) fuel must 
be increased at least tenfold to make a violent explosive reaction pos-
sible. We will see that fast reactors fueled with uranium or plutonium 
are typically enriched to about 20% fissile material, whereas a tenfold 
enrichment of natural uranium would give a fissile concentration of 
about only about 7%. The result is that the fuel enrichment required in 
fast reactors decidedly changes the safety picture; fuel enriched to the 20% 
level definitely has the potential for a violent nuclear explosive reaction.
8. Material 49
As mentioned above, this material is prepared from the neutron 
capture reaction in 28. So far only microgram quantities have 
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been produced, so bulk physical properties of this element are 
not known. Also its ν value has not been measured. Its cross 
section has been measured and found to be about twice that 
of 25 over the whole energy range. It is strongly alpha-radioac-
tive with a half-life of about 20,000 years. Since there is every 
reason to expect its ν to be close to that for U and since it is 
fissionable with slow neutrons, it is expected to be suitable for 
our problem and another project is going forward with plans 
to produce it for us in kilogram quantities. Further study of all 
its properties has an important place in our program as rapidly 
as suitable quantities become available.
We can update this statement for the plutonium isotope 239 (Mate-
rial 49). In addition to the knowledge that the cross section (reflecting 
the probability of fission of a given plutonium nucleus by a neutron) is 
about twice as great as U235 over the entire neutron energy (speed) range, 
the currently accepted value of ν is closer to 3, indicating a faster expo-
nential chain reaction rate. We will return later to the subject of radio-
activity when we attempt to understand the potential consequences of 
fast-neutron reactor accidents that could breach the containment and 
release the highly radioactive fission products produced by operation 
of the reactor as well as the highly radioactive plutonium remaining in 
the reactor to the environment. We note here that plutonium is widely 
considered one of the most toxic materials known. Serber stated that 
the half-life of Pu239 is about 20,000 years. Today the accepted value is 
known to be closer to 25,000 years.
9. Simplest Estimate of Minimum Size of Bomb
We will skip most of the technical details of this section, as it is not 
necessary for us to follow the important arguments presented here. 
We focus on the determination of the minimum size that would allow 
neutrons to “leak” through the surface sufficiently rapidly that the 
initial concentration of neutrons would die out rather than build up 
(stopping the chain reaction). Serber gives two estimates of the mini-
mum size, assuming the bomb material to be pure U235 in the form of 
a sphere. This size (measured as its diameter) is called the critical size, 
and its amount of material (mass) is the critical mass. The two estimates 
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given were 9 and 13.5 centimeters, with corresponding masses of about 
60 kilograms and 200 kilograms. Today, unclassified data on the criti-
cal mass of a U235 sphere suggests values slightly smaller than Serber’s 
estimate of 60 kilograms. These values assume no reflection of neutrons 
back into the fissionable material after they exit the surface. It would be 
expected that if the fissile material were surrounded by a material that 
would reflect neutrons escaping the surface back into the material, the 
critical mass (and radius) would be reduced.
10. Effect of Tamper
If we surround the core of active material by a shell of inac-
tive material, the shell will reflect some neutrons which would 
otherwise escape. Therefore a smaller quantity of active mate-
rial will be enough to give rise to an explosion. The surrounding 
case is called a tamper.
More current values for critical mass (in kg), with spherical geom-
etry, for weapons-grade fissile materials are:
  U235 Pu239
 Bare 56 11
 Thick Uranium Tamper 15 5
The bottom line is that a “tampered” sphere of essentially pure 
Pu239 weighing about 5 kg (about 11 pounds), of which about 20% 
(~1 kg) fissioned, delivered about 20,000 tons TNT equivalent explosive 
power at Nagasaki in 1945. The bomb’s plutonium sphere was about the 
size of a baseball. The amount that fissioned was approximately the size 
of a golf ball, and the amount of mass that was converted to energy by 
Einstein’s equation, E = mc2, was approximately 1 gram (1 pound mass 
is 454 grams).
11. Damage
Several kinds of damage will be caused by the bomb. A very 
large number of neutrons is released in the explosion. One 
can estimate a radius of about 1,000 yards around the site 
of explosion as the size of the region in which the neutron 
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concentration is great enough to produce severe pathological 
effects. Enough radioactive material is produced that the total 
activity will be of the order of 106 curies even after 10 days. Just 
what effect this will have in rendering the locality uninhabit-
able depends greatly on very uncertain factors about the way 
in which this dispersion by the explosion occurs. However, 
the total amount of radioactivity produced, as well as the 
total number of neutrons, is evidently proportional just to the 
number of fission processes, or to the total energy release. The 
mechanical explosion damage is caused by the blast or shock 
wave. . . . If destructive action may be regarded as measured by 
the maximum pressure amplitude, it follows that the radius of 
destructive action produced by an explosion varies as the cube 
root of the Energy (yield). Now in a ½ ton bomb, containing 
½ ton of TNT, the destructive radius is of the order of 150 feet. 
Hence in a bomb equivalent to 100 kilotons of TNT, one 
would expect a destructive radius of the order of . . . about 
2 miles.
We know now that the damage produced by a nuclear fission 
bomb is of three kinds: blast, thermal (heat), and radiation. The plu-
tonium “test” device exploded at the Trinity site (essentially identical 
to the bomb dropped on Nagasaki) was mounted on a steel tower and 
exploded at a height of about 100 feet above ground level. The divi-
sion of the total yield for such kiloton-range weapons among the three 
categories is, approximately, blast 50%, thermal (heat) 35%, and radia-
tion 15%. While nuclear fission weapons were principally designed to 
deliver damaging blast effects, the thermal energy released is of such 
magnitude as to cause extreme temperatures—sufficient to vaporize 
most materials near the explosion (the steel tower at the Trinity site was 
vaporized) and cause severe burns to unprotected persons at consider-
able distances as well as starting fires that under certain conditions can 
reach firestorm proportions. The radiation hazards of nuclear weapons, 
both primary effects of the bomb and secondary effects of the large 
amounts of radioactive materials released into the environment, have 
assumed much more importance as we have learned more about the 
overall effects of nuclear weapons.
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12. Efficiency
As remarked in Sec. 3, the material tends to blow apart as 
the reaction proceeds, and this tends to stop the reaction. In 
general, then, the reaction will not go to completion in an 
actual gadget. The fraction of energy released relative to that 
which would be released if all active material were transformed 
is called the efficiency.
“Gadget” was the scientists’ code for bomb. “Transformed” here 
means fissioned. We will see that this definition of “efficiency” of 
nuclear explosive energy release can be usefully extended to the fissile 
contents of a fast (enriched fuel) nuclear reactor. Consideration, then, of 
the possibility that some fraction of the active (fissile) material in the reactor 
can be fissioned under conceivable circumstances, including accidents and 
natural disasters, with sufficient energy release to fail the reactor contain-
ment becomes the question that brought us here.
13. Effect of Tamper on Efficiency
For a given mass of active material, tamper always increases 
efficiency. It acts both to reflect neutrons back into the active 
material and by its inertia to slow the expansion, thus giving 
opportunity for the reaction to proceed farther before it is 
stopped by the expansion.
The quantitative determination of tamper effect is complicated, but 
all we need to take away here is that if the fuel in a fast reactor were to 
suffer a reactivity excursion, the reactivity might be further increased 
in severity by the tamper effect of the masses of material surrounding 
the fuel. We can see that this is an important, but uncertain, part of the 
puzzle of quantifying the expected explosion severity in a fast-reactor 
accident.
14. Detonation
Before firing, the active material must be disposed in such a 
way that the effective neutron number is less than unity. The 
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act of firing consists in producing a rearrangement such that 
after the rearrangement the neutron number is greater than 
unity. This problem is complicated by the fact that, as we 
have seen, we need to deal with a total mass of active mate-
rial considerably greater than the critical in order to get appre-
ciable efficiency. 
This paragraph restates the basic requirement for achieving, and 
maintaining for a sufficient time, an exponentially increasing fission 
chain reaction. First a mass must be assembled that is configured 
(arranged) in such a way that is subcritical. The bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima accomplished this by assembling the (potentially critical) 
U235 in two (separated) sections. The bomb was detonated by rapidly 
combining the two masses; this was accomplished via the “shooting” 
method in which the two masses, separated in a tube (gun barrel), 
were rapidly combined by explosively driving one of the masses into the 
other. Simultaneously, the bomb released a strong source of neutrons at 
the center of the critical mass that initiated the bomb chain reaction. 
If during the assembly of the critical mass there are reaction-initiating 
neutrons present, a reaction can begin, termed a fizzle, that will not be 
exponentially increasing to produce the desired energy yield. This was 
a potential problem for the early bomb designers when plutonium was 
used as the fissile material because of the effectively higher reaction rates 
that controlled the fission rate of the plutonium. The reaction rates were 
too high to allow combination of the two masses of the fuel with the 
“shooting method”; the combination of the separate masses by shooting 
was just too slow. Consequently, the plutonium bomb utilized a sphere 
of plutonium that was subcritical. The fissile mass was “rearranged” 
by squeezing it using powerful explosives that spherically crushed the 
bomb material, increasing its density beyond the point of criticality, at 
which time neutrons were introduced that initiated the chain reaction 
fission process.
The fast-reactor safety problem we are considering is quite differ-
ent. In thermal reactors (without enriched fuel), although there can be 
present many times the amount of fissile material in the reactor required 
for criticality, it is separated into noncritical masses in the reactor so 
that there is no way, as long as the configuration is maintained, that a 
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reaction can be initiated that will have bomb-like efficiency. However, 
the potential for a much weaker nuclear explosion in a reactor with 
enriched fuel is very real. The question is whether the strength of the 
explosion that might be possible under any conceivable circumstances 
would be sufficient to fail the containment. We are again back to the 
question that brought us here.
15. Probability of Detonation (not included)
16. Fizzles
The question now arises: what if by bad luck or because the 
neutron background is very high, the bomb goes off when the 
neutron number is very close to zero? It is important to know 
whether the enemy will have an opportunity to inspect the 
remains and recover the material. We shall see that this is not a 
worry; in any event the bomb will generate enough energy to 
completely destroy itself. 
A “fizzle” describes the situation where “firing” of the bomb does 
not result in a sustained exponentially increasing rate of fission chain 
reaction. The designers worried that the fraction of the fissile material 
that fissioned could be so small as to obviate its bomb-utility. However, 
an important point arises here in our consideration of the explosion 
potential in fast reactors containing enriched fuel. Serber says there 
is no “worry” that the fizzled weapon could be inspected (giving up 
the secrets of its design), because even a very small, fractionally effi-
cient bomb would still be powerful enough to completely destroy the 
weapon. We have already noted that an explosion yield of 1/100 of 1% 
of a 20-kiloton bomb like that dropped on Nagasaki would be equiva-
lent to about 4,000 pounds of TNT. The published literature shows 
that the maximum planned explosive containments provided for any 
of the fast reactors considered by the United States was less than half 
that amount.
17. Detonating Source (not included)
18. Neutron Background (not included)
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19. Shooting (not included)
20. Autocatalytic Methods
The term “autocatalytic method” is being used to describe any 
arrangement in which the motions of material produced by 
the reaction will act, at least for a time, to increase the neutron 
number rather than to decrease it. Evidently, if arrangements 
having this property can be developed, they would be very 
valuable, especially if the tendency toward increasing the 
neutron number was possessed to any marked degree. 
Both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs utilized autocatalytic 
methods. The shooting method assembles the two subcritical masses 
sufficiently rapidly that the material is held together for a sufficient 
time for the energy release to meet the bomb design requirements. The 
“implosion” method used in the Trinity test device and in the Naga-
saki bomb squeezed the bomb core to a fraction of its original volume, 
and held it there for a sufficient time with chemical explosives aided by 
the tamper effect. The result was similarly successful for both bomb 
designs; criticality was reached when the density of the material (mass 
of bomb material divided by its volume) reached a degree of fission 
efficiency required to provide the desired explosive yield before the neu-
trons escaped through the bomb core surface sufficiently fast to shut the 
reaction down. We will see that autocatalytic processes can result in fast 
reactors in accidents or as the result of natural disasters. We return to 
the question that brought us here. The subject of autocatalytic processes 
will be further considered in chapter 5.
21. Conclusion
From the preceding outline we see that the immediate experi-
mental program is largely concerned with measuring the 
neutron properties of various materials, and with the ordnance 
problem. It is also necessary to start new studies on techniques 
for direct experimental determination of critical size and time 
scale, working with large but sub-critical amounts of active 
material.
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Serber’s conclusions are a short list of the needs then considered 
to be of high priority for producing a fission bomb. Not surpris-
ingly, these needs were similar to the needs of those people who were 
already working on the methods for designing fission reactors using 
the same materials, uranium and plutonium, to generate electrical 
power.
The First Plutonium Atomic Bomb
The first plutonium atomic bomb ever tested, rigged as a device named 
“The Gadget” and mounted on a steel tower approximately 100 feet 
above the ground, was demonstrated successfully in the Trinity test in 
New Mexico, July 16, 1945. The bomb design was based on the math-
ematical prediction of a nuclear fission chain reaction initiated in the 
center of a sphere of plutonium. Mathematical (computer) predictions 
indicated that if the chain reaction proceeded through about eighty fis-
sion generations, an explosive-energy release (yield) of about 20 kilotons 
(TNT equivalent) would be achieved. This prediction of the explosion 
yield of a spherical-shaped plutonium mass led the designers to shape 
the fissile material (plutonium) as a sphere with a hollow central core 
into which the neutrons could be released to initiate the fission process. 
The sphere of plutonium was sufficiently large that it could be made 
“supercritical” by compression (decreasing its volume) using a chemi-
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Left: Trinity Test Device,“The Gadget.” Right: Schematic of the Gadget.
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uniformly on the surface of the sphere and directed (focused) at the 
center. A “blanket” of explosives symmetrically surrounding the fissile 
material (the “bomb core”) was designed to squeeze the sphere to a 
sufficiently smaller volume that would make the resulting mass super-
critical. Then, at exactly the right instant, a cache of neutrons would 
be released at the center of the sphere. All of this “supercritical assem-
bly” of the fissile material (plutonium sphere) had to be accomplished 
in a total time, starting with the detonation of the explosive blanket, 
of the order of 1 millionth of a second. Perhaps most importantly, the 
“rearrangement” of the plutonium molecules was designed to cause a 
perfectly symmetrical decrease in the diameter of the spherical shape 
during the “squeezing” process. This required an extraordinary capabil-
ity for controlling the timing and direction of the chemical-explosive 
blanket detonation wave directed symmetrically inward toward the 
core center. In the end (mid-year, 1945), after a sufficient amount of 
plutonium was finally available, requiring nearly two years in the most 
expensive scientific/industrial undertaking ever attempted at the time, 
the design and demonstration of the bomb hinged on the ability of the 
designers to effect the squeezing of a plutonium sphere, maintaining 
its spherical shape, to a supercritical volume in around a millionth of a 
second and then release at that instant the neutrons at the bomb core 
center. If that could be accomplished, the bomb would do the rest. We 
know the result; within a few days, a device (dressed as a bomb) that is 
thought (the actual design is still classified) to be essentially identical 
to the Trinity device, was detonated about 1,600 feet over the aiming 
point in Nagasaki, Japan.
The burdens of uncertainty undertaken by the bomb designers 
were, although daunting, limited to barely manageable proportions 
by designing a process in which a carefully assembled amount of plu-
tonium could be, under controlled conditions, made “critical” at an 
appointed instant when the nuclear reaction would be triggered by 
the release of fast neutrons at the center of the core and the nuclear 
explosion would take its course. The predictions required by the sci-
entists to design a bomb in which such an exacting process would 
occur on demand, lasting on the order of a millionth of a second, 
required an extraordinarily expensive effort by the best scientists in 
the world.
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Relevance of the “Gadget” Design to Explosion Potential  
in Fast Reactors
The process of constructing the first nuclear (plutonium) fission 
bomb with nominal 20-kiloton TNT equivalent explosion damage 
potential, anticipated in Serber’s primer, follows relatively simple 
directions:
• Obtain a sufficient quantity of pure fissile material, approximately 
5 kilograms of Pu239. In order for this quantity to be safely handled, 
it must be separated into at least two parts with distance between the 
parts sufficient to prevent the volume of the material from becoming 
arranged compactly (by any means, including accidents) enough to 
reach super-criticality—the condition where the rate at which new 
neutrons are being produced in the material just exceeds the rate at 
which neutrons disappear by absorption (by other bomb materials) 
or by leakage through the fissile material’s surface.
• To effect an explosion, the separated parts (the molecules less densely 
spaced than required for criticality) of the plutonium must be assem-
bled so as to very rapidly increase the overall density sufficiently to 
make the material exceed the criticality condition. This is normally 
accomplished in a plutonium bomb by (extremely rapidly) compress-
ing a single subcritical mass to decrease the volume sufficiently for 
the mass to become supercritical.
• Just after the instant of assembly, release a collection of fast neutrons 
at the center of the critical mass, while preventing (to the extent prac-
ticable) the expansion of the volume of the material by the extreme 
heating process that ensues. It is not possible to completely prevent 
such expansion, but the expansion can be delayed to cause the num-
ber of fissions required to produce the design yield of the bomb 
before the expansion process stops the fission-energy release.
Extreme precision is required for the arrangement of the various 
parts of the device. In an implosion bomb, which we focus on, the 
compression and explosion development must be spherically symmetric. 
To produce such a precisely controlled nuclear reaction process required 
precision of construction and design that was unheard of in the mid-
1940s. Extreme precision is also required in the timing of the bomb 
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detonation processes. The duration of these processes is of the order 
of a small fraction of a microsecond (1 millionth of a second). In a 
properly operating bomb, the processes are so rapid that there is virtu-
ally no possibility of controlling the process in order to slow or stop it 
(save the certain expansion of the fuel and fission products as a result of 
extremely high temperatures).
A nuclear fission bomb is designed to effect a nuclear chain reac-
tion in a collection of fissile material that grows exponentially (in time), 
releasing a very large amount of energy in an extremely short time 
period (fraction of a microsecond). The fissile material is “assembled” 
as a “supercritical” mass, and then a cache of neutrons is released in the 
interior of the mass. The mass must be “held together” long enough 
(fraction of a microsecond) for the fast chain reaction process to cause 
the desired fission energy release (say eighty fission generations that 
would release approximately 20,000 tons TNT equivalent energy). The 
desired result is the same as for any bomb—the release of such a large 
amount of energy in a small volume generates extreme temperatures 
(measured in millions of degrees in a nuclear bomb), and such tem-
peratures transform the materials of the bomb to gas that expands, 
producing extreme pressures causing “disassembly” of the atoms of the 
fuel (as well as surrounding materials). Disassembly is another word for 
explosion. There are other damaging effects (such as radioactivity), but 
here we focus on the effects that occur in the surroundings as a result 
of the absorption (by the bomb materials) of the heat liberated in the 
chain reaction and the damaging pressures that are produced.
In contrast, a nuclear fission reactor for producing electric power 
is designed to effect a tightly controlled nuclear chain reaction in a 
collection of fissile material at a constant rate that can be converted to 
electric power. A typical 1,000-megawatt (one thousand million watts) 
power station must generate about 3,000 megawatts of heat at a steady 
rate to convert (roughly) one-third of that energy (power = energy per 
unit time) to produce 1,000 megawatts of electricity. The nuclear fission 
reactor in the plant produces the heat energy at a controlled rate and 
transfers that heat to the reactor coolant, which in turn transfers the 
energy (as steam) to an electric power generator. The sole purpose of the 
reactor is to produce the thermal energy (heat) that is carried away from 
the reactor (to the steam generator) by the reactor coolant.







A schematic diagram of a nuclear fission reactor. 
In contrast to a bomb, a power reactor must have a coolant fluid 
that flows continuously through voids (channels) in the fuel. The cool-
ant flow is designed to remove the heat of the fission process at the 
same (balanced) rate that it is produced. The process of constructing 
a nuclear fission reactor, then, also appears to follow relatively simple 
directions. As in a bomb, there is a requirement for extremely precise 
physical arrangement of the various parts of the device. In a reactor, 
the arrangement of the fuel must be compartmented to allow passage 
(through the fuel assembly) of the material (coolant) that absorbs the 
heat at the same rate that the reactor core produces it by nuclear reac-
tion. The nuclear reaction process is controlled with special materials 
inserted into (or surrounding) the compartmented fuel assembly that 
absorb neutrons produced in the fission process. The position of these 
materials (the “control rods”) is adjusted continuously (normally auto-
matically) in the core of the reactor so as to balance the rate of genera-
tion of neutrons with the rate at which newly produced neutrons are 
used to maintain the desired fission rate as well as the neutrons that are 
absorbed (but do not cause fission) in the core or are lost by leakage 
from the core. The process is a highly fine-tuned balancing process that 
must be maintained very accurately and precisely. If the reactor speeds 
up unexpectedly, which it can do if the spatial arrangement of the fuel 
changes only slightly (to a denser configuration), the heat produced by 
the fission process can overpower the coolant heat removal capacity. If 
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the rate of heat production exceeds the heat absorbed by the coolant by 
too large an amount, the temperature of the fuel can exceed the melt-
ing (and later vaporization) temperature in an extremely short period. 
Therein lies the potential for an explosion that might have the potential 
to fail the containment. And therein lies the problem of assuring an 
“engineered” design of the plant that will prevent a nuclear explosion 
of sufficient intensity to destroy any last-barrier containment provided. 
Engineering safety of such devices is extremely difficult if there is the 
potential for accidental “rearrangements” of the fuel that might result 
in very short duration productions of energy capable of destroying the 
reactor containment. It is simply a matter of having insufficient time 
to react defensively; the safety margin can be very thin. The primary 
purpose of this book is to argue that the proposed use of fast-fission reactors 
for electric power production is a move in a direction that could result in 
accidental increases in energy release that reduce the safety margin of con-
trol to an unacceptable level.
The development of nuclear fission reactors for “peaceful” pur-
poses, including electrical power generation, proceeded in parallel 
with the development of more efficient and powerful nuclear fission 
weapons systems. As fissile uranium (U235) and plutonium (Pu239) were 
exceedingly scarce when World War II ended in 1945, the production 
of plutonium in nuclear reactors suggested the so-called “breeder” reac-
tor, which, while producing electrical power at a controlled rate, could 
produce fissile plutonium (as a by-product) at a rate greater than the 
rate that the fissile material was used up to produce power. Producing 
plutonium with reactors was the primary purpose of the first so-called 
“production” reactors that the AEC operated during the 1950s and 
1960s to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Nuclear power reactors 
were soon envisioned to produce plutonium at a rate faster than the 
fissile uranium was fissioned (“burned”), resulting in accumulation of 
fissile material faster than it was used in the reactors; hence the reac-
tors would “breed” plutonium by converting the non-fissile uranium 
(U238) to fissile plutonium. This would mean that the very scarce fissile 
uranium available could be used while vastly increasing the available 
fission fuel supply—explaining why the first nuclear reactor that gen-
erated electrical power, constructed at the National Reactor Testing 
Station (NRTS) in Idaho in 1951, was designed to demonstrate the 
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practicability of a reactor that would “breed” new fuel faster than it 
was being used up in the reactor. That first experimental breeder reac-
tor (EBR-I) was a fast-neutron reactor fueled with enriched uranium 
built for that purpose.
To provide a brief introduction to the physics of nuclear fission 
reactors, with emphasis on fast-fission reactors, we defer to chapter 10 of 
Dr. Richard Webb’s book The Accident Hazard of Nuclear Power Plants, 
published by the University of Massachusetts Press, 1976:
The Explosion Hazard of the Advanced “Breeder”  
Reactor (LMFBR)
The liquid metal-cooled, fast neutron, breeder reactor (LMFBR) is an 
entirely different power reactor concept than the water-cooled reactor. 
It is designed specially to produce or “breed” fissionable material as a 
by- product, namely, plutonium fuel, by certain nuclear reactions in the 
reactor that convert plentiful uranium-238, a weakly fissionable species 
of uranium, into plutonium. The objective of the LMFBR is to produce 
more plutonium than is consumed in an operating cycle (about 7% more 
per year). The excess fuel can then be used to start up other LMFBRs 
and to fuel the PWRs and BWRs when the useful reserves of rare fis-
sionable uranium (U-235) are depleted, which is estimated to occur in 
about thirty years.4 Hence the PWRs and BWRs will ultimately depend 
on the LMFBR. (The reserves and present stockpiles of U-238 would 
last the U.S. for a thousand years or so, using the combination of LMF-
BRs and the water reactors.)
The AEC has projected that about one thousand large LMFBRs 
would eventually be built, along with a like number of water-cooled 
reactors.5 A license application to build the “LMFBR Demonstration 
Plant” in Tennessee is presently pending; and a smaller LMFBR-like 
reactor, called the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), is under construction, 
which is to be used to test LMFBR fuels under LMFBR core conditions 
encountered in normal operation. The FFTF differs from an LMFBR 
in that the plutonium-fueled core is not surrounded by uranium 238 
for breeding purposes; otherwise, it is basically the same as an LMFBR, 
from the standpoint of accident hazards.
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Unfortunately, the LMFBR has a power excursion (nuclear run-
away) potential—indeed, a potential for nuclear explosion as distin-
guished from a steam explosion—which is even more serious than that 
of the water-cooled reactors.6  The LMFBR explosion potential has 
extremely grave implications. Especially because such a nuclear explo-
sion would produce radioactive plutonium dust, which is extremely 
toxic. A steam explosion, or more accurately, a “coolant vapor explo-
sion,” is defined as the explosive vaporization (boiling) of coolant due 
to the contact of the coolant with extremely hot, molten fuel. This 
appears to be the only possible mode of explosion in the water-cooled 
reactors. A nuclear explosion, on the other hand, is defined as an explo-
sive vaporization of the fuel itself, which involves higher temperatures 
and potentially a much stronger explosion than a coolant vapor explo-
sion. An LMFBR could also produce strong coolant vapor explosions 
upon melting, which could add to the explosion force or by themselves 
be dangerous. As will be discussed, nuclear explosions of the order of 
20,000 pounds TNT-equivalent are theoretically possible. For compari-
son, the maximum economical containment capability is about 1000 
pounds TNT.7 Thus, such an explosive power excursion would vaporize 
the entire core, rupture the containment, and blow, say, half of the core, 
amounting to tons of radioactive plutonium, into the atmosphere and 
boil off practically all of the fission products and blow them into the 
atmosphere as well. Moreover, the core vaporization process presum-
ably would dispense the plutonium and fission products in the form 
of a superfine dust, causing severe, geographically widespread, ground 
contamination.
The consequences of such a heavy product release were estimated 
in chapter 1 (of Webb). The additional consequences due to plutonium 
release could be even worse. Because of the extreme toxicity of the plu-
tonium, its release (assuming two tons) and its long life (up to 600 
to 24,000 years “half-life,” depending on the isotopic species of plu-
tonium) could cause permanent abandonment of over 150,000 square 
miles (an area the size of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and half of Pennsylva-
nia combined). This estimate is based on simply substituting plutonium 
for the fission products in the atmospheric dispersal-fallout calculation 
of the WASH-740 report (that is, no extrapolations)8 and finding that 
Nuclear Fission Bombs and Reactors | 43
the ground contamination level at the boundary of the 130,000 square-
mile zone exceeds a proposed contamination limit of one microgram 
of plutonium 239 isotope per square meter.9 Actually, an LMFBR core 
will contain other, more radioactive, isotopes of plutonium, such that 
there will be about three to eight times more Pu 239—equivalent radio-
activity than if the core were 100% Pu 239.10 Hence, the equivalent Pu 
239 contamination of the 150,000-square-mile zone would be three to 
eight micrograms/m2 level proposed as a contamination limit by Will-
rich and Taylor, who stated that any ground contaminated above one 
microgram/m2 “would be likely to be deemed unacceptable for public 
health,” 11 and also exceeds the Rasmussen Report’s contamination limit 
of three micrograms/m2, above which “relocation” is to be required.12
Incidentally, the above use of the WASH-740 calculation does not 
involve those aspects of the WASH-740 analysis which differ with the 
Rasmussen Report; the differences appear to arise in the assumptions 
of the radioactive fallout dust particle size and contamination limits of 
Sr 90 following a meltdown accident, and not in the atmospheric dis-
persal-fallout aspects, were the dust particle size the same between the 
two reports. This assumes that a severe nuclear explosion of an LMFBR 
core would generate dust particles of one micron size or less, which 
is the basis for the 150,000 square-mile ground contamination value 
in WASH-740. In view of the extreme temperature of such a nuclear 
explosion, the assumption seems appropriate.
If the “hot particle” theory for lung cancer induction by plutonium 
dust, as proposed by Tamplin and Cochran and by Geesaman,13 is cor-
rect, then the cancer probability would be 100% for anyone attempting 
to live in the 150,000 square mile (or greater) fallout zone of the con-
ceived LMFBR explosion. Furthermore, the plutonium dust, because of 
its extremely long half-life, would forever be in the environment. Pre-
sumably, it would be mixed with ordinary dust, kicked up by wind ero-
sion and farming, and blown about and spread by the winds to present 
a continuous and permanent lung-cancer and other health hazard for 
any inhabitants of the contaminated and adjacent land. It is clear, there-
fore, that the question of the power excursion potential of the LMFBR 
is extremely serious. We shall now examine the state of the science of 
predicting the LMFBR explosion potential.
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The Basic Theory of Nuclear Explosion in LMFBRs
The LMFBR reactor and coolant system closely resemble the Pressur-
ized Water Reactor (PWR) except that the fuel rod bundles are each 
contained in a coolant channel or “duct” as in a Boiling Water Reac-
tor (BWR). Also, the batch of fuel rods which comprise the core is 
surrounded by a thick outer ring of rods containing uranium 238 for 
breeding plutonium, and of each core rod, only the middle vertical sec-
tion actually contains the fuel, with the top and bottom containing U 
238. Hence, the core is completely surrounded by a “blanket” of U 238 
rods. The coolant ducts containing each bundle of rods run the full 
length of the rods.
The reactor physics and the power excursion theory for an LMFBR 
are similar to those for a water-cooled reactor; except that liquid metal 
(heated sodium) is used as a coolant instead of water. The absence of 
water means that the energetic (fast) neutrons emitted by the atomic 
fissioning process are not slowed down within the core (it turns out 
that the fast neutrons enable the breeding process to work); but since 
fast neutrons are less effective in causing fissioning, the concentration 
or “enrichment” of fissionable material in the fuel must be higher in 
an LMFBR to achieve a critical reactor—over five times higher than 
a PWR or BWR. This higher fuel enrichment means that should 
the LMFBR fuel rods be compacted, either by a meltdown or by an 
explosion which compresses part of the core, the reactivity might not 
decrease, as it would in a water-cooled reactor, but could increase.14
The reason for this reverse reactivity effect is that in a water reac-
tor the fuel material, being less enriched in fissionable material, cannot 
sustain a fission chain reaction (criticality), even if fully compacted, 
unless the water is present between the fuel rods to slow down the 
neutrons and thereby increase their effectiveness for causing fission. 
Fuel compaction in a water-cooled reactor would squeeze out water and 
thus would reduce the reactivity, that is, shut down the fission chain 
reaction. On the other hand, the compaction of concentrated LMFBR 
fuel will increase the reactivity, since the nature of highly enriched 
fissionable material is such that it can be made critical if enough of it 
is brought together, which the compaction process accomplishes. (An 
atomic bomb is detonated by compacting extremely rapidly a mass 
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of highly enriched fissionable material with a surrounding TNT-like 
charge.)
What makes the compaction problem especially serious is that only 
about 2% core volume reduction, such as could easily occur upon core 
melting, would raise the reactivity to above the delayed neutron frac-
tion (which is about 0.3% for plutonium-fueled LMFBRs) and thus 
trigger a power excursion.15 Yet the potential for fuel compaction in an 
LMFBR is large, since only about 50% of the core volume is taken up 
by fuel rods, and the rest by the coolant. Hence, the core compaction 
potential is over 50%,16 should the coolant be expelled or drained, leav-
ing a void for fuel to enter; again, fuel compaction occurs whenever fuel 
fills voided coolant space between the fuel rods. Also, upon melting, the 
fuel rods of the core would lose their rigidity, and the fuel would then 
be easily compressible, as by gravity compaction.
Furthermore, it turns out that the rapid expulsion of the liquid 
metal coolant, as in boiling, can increase the reactivity in an LMFBR as 
well, due to complicated nuclear effects. This is in contrast with water-
cooled reactors, where a loss of coolant will at least reduce the reactivity 
and thereby shut down the fissioning. Finally, due to its size, a large 
LMFBR core will contain several “critical mass” loads of fuel, if fully 
compacted, so that an explosion due to an initial power excursion might 
rapidly compact a region of the core enough to make it prompt critical, 
thereby setting off a secondary, more severe excursion. In general, the 
more rapid the core compaction, the greater the rate of reactivity rise 
and the resultant power excursion.
In short, the LMFBR is prone to autocatalytic reactivity acci-
dents—that is, the reactor is its own catalyst (for generating power 
excursions, since fuel overheating due to some malfunction can cause 
a core meltdown or cooling boiling, which in turn could conceivably 
generate disastrous secondary excursions by some rapid recompaction 
process before the fissioning would be finally stopped by “core disas-
sembly”—blowing the core completely apart by explosion.
Incidentally, the LMFBRs, like the water-cooled reactors, are being 
designed with a negative Doppler reactivity effect which can safely ter-
minate minor power excursions caused by slight reactivity rises above 
the prompt critical reactivity level, the threshold for power excursion. 
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The Doppler effect has been demonstrated for LMFBRs in power 
excursion experiments using a small LMFBR reactor called SEFOR. 
However, the AEC’s characterization of these SEFOR tests can be 
very misleading. Said the AEC in their Proposed Final Environmental 
Statement for the LMFBR program—“In some of the experiments in 
SEFOR, the reactivity was intentionally increased well beyond prompt 
critical, and the rapid transient that resulted was controlled by the 
negative Doppler reactivity effect.” 17 This statement can be taken to 
imply that SEFOR proved that the LMFBR can tolerate strong reactiv-
ity rises—“well beyond prompt critical.” But this is not true, for the 
reactivity in the SEFOR tests was barely raised beyond prompt critical. 
Numerically, it was only .06% (% reactivity units) beyond prompt criti-
cal,18 compared to, say, 1% for a severe power excursion.19 Moreover, the 
Doppler strength in SEFOR was made three to four times greater than 
it would be in an LMFBR accident situation.20
With this background, we are ready to more carefully consider the 
question of the potential for a fast-neutron fission reactor to suffer, as a 
result of accident or natural-disaster-caused damage, a nuclear explo-
sion of sufficient power to destroy the reactor containment and allow a 
catastrophic release of radioactive fuel and fission products to the envi-
ronment. It seems appropriate to first consider carefully the worst-case 
implications of such a release.
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4 Catastrophic Release of Radioactive Materials
In an accident involving a plutonium reactor, a couple of tons of 
 plutonium can melt.
Edward Teller, 1908–2013
Before considering further the potential for catastrophic releases of 
radioactive materials from reactors designed for generating electricity, 
we should quantify the hazards that could have been realized as a result 
of accident at SEFOR. The magnitude of the radioactivity hazards that 
attended the operation of the SEFOR experimental reactor should not 
be considered comparable to commercial nuclear reactors, then or now, 
with two exceptions.
Most importantly, SEFOR was a fast reactor operating with 
enriched plutonium fuel. The heightened potential for a large-scale 
release of aerosolized plutonium to the atmosphere posed a new and 
highly contentious risk to the public—because of plutonium’s potential 
use as bomb material and its reputation for extreme radiotoxicity if it 
gains entry to specific organs in the human body. We will return to the 
plutonium question, but first we should quantify the risks at SEFOR of 
the fission-product materials that accumulated in the reactor.
The largest quantity of radioactive fission-product material con-
tained in SEFOR at any time during its operation was a small fraction 
of that contained in typical commercial power reactors such as the two 
~1,000-megawatt (electric) plants operating today on the Arkansas River 
some 80 miles distant. SEFOR’s fuel content was much smaller, and 
SEFOR was operated only intermittently—to meet the specific needs 
of the research program designed to address questions relating directly 
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to public safety (primarily the demonstration of the safety feature asso-
ciated with a negative Doppler coefficient). During most of SEFOR’s 
approximately three-year operating period, the reactor was charged 
with approximately 380 kilograms (836 pounds) of plutonium and (in 
total) generated 25,764 megawatt-hours of thermal energy (heat) dur-
ing a total operating time of 3,895 hours (162.3 days). In contrast, a 
single 1,000-megawatt (electric) reactor, “burning” uranium, operating 
steadily for three years (typical period between refueling) would pro-
duce approximately 3,500 x 3 x 365 x 24 = 92 million, megawatt-hours 
of thermal energy (heat). Approximating the thermal energy released 
for each plutonium nucleus fissioned to be 200 MeV, the number of 
fuel nuclei fissions that would have occurred in SEFOR compared to a 
single commercial reactor during a three-year period would be:
SEFOR 3 million billion billion
1,000 MW Plant  10 billion billion billion
The amount of radioactive fission products produced, which is 
directly proportional to the number of fissions occurring, is more than 
3000 times less for SEFOR than for a 1,000-megawatt fast-breeder 
plant. As the quantity of accumulated fission products was much lower 
in the SEFOR reactor, and since the amount of fission products con-
tained in the reactor at any time determines the maximum amount 
possible to be released in an accident, the fission product content of the 
SEFOR reactor was of greatly reduced concern compared to a com-
mercial plant.
But there were important hazards attending the operation of 
SEFOR that are not present in the typical commercial nuclear power 
plants operating then or now. To our knowledge, the siting of SEFOR 
near Strickler, Arkansas, was unique in that it was the first nuclear reac-
tor containing a substantial amount of plutonium as fuel (approaching 
a half-ton) that had ever been sited anywhere in the free world except 
on a government-controlled area intended to provide a secure “safe” 
separation distance from the public. While located in a very low popu-
lation density rural area in the Ozark Mountains, the SEFOR reactor 
was on a relatively small (640-acre) site with minimal security provided 
for control of access.
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The “unique” hazards at SEFOR were two “special” materials used 
in the reactor:
• The primary fuel was the 239 isotope of plutonium, acknowledged 
to be the choice material for construction of nuclear fission weapons, 
and considered to be one of the most radiotoxic materials known 
should it gain access to the interior of the human body, particularly 
the lungs and bone tissue.
• The coolant used to remove the fission heat was liquid sodium, 
which is highly flammable if contacted with air or water. In addi-
tion, the sodium becomes radioactive as it cools the reactor, adding 
to the inventory of radioactive materials that could potentially be 
released. The radioactive sodium was primarily a disposal problem, 
rather than a primary hazard to the public, due to the limited reactor 
operation time and the containment provided.
The use of sodium as coolant poses challenging fire and explosion 
hazards and can complicate the design of the containment structure 
that forms the last defense against explosion events that could result in 
catastrophic release of radioactive materials to the environment. Nev-
ertheless, this book focuses primarily on the hazards presented by the 
plutonium—because the plutonium fuel enriched to approximately 
20% presented a new potential for an accidental nuclear explosion that 
might fail the final barrier to a catastrophic release of the fuel in aerosol 
(hot-particle) form to the atmosphere.
In order to simplify our task, we focus on the additional risks intro-
duced if fast-neutron reactors replace thermal or slow-neutron reactors 
for generation of electric power. It is important to emphasize at the out-
set that the hazardous nature of both the extremely radiotoxic fission-
able (fuel) materials and the fission products that inevitably accumulate 
during the operation of any nuclear fission reactor (slow or fast neutron) 
pose the primary hazards that differentiate the nuclear electric energy 
industry from the fossil fuel energy industry. We know that the potential 
consequences to the public of releases of large amounts of reactor fission-
product contents, whether from thermal or fast-breeder reactors (of the 
same electric power generation capacity), pose similar risks to the public 
and the environment. This fact enables us to focus primarily on the 
additional risks associated with the adoption of fast-reactor technology.
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So, the primary safety problem considered in this book becomes 
that of ensuring against very large amounts of both the nuclear fuel and 
accumulated fission products in a fast-neutron reactor being melted and 
vaporized—producing temperatures and pressures that could explosively 
breach the containment and allow catastrophic release into the atmo-
sphere. Since the operation was of limited duration, the primary radioac-
tivity hazards at SEFOR at the time of the December 1971 experiments 
considered here focus on the plutonium. Since we want to emphasize in 
this book the additional risks involving catastrophic releases of aerosol-
ized fuel particles into the atmosphere, we first consider the baseline state 
of knowledge about the hazards of releases of radioactive fission products 
from reactors at the time the SEFOR experiments were completed.
The AEC-Acknowledged Public Hazards of  Catastrophic 
Accidental Releases of Fission Products from  Commercial 
Nuclear Reactors during the Period of SEFOR’s 
 Construction and Operation
Published estimates of damages that could result from large accidental 
releases of fission products were first prepared by experts for the govern-
ment in 1957. The results were so threatening to the future of commercial 
power ventures being considered that the AEC exerted great pressure to 
try and minimize the concerns of the public. The AEC’s task was dif-
ficult because the predicted hazards exceeded in magnitude that of any 
industrial (nonnatural) hazard that had been considered to that time. Ulti-
mately, the AEC (and its successor government agencies) adopted methods 
of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) that rely on mathematical predic-
tions of the likelihood of such accidents occurring to make the case that 
the risk could be “acceptable” in view of the positive benefits provided.
But there is a deep polarization of public opinion on such matters. 
In our opinion, the polarization is so profound that it is far beyond our 
ability to affect it in this book. We believe it is the most important ques-
tion that must be answered by the regulatory agencies involved—the 
question of the acceptability of the risks to us all.
Our approach will be to briefly define the state of the argument that 
faces us as we consider the present proposals to jump-start the nuclear-
electricity-generation industry using a new class of nuclear fast-fission 
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reactors. As we do not want to attempt to address the stalemate that 
has developed in the public sector about the acceptability of the risks of 
nuclear power that could result from catastrophic accidental releases of 
radioactive fission-products from existing nuclear electric power plants, 
we will attempt here only to identify quasi-quantitatively the additional 
hazards, and the potential severity thereof, that could result from wide-
spread adoption of fast-reactor technology. We believe those additional 
hazards are potentially game-changing.
To establish a baseline from which to compare the additional risks 
of fast-reactor technology, we begin with a brief description of the 
AEC’s attempt in 1957 to inform the public of the hazards that could 
be realized from credible accidental releases of radioactive nuclear fis-
sion products to the atmosphere. In our opinion, the questions raised 
by WASH-740, based as it was on consideration by competent experts 
of the worst-case credible accidental release of such materials that 
might occur (in 1957), have never been satisfactorily addressed. Indeed, 
it appears that the study was never satisfactorily (or publicly) updated 
by the government to reflect the increase in size of the reactors that are 
in operation today compared to the reactors chosen for analysis in 1957.
WASH-740
Theoretical Possibilities and  Consequences of Major  
Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants
Letter of Transmittal to Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
March 22, 1957.
Hon. Carl T. Durham,
Chairman Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Congress of the United States.
Dear Mr. Durham:
There is transmitted herewith a report of a study of the possible conse-
quences in terms of injury to persons and damage to property, if certain 
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hypothetical major accidents should occur in a typical large nuclear 
power reactor. More than two score leading experts in the sciences and 
engineering specialties participated in this study.
We are happy to report that the experts all agree that the chances 
that major accidents might occur are exceedingly small. This study 
constitutes a part of the commission’s continuing effort on a broad 
front to understand and resolve this problem of possible reactor haz-
ards so that we may proceed expanding atomic energy industry with 
full confidence that there will be few reactor accidents and that such as 
do occur will have only minor consequences. This effort and the work 
of translating the results into affirmative, concrete safeguards for pro-
tection of the public will, of course, be continued and expanded. Since 
the beginning of the reactor program the experts and the Congress 
and the public and the Commission have all been concerned with the 
causes of and the possible magnitude of damage from reactor accidents 
and with means of prevention. The subject was considered important 
enough to command four of the 60-odd sessions of the International 
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva eighteen 
months ago which, as you will recall, we initiated. One conference 
paper in particular gave estimates of the theoretical magnitude of dam-
age. In May of last year, Dr. Libby presented to your Committee some 
estimations of the possible extent of harm and damage should a major 
accident occur.
This study has taken the form in which it is now presented to you 
as a means of responding to the Committee’s specific request of last 
July 6. To produce such a study, it was necessary to stretch possibility 
far out toward its extreme limits. Some of the worst possible combi-
nations of circumstances that might conceivably occur were included 
in the hypotheses in order that we might assess their consequences. 
The study must be regarded as a rough estimation of the consequences 
of unlikely though conceivable combinations of failure and error and 
weather conditions; it is not in any sense a prediction of any future 
conditions.
This has been a difficult study to make. There has fortunately been 
little reactor accident experience upon which to base estimates. Nuclear 
reactors have been operated since December 2, 1942, with a safety 
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record far better than that of even the safest industry. More than 100 
reactor years of regular operating experience have been accumulated, 
including experience with reactors of high power and large inventories 
of fission products, without a single personal injury and no significant 
depositions of radioactivity outside of the plant area. There have been 
a few accidents with experimental reactor installations as contrasted 
with the perfect record of safety of the regularly operating reactors. But 
even these accidents did not affect the public. This record which shows 
that safe operation can be achieved is due to skillful design, careful 
construction, and competent operation.
Looking to the future, the principle on which we have based our 
criteria for licensing nuclear power reactors is that we will require 
multiple lines of defense against accidents which might release fission 
products from the facility. Only by means of highly unlikely combi-
nations of mechanical and human failures could such releases occur. 
Furthermore, the Government and industry are investing heavily in 
studies to learn more about the principles of safe reactor design and 
operation.
Framing even hypothetical circumstances under which harm and 
damage could occur and arriving at estimations of the theoretical 
extent of the consequences proved a complex task. To make the study 
we enlisted the services of a group of scientists and engineers of the 
Brookhaven National Laboratory and of another group of experts to 
serve as a steering committee. Through recent months these men have 
met with many additional expert advisors to offer judgment on the esti-
mates arrived at. We are not aware of such a study having been under-
taken for any other industry. We venture to say that if a similar study 
were to be made for certain other industries, with the same free rein to 
the imagination, we might be startled to learn what the consequences of 
conceivable major catastrophic accidents in those other industries could 
be in contrast with the action experience in those industries.
Remembering that this study analyzes theoretical possibilities and 
consequences of reactor accidents, we might note here the judgments 
presented on (1) possible consequences of major accidents and (2) the 
likelihood of occurrence of such major reactor accidents. The portion 
of the study dealing with consequences of theoretical accidents started 
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with the assumption of a typical power reactor, of 500,000 kilowatts 
thermal power, in a characteristic power reactor location. Accidents 
were postulated to occur after 180 days of operation, when essentially 
full fission product inventories had been built up. Three types of acci-
dents which could cause serious public damages were assumed. Pes-
simistic (higher hazard) values were chosen for numerical estimates 
of many of the uncertain factors influencing the final magnitude of 
the estimated damages. It is believed that these theoretical estimates 
are greater than the damage which would actually occur even in the 
unlikely event of such accidents.
For the three types of assumed accidents, the theoretical estimates indi-
cated that personal damage might range from a lower limit of none injured 
or killed to an upper limit, in the worst case, of about 3,400 killed and 
about 43,000 injured.
Theoretical property damages ranged from a lower limit of about one 
half million dollars to an upper limit in the worst case of about seven billion 
dollars. This latter figure is largely due to assumed contamination of land 
with fission products.
Under adverse combinations of the conditions considered, it was esti-
mated that people could be killed at distances up to 15 miles, and injured at 
distances of about 45 miles. Land contamination could extend for greater 
distances.
In the large majority of theoretical reactor accidents considered, the 
total assumed losses would not exceed a few hundred million dollars. 
(emphasis added)
As to the probabilities of major reactor accidents, some experts 
held that numerical estimates of a quantity so vague and uncertain as 
the likelihood of occurrence of major reactor accidents have no mean-
ing. They declined to express their feeling about this probability in 
numbers. Others, though admitting similar uncertainty, nevertheless 
ventured to express their opinions in numerical terms. Estimations so 
expressed of the probability of reactor accidents having major effects on 
the public ranged from a chance of one in 100,000 to one in a billion 
per year for each large reactor. However, whether numerically expressed 
or not, there was no disagreement in the opinion that the probability of 
major reactor accidents is exceedingly low.
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Some of the reasons for this belief follow:
First, industry and government are determined to maintain safety 
and protect the health and property of the public from nuclear hazards. 
The Congress has authorized and we in the Commission are carrying 
out a program of close and careful regulation and inspection. Thus the 
potential hazard of this new industry has been recognized in advance 
of its development and brought under a strict system of safety control 
before the occurrence of the incidents which in other fields have marked 
the birth of new industry and have subsequently led to control.
Secondly, the challenge of this new and important venture in man’s 
application of the forces of nature has attracted able and energetic men 
into the work of assuring safe design and operation.
In the third place, multimillion-dollar efforts in research and devel-
opment, both public and private, are directed toward identifying and 
solving safety problems. We know of no other industry where so much 
effort has been and is being spent on the definition and solution of 
safety problems.
Fourthly, the cost to the industry and government of reactor acci-
dents, even of a minor nature, would be very high—much higher than 
for accidents in other industry. Self-interest, therefore, as well as public 
interest dictates avoidance of accidents.
To sum up, the report affirms that a major reactor accident is 
extremely unlikely. To reduce the matter of assumed hazards to com-
parative numbers, let us take the most pessimistic assumptions used 
and apply them to a case of 100 power reactors in operation in the 
United States.
Under these assumptions, the chances of a person being killed in 
any year by a reactor accident would be less than 1 in 50 million. By 
contrast, the present odds of being killed in any year by an automobile 
accident in the United States stand at about one in 5,000.
We are not surprised by the contents of the report, nor are we 
made complacent. The report serves to identify areas where contin-
ued research and development are needed, and areas where emphasis 
is needed in the further development of our regulatory program. It 
gives renewed emphasis to our belief that our research and development 
program and our regulatory program in the nuclear power field must 
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continue with vigor to the end that the “conceivable” catastrophe shall 
never happen.
We would appreciate your regarding the attachment as an “advance” 
report. It is being reviewed for editorial and mechanical errors and 
omissions. Copies of the report as corrected will be furnished to you at 
an early date.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Harold S. Vance,
Acting Chairman
WASH-740 Was Not Updated
The results of WASH-740, prepared by a blue-ribbon panel of scientists 
from the Brookhaven National Laboratory, delivered an unsettling pic-
ture to the public about the risks of embarking on a program to develop 
a large number of fission reactors for generating electric power. The 
predictions of death, injury, and possible abandonment of large tracts 
of land downwind of such accidents appeared to exceed any hazards 
expected previously from industrial enterprises.
WASH-740 was never updated to reflect the changes that would be 
required when much larger reactors were being suggested by the 1970s. 
Then in 1976, Dr. Richard E. Webb, who had testified in 1972 about 
the nuclear explosion hazards of fast reactors before the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress (see Notes), published 
the book The Accident Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants. In the book, 
Dr. Webb updated the predictions of WASH-740 to account for the size 
of reactors planned in 1976, nominally 1,000 megawatts, from the reac-
tor size assumed in WASH-740, ~200 megawatts (electric). Dr. Webb 
assumed that the damages would scale directly with the total fission 
rate, which would be approximately six times larger in 1970 than in 
1957. Quoting Webb:
To estimate the maximum sequences of any reactor accident, we 
adjust the estimates of the maximum possible reactor accident 
as given in the 1957 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) report, 
Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents 
in Large Nuclear Power Plants (WASH-740), to account for the 
six-fold increase in the highly intense, short-lived radioactivity 
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and the fifteen-fold increase in the long-lived radioactivity in 
present day reactors. The maximum conceivable consequences 
of the worst accident are as follows: (1) a lethal cloud of radia-
tion with a range of seventy-five miles and a width of one mile; 
(2) evacuation or severe living restrictions for a land area the 
size of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio combined (120,000 square 
miles), lasting a year or possibly longer; and severe long-term 
restrictions on agriculture due to strontium 90 fallout over 
a land area of the size of about one half of the land east of 
the Mississippi River (500,000 square miles), lasting one to 
several years, with dairying prohibited “for a very long time” 
over a 150,000 square mile area. There are other consequences 
not here estimated for water-cooled reactors, such as genetic 
damage. The potential accident consequences for the LMFBR—
especially with respect to plutonium contamination, which may be 
a gravely serious lung-cancer hazard—will be discussed later, since 
they will depend on the explosion hazard unique to that reactor. 
(emphasis added)
Plutonium Fuel
The bulk of the radioactive materials contained in any operating reactor 
comprises the fuel and its fission products. SEFOR was fueled with plu-
tonium, the core enriched to roughly 20% plutonium with the balance 
primarily uranium 238. Because of the relatively low total production 
of fission products in the SEFOR reactor during its operating period 
(compared to a commercial reactor), the focus of the accident hazard 
potential for SEFOR was the plutonium. So what is the special concern 
about plutonium?
Typical commercial reactors operating in the 1960s “burned” U235. 
Further, all of these reactors were (and remain) “thermal,” or slow- 
neutron reactors, with average neutron speeds around 2,000 meters 
per second (around 4,500 miles per hour). The exceptions during that 
time period (1950s and ’60s) were SEFOR and a commercial, though 
“demonstration,” fast-neutron “breeder” reactor known as FERMI 1, 
which was constructed on the shore of Lake Erie about 30 miles from 
Detroit. FERMI 1 was fueled with enriched U235 metal, whereas 
SEFOR was fueled with enriched Pu239 oxide. FERMI 1 and SEFOR 
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were fast- neutron reactors, with fission neutrons driving the chain reac-
tions with average neutron speeds typically about 20 million meters 
per second (around 45 million miles per hour). Importantly, plutonium 
oxide, in contrast to plutonium or uranium metal, had been shown 
to exhibit a much larger negative Doppler coefficient. It was the mag-
nitude of this negative Doppler coefficient that constituted the safety 
margin that was to be demonstrated at SEFOR.
Hence, SEFOR became, in the mid-1960s, the first (relatively) large 
fast-neutron reactor fueled with plutonium to be built in the United 
States. The SEFOR reactor was the first (large) reactor to couple the 
potential for very fast-neutron reaction rates (more challenging to con-
trol than the slow-neutron “thermal” reactors) with the use of pluto-
nium as fuel. Because of the perceived high hazard of plutonium should 
it be released to the atmosphere, and the increased risk of nuclear explo-
sion energy release that accompanies the operation of fast reactors, 
concerns of knowledgeable scientists, medical doctors, and industry/
government parties were very real.
The general population of northwest Arkansas and surrounding 
states appears to have been largely unaware of such concerns, instead 
receiving assurances by the AEC and the nuclear industry that the 
reactor would safely “demonstrate” that widespread fears of a nuclear 
explosion of magnitude to allow significant amounts of the plutonium 
in the reactor to enter the atmosphere were unfounded for the fast 
reactors then planned to be fueled with plutonium oxide (not metal-
lic plutonium). It didn’t hurt the government’s promotional case that 
the proposed commercial fast-breeder reactors (nearly a thousand were 
tentatively planned), all burning oxides (oxygenated forms of the pluto-
nium), were widely viewed as the best, if not the only, potential solution 
to the country’s energy problems. The nuclear explosion question was 
now going to be addressed with the use of plutonium oxides as fuel. 
How well it would be addressed is the principal concern of this book.
Important Additional Hazards of Plutonium
Plutonium began appearing in measurable amounts after about 1940 as 
a result of research driven by the development of nuclear fission weap-
ons. It soon became the fissile (fissionable) material of choice for nuclear 
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weapons production. The first microgram quantity of plutonium was 
produced at the University of California in 1941. Within a few years, 
plutonium production reactors were operating on the Hanford Res-
ervation spread out along the Columbia River in Washington State. 
The plutonium produced in those so-called “production” reactors was 
chemically separated into near pure form in purpose-built separation 
plants at Hanford.
The hazards of plutonium are due to its chemical (heavy metal) 
toxicity and its radioactivity. Plutonium is considered one of the most 
radiotoxic materials known. The first bomb-grade plutonium at Han-
ford was assembled as a hollow sphere approximately 4 inches in diam-
eter weighing about 6 kilograms (about 14 pounds), transported to the 
Trinity site in New Mexico and exploded in August 1945. A similar 
plutonium sphere was used in the bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki. 
In the Trinity test and in the Nagasaki bomb, only about one-fifth of 
the core, approximately 1 kilogram, fissioned, and approximately 1 gram 
(1/30th of an ounce) of its mass was converted into explosive energy 
equivalent to ~21,000 tons of TNT.
Most importantly to the population around the SEFOR site, the 
reactor’s enriched plutonium fuel made it a fast reactor, with potential 
neutron speeds tens of thousands of times faster than occurs in thermal 
reactors. Such neutron speeds results in much higher fission reactivity 
rates, which makes the engineering design for reactor control much more 
challenging. The result is a heightened potential for accidental explo-
sions; enrichment to the 20% level is an important step along the path 
required to assemble a nuclear weapon with very high explosion yield—
witness the present heightened concerns about the dangers of fissile fuel 
enrichment by countries potentially unfriendly to the United States.
We will very soon focus on the explosion potential of fast reac-
tors. However, as we are primarily concerned about the potential for 
radioactive substances accidentally released from reactors to enter the 
air (enabling inhalation by humans), we will first briefly consider what 
we think we know, and in some considerable measure has been verified, 
about quantifying the potential for humans to inhale air containing 
radioactive materials and the damage that can result. Of course, the 
libraries are filled with books containing such information, but it is so 
extensive and complicated that there is little likelihood of the general 
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population achieving a satisfactorily complete understanding of that 
scientific knowledge to be able to collectively agree on the dangers 
involved and the measures that can be taken to mitigate the hazards. 
Instead, the public continues to argue, largely utilizing various forms 
of wishful thinking, that the hazards to humankind of adopting such 
technological measures as fast plutonium-fueled reactors to generate 
electricity are overblown, in much the same way as the general popu-
lation seems split on the dangers of global warming. It is ironic that 
the present argument for the “nuclear” solution, involving consider-
able uncertainty, and so presciently negated with the occurrence of 
nuclear accidents “that couldn’t or wouldn’t happen” (like Chernobyl 
and Fukushima), is being suggested to solve the problem of global cli-
mate change. We believe that either of these threats, in time, could “do 
us in”; hence we must get this argument right lest we create even more 
problems that we cannot solve. Our first step is to set down briefly what 
the concerns are for the radioactivity hazards that could attend large-
scale plutonium fast-reactor operation to generate electricity.
While plutonium is “new,” radioactivity has been with us all 
along. It is common knowledge that radioactive materials are pervasive 
throughout the earth and its oceans and atmosphere; indeed, radioac-
tive materials, and the attendant hazards, are accepted as pervading 
the entire universe. But there has been an important change during the 
last century, beginning about 1940—we have managed to rearrange the 
materials composing the earth so as to concentrate them in more com-
pact form for our (presumed) benefit. We have learned how to “assem-
ble” or “concentrate” the unstable elements like uranium and heavier 
elements (like plutonium) in configurations with which we can design 
systems to release the powerful forces that hold the atoms of these mate-
rials together. The splitting of the nuclei of such atoms, which requires 
their assembly in greatly purified form, releases energy in the form 
of heat at rates thousands of times greater than we could accomplish 
before we “discovered” the mechanism of chain reaction nuclear fission.
The “assembly” discovery led to our building weapons that produce 
extraordinary explosion power utilizing uncontrolled fission processes, 
but the technology involved was soon extended to build nuclear power 
plants to provide controlled release of fission-generated heat energy to 
drive electricity generators. We now are well into an age of crippling fear 
of the potential for accidents in nuclear power stations to suffer releases of 
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radioactive materials to the environment with catastrophic consequences 
extending from the release site to very large distances— potentially 
involving large segments of the human, plant, and animal populations. 
The amount of radioactivity resulting from nuclear electric power pro-
duction in the world already may exceed the amount of radioactive mate-
rials that could be released if all of the atomic weapons existing were 
exploded (this amount is thought to be classified), and it is expected to 
grow even further, with few solutions for satisfactorily safe disposal in 
sight. Such is the present state of the nuclear waste disposal dilemma. 
The problem is at once simple to state and extraordinarily difficult to 
solve. The radioactive fission products that build up in fission reactors 
must be contained safely within the plants until they are required to be 
removed (periodically, for refueling). When they are removed, they must 
be placed where they cannot escape until the radioactive decay processes 
proceed to the point where the radioactivity hazard “disappears” (which 
it will eventually do). The problem is that the time period for radioactive 
decay processes to reach safe levels ranges, depending on the individual 
species (of which there are hundreds), from time periods of a few minutes 
(or small parts thereof) to thousands of years. Humankind has thus far 
been unable to solve this problem, which appears to be intractable, per-
haps more for political/sociological reasons than scientific ones.
Fast-Reactor Explosion Hazards
This book’s principal focus is the potential for accidental explosions 
occurring in fast nuclear reactors that could result in the release of large 
amounts of radioactive materials, including plutonium or other fissile 
isotopes of trans-uranium materials, into the environment. Aside from 
the releases of natural radioactive materials that occur in nuclear (elec-
tric) power generation due to mining and preparation of nuclear fuel 
and some arguably minor but necessary “planned” releases of radioac-
tive gases produced in operating reactors, the potential for radioactive 
materials contaminating the earth as a result of nuclear-powered elec-
tricity generation rests in large part in our lack of inability to ensure 
against releases due to accidental or intentional (terrorist) breaching of 
the reactors and their containment structures. In light of Chernobyl 
and Fukushima, as well as several other potentially disastrous near 
misses, we have a long way to go in solving this problem.
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Increasing fears of “radioactivity” were spurred by the results of 
the atomic bomb attacks on Japan, where the direct results of exposure 
to significant amounts of radiation were extreme, injuring and killing 
people in huge numbers within days or weeks. Following WWII, the 
increased releases of radioactive materials—especially associated with 
open-air weapons testing that resulted in exposure to the public to great 
distances by winds carrying the airborne radioactive gases and liquids 
and solids small enough to remain suspended in the atmosphere—
resulted in the fallout problem. We now know that a large part of the 
radioactive materials in the “clouds” produced by nuclear weapons 
remain suspended in the atmosphere for sufficient time to allow some 
of the material to become effectively diffused throughout the earth’s 
atmosphere. It is by no means uniformly distributed, but we can be sure 
that it has, or will, spread throughout the atmosphere, and indeed, in 
sufficient time, the entire earth. The part that does not stay suspended 
falls out onto the earth, constituting additional routes by which the 
radioactive materials can contact humans. Finally, such radioactive 
materials, which by definition are unstable, change to other materials 
via a process called radioactive decay. The so-called “daughter” prod-
ucts may also be radioactive, which means that all of the materials so 
formed will ultimately further decay into products until materials that 
are stable—that is, not radioactive—result.
In the case of electric-power-generating reactors, the radioactive 
products of the fission process and the subsequent decay processes that 
inevitably occur could theoretically be contained so that humanity is 
never exposed to significant amounts. Significant amounts are generally 
considered to be amounts that would not exceed those already pres-
ent on earth. What “significantly” means is, like the nuclear explosion 
potential of fast reactors, at best argumentative.
Explosion Containment
Research for this book showed that at the time SEFOR was constructed:
• The maximum (economical) containment that could be provided to 
ensure that a major release of aerosolized fuel and fission products 
from a commercial-size LMFBR could not occur was estimated to be 
about 1,000 pounds (1/2 ton) of TNT explosive equivalent. Provision 
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of significantly more robust containment appeared, on its own, to 
make the plants economically uncompetitive.
• The maximum possible (nuclear) explosion yield that could occur 
in a fast reactor due to accident or natural disaster causes was then 
argumentative, at best, and had been predicted by reputed scientists 
to exceed by an order of magnitude (at least ten times) the explosion 
energy yield that could be economically provided for.
Arkansas Gazette, May 15, 1964
Arkansas congressmen and businessmen pose with officials of the 
AEC at a signing of a contract for a multimillion-dollar atomic reac-
tor project near Fayetteville. At right, seated, is Glenn Seaborg, 
chairman of the AEC. 
















































Height 115 feet – Diameter 50 feet
Reactor vessel near center.
View through containment door. Grappling hook over reactor in 
 background. Post-closure.
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Fast Reactivity Excursion Device
FRED was an electromechanical device designed to accurately change 
the vertical position of a poison rod in the center of the reactor core. 
When the poison rod was centered in the core, it provided zero positive 
reactivity. Reactivity was added by pushing the rod out of the core at 
an accurately controlled rate, to an accurately specified position, after 
which the rod fell back into the core, terminating the reactivity addition. 
The time from start of rod movement to the chosen extent (larger extent 
gave increased reactivity addition) was intended in the tests described 
to be 0.1 second.
This photo was discovered in a magazine entitled The Russian Disaster: 
A Survival Handbook for the Nuclear Age, by Bernard Crossfield, PhD, 
published following the Chernobyl, Ukraine, disaster by Paladin Press. 
The text that had been added is incorrect; it is not a breeder reactor, nor 
is it being charged with fuel. At the time of the photo it was charged with 
approximately 900 pounds of plutonium fuel. The photo was taken from 
overhead the SEFOR reactor in the refueling cell. The reactor top has 
been removed, and the two men suited appear to be installing the FRED 
reactivity device. If the men pictured are recognized in this picture, we 
would appreciate a contact with the authors.
This photograph, an enlargement of the center section of the previ-
ous photo, appears to show the Fast Reactivity Excursion Device being 
installed in SEFOR. The FRED was installed in the center of the reactor.
Arkansas Gazette, March 7, 1967
J. Robert Welch (center), president of Southwestern Electric Power Com-
pany at Shreveport and president of Southwest Atomic Energy Associates, 
which is sponsoring construction of the SEFOR Reactor near  Fayetteville, 
discusses the project with Dr. Bert Wolfe, manager of SEFOR Engineer-
ing and Development (left) and Dr. Karl Cohen, manager of General Elec-
tric’s Advanced Products Division, designer and builder of the fast-oxide, 
sodium-cooled reactor of which Dr. Cohen is considered the originator.
This picture of the abandoned reactor, in a hayfield overgrown with 
trees, was taken from adjacent Arkansas Hwy 265, probably in the period 
2000–2010.
2019. The above-ground top half of the steel containment cylinder has 
been removed, and the reactor is being extracted.
2019. Installed in a secure container, leaving the site headed to a Nevada 
disposal site—after fifty years.
SEFOR demonstrated the Doppler effect for nuclear safety of fast-
breeder reactors fueled with plutonium-oxide fuel. Despite the acknowl-
edged importance thereof, this book shows that the results of the SEFOR 
experiments did not carry the message of guaranteed safety that the 
public was led to believe.
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For the fast breeder to work in its steady-state breeding condition you 
probably need something like a half ton of plutonium. In order that it 
should work economically in a sufficiently big power-producing unit, 
it probably needs quite a bit more than one ton of plutonium. I do 
not like the hazard involved. I suggested that nuclear reactors are a 
blessing because they are clean. They are clean as long as they func-
tion as planned, but if they malfunction in a massive manner, which 
can happen in principle, they can release enough fission products to 
kill a tremendous number of people. . . . If you put together two tons 
of plutonium in a breeder, one tenth of one percent of this material 
could become critical. I have listened to hundreds of analyses of what 
course a nuclear accident can take. Although I believe it is possible to 
analyze the immediate consequences of an accident, I do not believe 
it is possible to analyze and foresee the secondary consequences. In an 
accident involving a plutonium reactor, a couple of tons of plutonium 
can melt. I don’t think anybody can foresee where one or two or five 
percent of this plutonium will find itself, and how it will get mixed 
with some other material. A small fraction of the original charge can 
become a great hazard.
Edward Teller, 1908–2003
In September 1972, Dr. Richard E. Webb appeared before the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress in opposition to the 
construction of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project (CRBRP). Dr. 
Webb testified to the potential danger of nuclear explosions in fast reac-
tors that could be severe enough to compromise the containments then 
proposed to prevent catastrophic releases of radioactive materials to the 
environment. Webb’s testimony included statements that the AEC was 
c h a p t e r 
5 Nuclear Explosion Potential in Fast Reactors
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taking a chance with public safety by approving SEFOR as well as 
the CRBRP before sufficient research had been done to determine the 
maximum explosion potential that was possible in liquid-metal-cooled 
fast reactors. The written record of his testimony was followed by the 
AEC’s response, which we believe was unjustifiably dismissive. Webb 
prepared a written rebuttal to the AEC’s response and delivered it to the 
AEC in July 1973. Webb’s rebuttal was not made public by the AEC (to 
our knowledge), but we know the AEC received his rebuttal remarks, as 
the University of Arkansas Library determined that a copy of the rebut-
tal document is held by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
in Washington, D.C.
We obtained a copy of Webb’s rebuttal remarks to the AEC from 
Purdue University, whose library holds Dr. Webb’s papers relating to 
nuclear safety, in 2014. After careful review, we concluded that the rebut-
tal remarks, which exceed two hundred pages, constitutes one of the 
best discussions of fast nuclear reactor safety explosion hazard potential 
(that could be considered understandable by the public) that was avail-
able at the time it was written—mid-1973, one year after SEFOR closed. 
Webb’s rebuttal “report” is particularly significant because it can be 
confirmed that the AEC (now NRC) received it (presumably in 1973). 
The rebuttal remains today an excellent example of independent-expert 
testimony on the specific subject of fast-reactor explosion potential.
We present here selections pertaining to reactor safety from Dr. 
Webb’s testimony to Congress in 1972 followed by selected sections 
from the AEC’s response. We then present selected material from 
Webb’s rebuttal, which we believe remains insufficiently considered to 
this day. Finally, a stand-alone section from Webb’s rebuttal entitled 
“Basic Theory of LMFBR Nuclear Runaway in More Detail” is pre-
sented. This section provides excellent information for understanding 
the limits of nuclear explosion potential in fast reactors. While Webb’s 
testimony and his rebuttal will be heavy sledding for the typical reader, 
we think it important to make it a matter of public record in this book. 
In our opinion, Webb’s presentations, particularly the technical discus-
sions about the potential for nuclear explosions in fast reactors, remain 
the most accurate and sober description of such risks available to the 
lay reader. Indeed, it is suitable for careful study as groundwork for 
students as well as practitioners of nuclear engineering.
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It is our hope that Webb’s statements to Congress and the review 
thereof by the AEC in 1972, along with Webb’s rebuttal in 1973, and 
the effective dismissal by the AEC of essentially all of the points he 
raised less than a year before the AEC was dissolved, will be considered 
appropriate for serious consideration by any party desiring to know 
more about this critically important subject of nuclear fast-reactor 
safety—including the public and students at advanced levels in related 
engineering and science disciplines.
The AEC was abolished in 1974. In this chapter, we consider the 
relevance of Webb’s submissions to the AEC regarding the fast- reactor 
safety debate. Dr. Webb’s statement to Congress and his rebuttal 
remarks to the AEC appear below.
Excerpt from Hearings before the Joint  Committee on 
Atomic Energy, Congress of the U.S., 92  Congress, Second 
Session, Sept. 1972: Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor 
(LMFBR) Demonstration Plant
Excerpts from Statements by Dr. Richard E. Webb
Bloomington, Ind., September 20, 1972.
John O. Pastore
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Senator Pastore:
I am enclosing my statement concerning the Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast 
Breeder Reactor Demonstration Plant. Please accept it for inclusion in 
the record of your hearings on the LMFBR Demo.
My background and expertise briefly is as follows:
1.  Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering, the Ohio State University, March 
1972. My Ph.D. thesis concerns the explosion potential of the 
LMFBR.
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2.   Served four years (1963–1967) with the AEC’s Division of Naval 
Reactors, during which my primary responsibility was for the 
nuclear reactor portion of the Shippingport Pressurized Water 
Reactor.
a.  Certificate of successful completion, Bettis Engineering 
School of the AEC’s Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory (1965)
b.  Reactor Plant Training (one month) at the Navy’s DIG Pro-
totype Reactor Plant at the AEC’s Knolls Atomic Power 
Laboratory (1966).
3.  Worked one-half year at Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Station 
(Boiling Water Reactor) at Charlevoix, Michigan as associate 
engineer with reactor engineering duties in 1967. (I was offered 
a position with the LMFBR Program Planning Office in 1968.)
4.  B.S. Engineering in Physics, University of Toledo, 1962.
5.  Presently preparing a book on criteria and procedure for estab-
lishing sound public decision with respect to civilian nuclear 
power at Indiana University’s School of Public and Environ-
mental Affairs (Science, Technology and Public Policy section).
Sincerely yours,
Richard E. Webb
Enclosure: Statement on the LMFBR Demonstration Plant.
LMFBR Demonstration Plant
(Statement by Richard E. Webb)
Summary
The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Demonstration Plant (LMFBR 
Demo) should not be built (not now at least) because the maximum 
explosion potential has not been scientifically determined. Because the 
LMFBR Demo will contain up to 1.3 tons of Plutonium and a large 
amount of fission product radioactivity, which absolutely must not be 
allowed to be spewed into the environment by a reactor plant explo-
sion, the unknown explosion potential of the LMFBR Demo makes it 
imperative that the present plans for constructing and operating such a 
reactor be discarded in favor of further, more thorough, theoretical and 
experimental research into the said explosion potential. . . .
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Explosion Potential
The “Environmental Statement” (WASH-1509, April 1972) issued by 
the Atomic Energy Commission for the LMFBR Demo states that the 
substantiation of the claim that the reactor will be safe must await 
the issuance of the preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) when 
the construction permit application is filed with the AEC. (See E.S., 
p. 37, 107). But it is obvious from reading the Environmental State-
ment that the AEC and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have 
prejudged the question of safety. For example, Congress has already 
authorized the LMFBR Demo and appropriated the money for it (E.S., 
p. 1).  Furthermore, the AEC asserted in the Environmental Statement 
that the provisions in the reactor containment structure for “blast and 
missile protection within the inner barrier provide substantial margins 
against major potential energy release for all classes of accidents” (E.S., 
p. 54; emphasis added). The AEC added: “While it is impossible to 
postulate with precision the detailed course of accidents, including 
their likelihood and possible environmental consequences, it is possible 
to place bounds on such accidents” (E.S., p. 119; emphasis added).
These statements have no scientific foundation. Based on my 
knowledge of the state of the science of LMFBR explosion calculations, 
there is no chance that the aforesaid PSAR will substantiate such con-
clusions. Therefore, the construction of the LMFBR Demo should not 
be undertaken until after the necessary theoretical and experimental 
research is conducted, if such research demonstrates safety. The alter-
native is for Congress to recall the authorization and appropriation for 
the LMFBR Demo, wait for the issuance of the PSAR, and its review 
by the AEC and the Public, then hold public hearings on the safety of 
the LMFBR Demo.
The basis for my assertion is contained in my Ph.D. dissertation 
(thesis) which was submitted to, and approved by, the faculty authori-
ties in the department of Nuclear Engineering at the Ohio State Uni-
versity. The title of the dissertation is “Some Autocatalytic Effects dur-
ing Explosive Power Transients in Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast Breeder, 
Nuclear Power Reactors (LMFBRs),” the Ohio State University (1971).1 
A copy of the dissertation was sent to the director of the AEC’s Division 
of Reactor Licensing (Mr. Peter Morris), which the Committee could 
borrow.
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To summarize the conclusions of my dissertation, the calcula-
tional methods for determining the maximum explosion possible in 
an LMFBR have not been developed to include all possibilities, and 
their combinations, for autocatalytic phenomena during and after an 
initial nuclear runaway. That is, there are conceivable mechanisms by 
which “reactivity” can or might be rapidly “inserted” due to the motion 
of fuel material resulting from an initial core explosion or meltdown 
event. (Recall that in fast reactors, a core meltdown presents a mecha-
nism by which reactivity can increase semi-rapidly and trigger disrup-
tive or explosive power pulses.)2 In other words, an initial event, or 
series of events, might cause the reactor to feed itself a massive dose of 
“reactivity” which would amplify the initial runaway, or cause a very 
severe secondary runaway; either of which might lead to a disastrous 
explosion.
When the calculational methods are developed to include all pos-
sible autocatalytic effects, they would still need experimental confirma-
tion. Moreover, as I asserted in my thesis (p. 44), the present calculation 
methods “have not been confirmed experimentally for power reactor 
designs”. For example, it has been claimed by Hirakawa and Klick-
man3 that the KIWI-TNT power excursion experiment (TNT stands 
for Transient Nuclear Tests) has confirmed the MARS fast reactor 
excursion computer code. (The basic theory in MARS is the Bethe-Tait 
theory, which is partially used in the more advanced explosion codes 
such as VENUS. This theory provides the reactivity feedback mecha-
nism that ends or “shuts down” the power excursion, and thereby, limits 
the explosion force.) However, though the post facto MARS calcula-
tion of energy yield agreed fairly well with the KIWI-TNT measure-
ment, the power pulse height (peak power), pulse shape, and pulse 
width as calculated by the MARS code are completely different than 
the KIWI-TNT experimental results. I used a simple thermal expan-
sion model which excludes the basic theory in MARS that was thought 
to be tested (i.e., the Bethe-Tait theory), and calculated all four of the 
above items in excellent agreement with the experimental results.4 This 
strongly indicates that the inherent shutdown reactivity mechanism in 
the  KIWI-TNT experiment was not the Bethe-Tait mechanism, but 
one due to the simple thermal expansion of the KIWI core; and that 
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agreement between the MARS value of energy releases and experimen-
tal measurement was coincidental. In support of my conclusion, Jankus 
stated that the “Bethe-Tait assumption is definitely unjustified” for the 
KIWI-TNT excursion.5 Furthermore, KIWI was not a fast reactor. 
Therefore, the KIWI-TNT explosion test has not been shown to be a 
confirmation of LMFBR explosion theories.
The SEFOR power excursion tests, which were performed to con-
firm the mitigating action of the Doppler effect for fast reactors, can-
not be considered as proving out the LMFBR explosion calculational 
methods because the SEFOR excursions were not designed to lead to an 
explosion.6 The tests involved (1) relatively mild rates of programmed 
reactivity insertion, (and then the total reactivity inserted was limited 
to a small amount); (2) designed Doppler feedback magnitudes that 
were much greater than typical 1000 MWe LMFBR design values; and 
(3) automatic termination of the power transient by control rod scram 
(probably preprogrammed) to ensure against unexpected secondary 
excursions. Because of the strong Doppler and the limited amount of 
total reactivity that was inserted, the strongest power excursion tested 
was easily stopped with only about a 10% rise in the fuel tempera-
ture, which means that the SEFOR tests approached no threshold for 
meltdown or explosion. Normally in LMFBR accident calculations 
one assumes that the initial reactivity insertion is not limited, but is 
unrelenting. Thus in a real accident situation the Doppler effect alone 
would not be sufficient to terminate the power excursion, and the core 
would continue to generate energy until there is an explosive or disrup-
tive “disassembly” of the core that finally stops the power excursion 
and shuts down the reactor, if one could still call a reactor destroyed a 
“reactor.” (Just how severe the explosion is and whether aggravated by 
autocatalytic effects is my main concern.)
Therefore, although the SEFOR tests were very useful in demon-
strating the Doppler mitigating mechanism, and were evidently suc-
cessful in that regard they provide no confirmation of explosion cal-
culational methods. This is just as well, since there is a report which 
indicates that SEFOR was not designed to contain severe explosions.7 
With one-half ton of Plutonium in the SEFOR reactor, it appears that 
the AEC simply took a chance with the public safety by purposely 
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causing power excursions, which one tries normally to prevent in 
power reactors, to test a safety effect (Doppler feedback) that was not 
beforehand demonstrated in a fast reactor power excursion. (SEFOR is 
now being decommissioned now that the tests are finished.) Whereas, 
prudence would suggest that such tests involving so much Plutonium 
should have been conducted only after a thorough research into auto-
catalytic reactivity effects was completed to establish the maximum 
possible accident. Then prudence would suggest that such a test reactor 
would be placed deeply underground just in case something was over-
looked. (The EBR-I, BORAX-I, and SPERT-I reactors all suffered acci-
dents because the power excursions were under-calculated.8 But instead, 
SEFOR was built above ground and may have been without explosion 
containment. Similarly, the LMFBR Demo would be an experiment 
with unknowns, involving 1.3 tons of Plutonium, and fission product 
Strontium-90 and Cesium-137 and the like. That is, the LMFBR Demo 
is simply a chance that will be taken with the health and safety of the 
Public if allowed to be built without a firm ground of scientific research 
to establish the containment design.
I mentioned so far the lack of experimental confirmation of existing 
calculational methods, as well as the inadequacy of the calculational 
methods from the standpoint of autocatalytic reactivity effects. The 
improved calculational methods for predicting the LMFBR explosion 
potential, once developed, would still require experimental confir-
mation, just as was done to some extent for the Doppler effect in the 
SEFOR tests. To be sure, fast reactor explosion tests were proposed by 
Nims at the 1963 Argonne National Laboratory Conference on “Breed-
ing, Economics and Safety in Large Fast Power Reactors.” 9 Nims con-
sidered the straightforward approach of simply building a prototype 
reactor, causing the core to meltdown, and observing the resulting 
explosion. Such tests would have to be repeated in a variety of ways 
in an effort to cover all possible or conceivable ways in which the core 
might meltdown. Nims indicated that the costs for such a series of 
tests would be prohibitive, since a series of costly reactors would have 
to be built, just to be destroyed. As an alternative he proposed a series 
of partial core meltdown experiments, short of explosion, to learn the 
manner in which the core would meltdown; and then with a more con-
fident understanding of core meltdown acquired by such tests, full scale 
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reactor meltdown tests would be designed and performed to determine 
the severity of the explosions associated with the prior established core 
meltdown patterns.
Nims argued that this alternate scheme may provide the desired 
information regarding LMFBR explosion potential at acceptable cost. 
I would add that the development of improved calculational methods 
regarding autocatalytic effects, that I contend is necessary, would be 
of help in designing such explosion experiments. (Of course, there is 
the possibility that such improved calculational methods might predict 
with confidence that the explosion potential of LMFBRs is simply too 
great to ever consider building LMFBRs at all.) The LMFBR Program 
Plan (Volume 10, Safety) provides for studies of the necessity for such 
explosion testing.10 (The Plan has adopted the alternate scheme inves-
tigated by Nims as that which is to be considered, without mentioning 
the more direct method of testing prototype reactors.) I have seen no 
results of such studies. Presumably, they are still being conducted. But 
regardless of their outcome, until improved theoretical methods are 
developed and tested by reactor explosion experiments, claims that the 
LMFBR containment structure is designed to contain “all classes of 
accidents” and that “it is possible to place bounds on such accidents” 
will continue to be groundless. Accordingly, if the United States is to 
pursue LMFBR development, we should discard the plans for a dem-
onstration power reactor in favor of further research terminating in 
explosion testing, unless the theoretical research proves that LMFBRs 
are inherently unsafe, so that we can be assured of confining the Pluto-
nium and other radioactivity in the event of the worst possible LMFBR 
accident.
(The foregoing material was submitted to the AEC for comment 
Correspondence and comment follow:)
September 25, 1972.
Mr. Robert E. Hollingsworth
General Manager, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C.
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Dear Mr. Hollingsworth:
Enclosed is a “Statement on the Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast Breeder 
Reactor Demonstration Plant” by Richard E. Webb, Ph.D. The Com-
mittee is considering the inclusion of this statement in the public 
hearing record on the arrangements for construction and operation of 
the demonstration liquid metal fast breeder reactor. Please review the 






Washington, D.C., October 25, 1972.
Mr. Edward J. Bauser
Executive Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Congress of the United States
Dear Mr. Bauser:
In accordance with the request in your letter of September 25, 1972, 
enclosed is the AEC staff Review of a “Statement on the Liquid Metal 
Cooled, Fast Breeder Reactor Demonstration Plant” by Richard E. 
Webb, Ph.D.
In its comments the staff addresses mainly Dr. Webb’s views on 
breeder reactor safety. . . . Our review indicates that from technical 
and legal standpoints the Statement offers no justification for reversing 
the AEC’s current plans for designing, constructing and operating the 
LMFBR Demonstration Plant.
If we can provide you with any additional information in this 
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AEC Staff Review of Dr. R. E. Webb’s Statement on the 
LMFBR Demonstration Plant
Safety Issues Pertinent to the LMFBR Demonstration Plant
The Division of Reactor Development and Technology has under 
way an extensive base technology and development programs for the 
purpose of providing engineering and safety understanding and thus 
assuring the success of the LMFBR program objectives, including the 
Demonstration Plant. Volume 10 of the LMFBR Program11 covers all 
questions relating to the LMFBR Safety program and in particular such 
questions as raised by Dr. Webb, which fall in the category of hypo-
thetical accidents and their consequences. In the area of hypothetical 
accidents, the safety program has as its objective the understanding 
of phenomena related to hypothetical events and their consequences 
through the conduct of extensive in-pile and out-of-pile testing as well 
as analytical programs which complement the experiments. This under-
standing will provide realistic bounds and estimates of risk so as to 
permit both favorable engineering selection and assessment of risk rela-
tive to alternatives and to benefits anticipated. The LMFBR base and 
development program will encompass a full consideration of accident 
situations. Finally, the construction and the operation of the LMFBR 
Demonstration Plant will be subject to the Commission’s regulatory 
requirements; as required by law, a permit or license will not issue if the 
Commission believes such issuance would be inimical to the health and 
safety of the public. The Commission’s regulatory review will, among 
other things, be based on the state of the technology at that time, and 
on the specific features of the design being considered. Some examples 
of work under way in the areas of most concern to Dr. Webb are:
a. In the area of calculational methods for determining the magnitude 
of disassembly accidents, Argonne National Laboratory has devel-
oped the two-dimensional VENUS reactor disassembly code. This 
code takes into consideration autocatalytic reactivity effects such as 
fuel motion. The main conclusion from this work so far is that it 
takes only a moderate pressure and a very small amount of material 
movement to cause the disassembly of a nuclear reactor. Thus dur-
ing a hypothetical nuclear excursion, the minimum energy and thus 
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the generated pressures are limited by the early occurrence of disas-
sembly. This work has been conducted by using the FFTF param-
eters and characteristics. As can be seen from the referenced LMFBR 
Program Plan, work in this area is continuing. Because of the close 
coupling of potential safety problems to a particular design, a specific 
design (the demonstration plant for example) will be used to bring 
into sharp focus the LMFBR safety program, including work in the 
area of disassembly accidents of concern to Dr. Webb.
b. The in-pile meltdown tests performed to date in the TREAT reactor 
indicate that the mechanical damage potential is less than that which 
is thermodynamically possible by two or more orders of magnitude. 
  Dr. Webb uses the EBR-1 incident as a strong justification for his 
argument of the autocatalytic nature of fuel element melting. It has 
been established that the meltdown of the EBR-I fuel was due to 
fuel element bowing which because of the fuel’s structural design 
caused a positive coefficient of reactivity. It is this effect that caused 
the short period transient in the EBR-I experiment and eventually led 
to the meltdown. The postmortem examination of EBR-I indicated 
that uranium was expelled from the core. More than half of the ura-
nium which was originally at the core center had been pushed out by 
melting to a position near the edge of the core. Therefore, the EBR-I 
meltdown incident demonstrated that this phenomenon contributed 
to the shutdown of the reactor instead of leading the reactor into a 
“runaway” condition as asserted by Dr. Webb. In fact, the importance 
of fuel motion as a shutdown mechanism is also evident from recent 
analyses (ANL’s SAS and HEDL’s MELT Accident Analysis Codes) 
and the results from the in-pile testing in the TREAT reactor. 
The following are selected excerpts from Dr. Webb’s rebuttal to the 
AEC of July, 1973:12
Rebuttal
The AEC letter forwarding its Staff Review concludes that my State-
ment “offers no justification for reversing the AEC’s current plans for 
designing, constructing and operating the LMFBR Demonstration 
Plant.” However, the AEC’s staff review provides no valid basis for this 
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conclusion. Indeed, the staff review does not positively deny my allega-
tions. . . .
I will first describe basically how the LMFBR explosion hazard 
arises and the main problem to be solved in predicting the explosion 
potential. This basic theory will hopefully enable the layman to follow 
this evaluation, including my original statement. . . .
The Basic Theory of LMFBR Explosion Hazard
Basically, the LMFBR contains bundles of vertical fuel rods packed 
together to form the “core” which produces most of the heat of the reac-
tor. A coolant in the form of liquid metal (sodium) is pumped through 
the core to remove the heat and transfer it to the steam-turbine systems 
for electricity generation. The coolant passage space within the core 
is the narrow space between adjacent fuel rods. In addition, the core 
is pierced by non-fuel “control rods,” which are used to control the 
nuclear reaction. Surrounding the core is a “blanket” of fertile nuclear 
material, again in the form of rods, which is converted to fissionable 
fuel (Plutonium) by the “neutron” radiation from the core. (This con-
version into fissionable fuel is called “breeding.”)
The explosion hazard arises because of a phenomenon called 
“nuclear runaway,” which is an extremely rapid rise and fall in the reac-
tor power to extreme peak levels that yields an explosive burst of energy 
before the “nuclear excursion” is terminated. (This is also called a 
“power excursion.”) The reactor parameter or quantity that determines 
whether a runaway will be triggered is the “reactivity,” and is to be con-
trolled in order to avoid a nuclear runaway. When the reactivity is made 
zero, the reactor power level will remain constant; and the reactor is said 
to be “critical,” which is the desired condition for normal, steady, full-
power operations. When the reactivity is made positive (increased), but 
not too high, the reactor power level will rise at a controllable rate, and 
the reactor is said to be “supercritical.” When the reactivity is decreased 
to below zero (made negative), the power level will decay or fall; and the 
reactor would be said to be “sub-critical.”
But if the reactivity should increase above a threshold level, called 
“prompt critical,” then an uncontrollable nuclear runaway will occur, 
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which can end in core destruction, and conceivably a disastrous explo-
sion. During the nuclear runaway the reactor is said to be “super-
prompt- critical.” Again, if the reactivity is below prompt critical, but 
still positive (above zero), the power level will rise relatively slow in 
a controlled rate due to the action of something called “delayed neu-
trons,” which need not be described here. (See Appendix C for a deeper 
insight.) As we shall see, an unchecked supercritical power transient can 
lead to fuel over-heating and then a rise in the reactivity to trigger a 
super-prompt-critical power transient, or nuclear runaway.
The reactor “control rods” are the mechanical devices used to con-
trol the reactor’s reactivity. They are regulated, or moved in and out 
of the core of the reactor (the fuel region), to control the reactivity 
during normal operation, in order to control and maneuver the power 
level. Control rod withdrawal increases the reactivity, and control rod 
insertion decreases the reactivity. The control rods also have a crucial 
emergency function to be described shortly.
The mechanisms by which the reactivity is increased in an LMFBR 
accident situation are: Fuel compaction, and perhaps something called 
fuel “implosion”; control rod withdrawal; and sodium-coolant expul-
sion or voiding from the interior of the reactor core. The mechanisms 
for decreasing the reactivity during an accident are: core expansion; 
fuel temperature rise (the Doppler Effect); and control rod insertion. 
Increasing, or decreasing, the reactivity is sometimes referred to as 
“inserting” positive, or negative, reactivity, as the case may be.
The reactivity is measured in “percent” units. About .35% reac-
tivity is sufficient to make the reactor prompt-critical for an LMFBR 
(and about .7% for a water-cooled reactor). In general, a 2% reduction 
in the reactor core volume by fuel compaction produces about ½% 
positive reactivity (+ ½% reactivity). Conversely, a 2% increase in the 
core volume by fuel expansion produces about ½% negative reactiv-
ity (- ½% reactivity insertion). Therefore, slight compaction of the 
core can render the core super-prompt-critical and trigger a nuclear 
runaway, inasmuch as .35% reactivity equals prompt-critical. Due to 
the coolant space in the core, the potential for core compaction is 
about 50%, and therefore the potential for reactivity insertion is great; 
although the reactivity could not increase much beyond +1% without 
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causing a disastrous explosion and reversal of the compaction pro-
cess. Unchecked control rod withdrawal, and sodium expulsion due 
to sodium over-heating and boiling, can each add enough reactivity to 
cause a nuclear runaway, as well as fuel or core compaction.
It is the slight expansion of the core in response to the build-up of 
energy, and hence pressure, during a nuclear runaway that decreases 
the reactivity to below prompt-critical so as to terminate the nuclear 
runaway. (The Doppler temperature effect assists the core expansion 
effect in inserting negative reactivity.) Since the maximum net reactiv-
ity in a runaway will be about 1% for disastrous explosions, only the 
initial amounts of core expansion (about 1% increase in core volume) is 
needed to end even the worst nuclear runaway. If the energy generated 
during the runaway (called the “energy yield” or “energy released”) is 
strong enough, the core expansion process will take the form of an 
explosion. The expansion of the core due to explosion will ultimately 
render the reactor permanently subcritical (shutdown), if we can still 
call a destroyed reactor a “reactor,” as the core is “disassembled” by the 
explosion.
The severity of the nuclear runaway depends in part on the rate 
at which the reactivity increases above prompt-critical—i.e., the reac-
tivity insertion rate. A higher rate means that more reactivity can be 
“inserted” before expansive pressures build up than the case of a lower 
reactivity insertion rate, which in turn means that more expansion is 
then required for terminating the runaway. But before the core can 
expand and reduce the reactivity, the fuel materials must first acceler-
ate outward, which takes time and, thereby, delays the termination of 
the runaway beyond the point in time when the expansive pressures 
first appear. This time delay in expansion allows the runaway power 
level to continue to increase rapidly, and hence to increase the energy 
yield before expansion terminates the runaway. Since a higher reactivity 
insertion rate requires more expansion to stop the runaway, this time 
delay is lengthened, thereby worsening the energy yield. Any such delay 
is dangerous, since the energy yield could very quickly (of the order 
of a few millionths of a second) become extremely severe producing a 
disastrous explosion. Therefore, a greater reactivity insertion rate means 
more core expansion is needed to terminate the runaway, which in turn 
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means increased time delay before a termination, which in turn means 
a higher energy yield and, ultimately, a greater explosion.
There is, however, another phenomenon besides the initial reactivity 
insertion rate on which the severity of an LMFBR nuclear runaway acci-
dent depends, and this is called an autocatalytic reactivity effect, which is 
the main focus of my concerns for the LMFBR explosion hazard, and is 
defined as an increase in the reactivity during or after an initial nuclear 
runaway due to some cause which offsets the negative reactivity inserted 
by core expansion and the Doppler effect. If autocatalysis occurs, the ter-
mination of the nuclear runaway will be delayed, or the runaway could 
even be made worse by increasing the reactivity instead of decreasing it 
during the runaway; or if the runaway is already terminated, a second 
runaway could be triggered. An autocatalytic effect, then, worsens the 
total energy yield in an LMFBR accident and the resultant explosion.
The LMFBR has the potential for nuclear runaway and autocata-
lytic reactivity effects because the core contains so much concentrated 
fuel which is not arranged in the most reactive configuration. This is 
because the fuel is arranged in bundles of fuel rods (about 0.2 inch 
in diameter) which are spaced apart for coolant passage. About 50% 
of the initial core volume is taken up by these coolant passages. The 
coolant passages, therefore, provide space for fuel compaction. Should 
the fuel over heat and melt down or slump, the core can then become 
compacted and insert the reactivity to trigger a runaway. Since only 2% 
volume reduction can raise the reactivity to prompt critical, and 2% 
more can result in a disastrous explosion, we can see the potential ease 
for runaway due to core meltdown.
Strictly speaking, any spontaneous rise in the reactivity while below 
prompt-critical is also “autocatalytic,” as it produces a worsening power 
excursion, and can lead into a nuclear runaway. So, in the strict sense, 
any core compaction, implosion, or coolant expulsion that occur upon 
core overheating to increase the reactivity spontaneously are autocata-
lytic effects.
A core overheating and meltdown situation can be created by an 
“over-power accident,” which I’ll call a slow power excursion or rise, 
short of nuclear runaway, which heats the fuel at a greater rate than 
what the reactor coolant can remove; or by a loss-of-cooling accident in 
Nuclear Explosion Potential in Fast Reactors | 91
which the reactor coolant slows down as it passes normally through the 
core (due to loss of pumping), or is expelled from the core as it is boiled, 
or simply drains through a pipe rupture.
The fuel motion under meltdown can be vigorous as molten and 
hot solid fuel is pushed by the boiling, flashing, and exploding sodium 
coolant, and other high pressure forces, or as the fuel is acted on by grav-
ity. The fuel motion upon core meltdown then determines the reactiv-
ity insertion rate at prompt-critical, which could be severe. Recall that 
sodium coolant expulsion due to boiling is another way which reactivity 
can be added to trigger a nuclear runaway. Other ways include control 
rod ejection and dropping a fuel rod bundle into a critical core during a 
refueling operation. These other ways could produce a severe reactivity 
insertion rate as well. (Although, it is not clear that a single control rod 
ejection by itself could trigger a nuclear runaway; but it could induce a 
power excursion, and core meltdown, and then a runaway.)
(Incidentally, the LMFBR core will contain about 250 bundles of 
fuel rods, all bunched together; and each bundle will contain about 200 
fuel rods, making about 50,000 fuel rods total in the core. The number 
of control rods will be about 50, although these are much larger than 
a single fuel rod.)
The concern for autocatalytic reactivity effects arises because of 
the non-uniform nature of core meltdown and expansion. If the core 
were uniform and expanded uniformly as the result of a nuclear run-
away, there would be no question but that the expansion would reduce 
the reactivity and terminate the runaway without autocatalysis. But 
because the expansion process will be highly non-uniform (i.e., the fuel 
motion will be haphazard) and because of the large amount of con-
centrated fuel in an LMFBR (the core contains enough fuel to make 
ten to forty separate “critical” reactors if fully compacted), there is the 
valid concern that the fuel will, on its way toward overall core expan-
sion, collect in a different  super-prompt-critical configuration long 
enough (of the order of 5/1000 second) to amplify the initial nuclear 
runaway or cause a very severe secondary runaway. These autocatalytic 
effects due to fuel motion during or right after a nuclear runaway, then, 
become a matter of grave concern. For an initial runaway could add 
enough energy to melt the whole core and even vaporize it to explosive 
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pressures. Under these conditions, the motion of fuel can conceivably 
generate very severe autocatalytic reactivity effects ending in a disas-
trous explosion. For example, an initial runaway could be terminated 
by slight expansion of the core in the initial phase of the explosion. 
But because there is so much fuel that is relatively loosely arranged, the 
expansion of fuel in one region of the core could conceivably compact 
another region of the core and make the overall reactor super-prompt- 
critical again. This “explosive compaction” could make the “ reactivity 
insertion rate” for the second runaway very high, because the reactivity 
is rising with explosive fuel velocities, which tends to produce an even 
greater runaway. Furthermore, with explosive compaction, the momen-
tum of the fuel would be toward increasing local compaction, and, 
therefore, increasing reactivity, delaying the core expansion (shutdown) 
process until it can overcome the momentum, which would make the 
runaway all the more worse. The process is extremely complicated to 
analyze.
A special case of fuel motion is “implosion,” where the fuel in the 
core explodes or expands inward or into an inner, hollow cavity that 
may have been created in the core upon meltdown. Implosion is neither 
compaction, nor overall core expansion; but it can be autocatalytic, as 
it tends to bring fuel together, like compaction, and thereby raise the 
reactivity. Thus implosion further complicates the calculation of core 
behavior in an LMFBR accident to predict whether net autocatalytic 
behavior is possible.
The primary purpose of evaluation of LMFBR safety, given in this 
rebuttal, is to convey to the layman the extreme complexity involved 
in calculating fuel motion under LMFBR accident situations or condi-
tions, and to show that disastrous autocatalytic nuclear runaways due 
to fuel motion may very well be possible, and certainly have not been 
scientifically investigated, and that the maximum explosion potential 
has not therefore been established. That is, it may very well be possible 
for an LMFBR to suffer a disastrous nuclear explosion, releasing a large 
fraction, if not virtually all, of the core’s Plutonium and fission product 
radioactivity into the Environment, as the science of LMFBRs is not 
well established in this regard.
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So far, I have but touched on the Doppler effect, which has an 
important mitigating effect on the nuclear runaway. This Doppler 
effect promptly inserts negative reactivity as the fuel temperature climbs 
during the runaway, so as to reduce the reactivity and slow down the 
runaway. Without it, the explosion potential of the LMFBR would 
unquestionably be too high. However, the reactivity reduction potential 
of the Doppler effect is limited to about 1% negative reactivity, which 
means that autocatalytic reactivity effects conceivably could override or 
nullify the Doppler effect.
Another important aspect of LMFBR accidents is the “reactor 
scram” function, which is the rapid insertion of the reactor control 
rods to render the core subcritical in an emergency, and thereby avoid 
prompt-criticality (i.e., nuclear runaway). The SCRAM, then, shuts 
down the reactor so as to ensure against overheating and melting, and 
thus core compaction and the resultant nuclear runaway, provided that 
the coolant is still present to remove the “decay heat” produced by the 
decaying radioactivity that builds up with reactor operation. Failure to 
SCRAM upon detection of a core-overheat situation is expected to be 
the most probable way in which a nuclear runaway can occur, and the 
power level would remain high to effect meltdown or coolant expul-
sion—the main reactivity rise mechanisms.
However, once the reactor is super-prompt-critical, the control rod 
scram function is of no use since the runaway is extremely rapid (lasting 
only about 1/1000 of a second), and will be over before the control rods 
could be inserted appreciably. Furthermore, once the core melted-down 
or exploded, it seems possible that a control rod scram would not be 
of any help in preventing secondary nuclear runaways, as (1) the core 
could be so distorted as to not permit control rod insertion, since these 
rods are fitted into the core with little clearance; (2) the control rods 
themselves could be damaged or ejected by the explosion; or (3) the 
reactivity rise due to meltdown could override the negative reactivity 
“worth” of the control rod scram. In addition, there is the concern 
that the core could suffer overheating leading to runaway before being 
detected quickly enough for the SCRAM to be initiated in time to 
control the situation.
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Finally, it is useful to compare the LMFBR with the commercial 
water-cooled nuclear reactor of today—the so-called “light water reac-
tor,” or the LWR. The LMFBR is greatly different than the LWR from a 
core meltdown and nuclear runaway standpoint. A large LMFBR has a 
much higher “power density in the core at normal, full-power conditions, 
by about 10 times (the power density is the power produced in one unit 
of core volume); a much greater concentration of fuel; and a much more 
rapid nuclear runaway given the same reactivity rise, which is a conse-
quence of the greater fuel concentration and the different reactor coolant. 
LWRs have such a low fuel concentration, on the other hand, that they 
are not susceptible to nuclear runaway upon fuel meltdown, even if the 
fuel were fully compacted, according to Forbes (a point which should be 
confirmed). The higher power density means that the LMFBR is all the 
more prone to meltdown should the core suffer coolant interruption, and 
in that respect is more prone to nuclear runaway. The higher power den-
sity means also that the heating due to the intense radioactivity buildup 
in the core is greater because the radioactivity is more concentrated. This 
heating, called “decay heat,” exists even when the reactor is subcritical, 
and can by itself under certain conditions cause meltdown and bring 
about nuclear runaway in the LMFBR. (For example, it is conceivable 
that the core could be distorted by an explosion such that it would not 
be amenable to cooling. Because of the decay heat, the core would melt 
down, even if the fission power level were negligible, and trigger a sec-
ondary explosion.) Nor does the LMFBR inherently shutdown (become 
subcritical) should the core lose its coolant, as is the case for an LWR. 
Instead, a reduction of coolant in the LMFBR core can by itself raise the 
reactivity and trigger a nuclear runaway as mentioned before; whereas 
the LWR requires the presence of the water coolant in the core to make 
the reactor critical, because of its low fuel concentration.
In other words the LMFBR has so much fissionable material in con-
centrated form that it is prone to suffer nuclear runaway and explosion 
accidents if the core configuration or condition is perturbed slightly. 
Indeed, a mild local perturbation in the core of an LMFBR could 
generate a strong enough over-power transient so as to melt down the 
entire core and lead to an even stronger nuclear runaway, the bounds of 
which have not been scientifically determined. Again my concern for 
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autocatalytic reactivity effects is that a core undergoing a nuclear run-
away may possibly be capable, during an early phase of the explosion, of 
either compacting or imploding part of its fuel so as to amplify the ini-
tial nuclear runaway or to trigger stronger secondary nuclear runaways 
that end in a disastrous explosion. Core explosion is given the name 
“core disassembly,” although this term could imply relatively nonviolent 
core disruption or expansion as well. Core disassembly is the reverse of 
compaction or implosion and eventually stops the nuclear runaway by 
virtue of the fact that the fuel is blown apart so that it can no longer 
sustain an atomic fission chain reaction to generate energy. But, if the 
energy created by the runaway is great enough, the disassembly would 
occur explosively. It is crucial to predict the fuel motion during the acci-
dent to determine whether the fuel will implode or compact in an auto-
catalytic manner, or whether the fuel disassembles permanently without 
chance for re-assembly into a critical mass, and runaway, later on.
Complicating a prediction of the motion of fuel, and thus the 
strength of nuclear explosions (I shall use the term “nuclear explosion” 
to denote the combination of the nuclear runaway and the explosion 
which follows.), is the existence of a myriad of different pressure sources, 
such as sodium coolant boiling, which can itself be explosive, gaseous 
by-products of the fission process, and fuel vapor and other effects, all of 
which are inter-related and dependent on the conditions of the reactor 
at the onset of trouble. These complications, plus the difficulty in pre-
dicting theoretically whether autocatalytic reactivity effects due to the 
complicated fuel motion can occur, and then confirming the theoretical 
predictions experimentally, is the central problem which my Statement, 
and this Rebuttal of the AEC’s comments, address.
Finally, we present Appendix C of Dr. Webb’s rebuttal to the AEC. 
Webb suggested (in his rebuttal remarks above) it be referred to “for a 
deeper insight.” It appears that Appendix C would still be lying in a 
drawer at the NRC had we not searched for the record of his submit-
tal remarks to the AEC. In our opinion, Webb’s Appendix C may well 
be the most concise, accurate, and sober description of the potential 
explosion risks associated with fast-breeder reactors that is suitable for 
consideration by the public today.
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Appendix C of Webb’s Rebuttal
Basic Theory of LMFBR Nuclear Runaway in More Detail
A nuclear power reactor, such as an LMFBR, generates energy or heat 
for eventual electric power production by the fissioning (splitting) of 
uranium and plutonium fuel atoms. This fissioning is caused by the 
interaction of fuel atoms with small atomic particles, “neutrons,” which 
fly around inside the reactor at great speeds. When a neutron strikes the 
nucleus of a fuel atom, it is likely to be absorbed and cause the atom to 
fission. The number of fuel atoms in the core is extremely large; and only 
a tiny fraction of these are fissioned in one second. Numerically, one ton 
of fuel in a large 1000 MW LMFBR is made up of about 2 x 10 27 atoms, 
i.e., 2 thousand trillion trillion atoms. In one second our 1000 MW 
LMFBR will fission 3 x 10 19 fuel atoms, or 3 billion trillion atoms. 
Hence to fission all of the fuel atoms in a ton of fuel in our 1000 MW 
LMFBR would require 2 x 10 27 ÷ 3 x 1019 = 2/3 x 10 8 seconds (67 mil-
lion seconds), or about 3 years. Therefore, when I speak of fissioning, 
extremely large numbers are involved, even though I might refer to one 
or a thousand fissions. Likewise, large numbers of neutrons are involved.
Each fission, besides releasing the sought after energy, releases sev-
eral neutrons (2.5 neutrons per fission on the average), which are then 
available to carry on the process through the next fission cycle in order 
to sustain the fissioning rate (power level) in the reactor. However, since 
only one of the released neutrons is needed for the “next fission,” 1.5 
neutrons per fission are extra, the difference between 2.5 and 1.0. But 
as we shall see next, these extra neutrons are lost to the system either 
by leakage or non-fissionable absorption, except for slight imbalances 
which give rise to power level transients, which can be slow or extremely 
rapid, as in an explosive nuclear runaway.
Because of the finite size of the batch of fuel in the reactor, which 
is called the “reactor core,” a fraction of the neutrons produced by fis-
sion are lost due to leakage—i.e., some neutrons escape the core and 
never return to cause fissions. Because, too, non-fuel materials exist 
in the core which absorb neutrons, such as structural materials and 
 Uranium-238, used to dilute the fuel, some of the neutrons are absorbed 
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without causing fission. The result of the size and non-fuel effects is a 
competition between losses (leakage and absorption) and gains (fission 
neutrons). When these competing factors are balanced, the fission rate 
or power level is constant, and the reactor is said to be “critical.” In 
general, whenever fissionable material in a critical reactor is brought 
closer together (fuel compaction), the chances for the neutrons striking 
fuel atoms and causing fission, rather than leaking out of the core, will 
improve; and the neutron balance in the fission cycle tips in favor of 
excess neutrons available for fissioning. The extra neutrons then pro-
duce fissions which in turn produce extra neutrons, and so on as the fis-
sion-neutron cycle repeats. The result is a growing neutron population 
and a growing fissioning rate, and hence an increasing reactor power 
level. In this condition the reactor is said to be “supercritical.” In the 
reverse case, when fuel expands (fuel moving apart), the neutron leak-
age increases; and then the neutron balance tips the other way, causing 
the power level to decay, since less than one neutron released per fission 
on the average is available to sustain the next fission. In this condition 
the reactor is said to be “subcritical.”
The percentage difference between the number of neutrons available 
for fissioning and the number needed to sustain the fissioning rate at a 
constant level is a crucial parameter called the “reactivity.” Therefore, 
when the reactivity is positive, the fissioning rate grows and the reactor 
is supercritical; and when the reactivity is negative, the fissioning rate 
decays, and the reactor is subcritical. Thus, fuel compaction increases the 
reactivity, and fuel expansion decreases the reactivity. When the reactivity is 
zero, the reactor is critical. As we shall see, +1% reactivity is very strong.
There is another kind of neutron balance involving the time scale, 
and concerns the controllability of reactor power level increases. Fore-
most is the “neutron lifetime,” which is the time period between the 
release of neutrons from one set of fissions until these fission neutrons 
cause the next set of fissions (a fission cycle). The neutron lifetime is 
extremely short in an LMFBR—about .0000001 seconds, or one-tenth 
of a millionth of a second, due mainly to the fast speeds of the neutrons, 
which is why the LMFBR, Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor, is called 
a “fast” reactor—meaning a fast neutron reactor. If this is all there were 
to fission-physics, then once a reactor was made slightly supercritical, it 
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would quickly runaway with an uncontrollable burst of energy. In order 
to appreciate this, assume that a large 1000 megawatt LMFBR was criti-
cal at a feeble power level of 1/100 watt, which would be .00000000001 
of the reactor’s designed full-power level. Then assume the reactor is 
made supercritical by a slight compaction of the fuel so that the reac-
tivity is increased to +.5%. (Roughly, a 2% reduction in reactor core 
volume by core compaction adds .5% of positive reactivity. Potentially, 
the core volume could be reduced by about 50% by compaction; but as 
we shall see, a nuclear runaway would explode the core before it could 
be compacted very much past a 2% volume reduction). A reactivity of 
.5% means that the number of fissions per cycle would increase by .5% 
with the passage of each neutron lifetime (i.e., from one fission cycle to 
the next fission cycle). This means that the number of fissions occurring 
per cycle increases, not at a steady rate, but at progressively increasing 
rate (i.e., “exponentially”). This is because the number of fissions in 
one cycle is .5% greater than the number of fissions in the immediately 
preceding fission cycle, and not .5% of the number of fissions in the 
first cycle after the reactivity was raised above zero. That is, the increase 
between successive fission cycles is .005 times the current number of 
fissions occurring per cycle. Since the increase per cycle gets larger when 
the current number of fissions per cycle gets larger, the growth rate of fis-
sioning accelerates, instead of staying constant, as time progresses.
As an illustration, let us assume that the cycle produced 1000 fis-
sions, and then compare the case of steady-rise with the exponential-
rise after 10, 100, 300, 1000, and 2000 cycles, respectively, given the 
.5% reactivity. The following table illustrates the difference between 
the two cases.
Number of Fissions Occurring in the “Nth” Cycle
 Nth Cycle  Steady Rise  Exponential Rise
 1st 1,000 1,000
 10th  1,050 1,051
 100th  1,500 1,650
 300th 2,500 4,500
 1,000th 6,000 143,000
 2,000th 11,000 20,500,000
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From the table we see that there is little difference in the first 100 
cycles. However, the number of fissions per cycle in the exponential case 
begins to get progressively greater than the steady-rise case, until past 
the 1000th cycle when the exponential rise “runs away.” This process 
happens extremely quick in time because of the short neutron lifetime 
(time period of the fission cycle). For example, there are 50,000 fission 
cycles in just one-thousandth of a second, or millisecond, which allows 
a tremendous growth in fissioning in a very short interval of time.
Let us now ask what would be the power level and energy generated 
after our hypothetical reactor was supercritical at .5% reactivity for one 
millisecond. The answer is that the power level would grow, if it were not 
controlled by core expansion (and fuel burn-up) to 500 billion times the 
1000 megawatt full-power level designed for the reactor, starting with 
only a feeble 1/100 of a watt; and the energy generated during the mil-
lisecond would be 100 billion megawatt-seconds, roughly equivalent to a 
25 megaton nuclear weapon explosion. Actually, the heat generated early 
during the transient would create pressures within the fuel to expand 
the fuel, which decreases the reactivity to a negative value. (Just as the 
fission rate grows exponentially when the reactivity is positive, the fission 
rate decays exponentially when the reactivity is negative. Therefore, when 
the reactivity is negative, the power level will quickly decay to a feeble 
level with the same rapidity as the runaway rise in power level.) This 
expansion, therefore, affects the reactivity, and the course of the runaway, 
and must be taken into account. When it is, an LMFBR under a .5% 
reactivity runaway (and no Doppler feedback) will produce an explosion 
of the order of 1000 lbs. TNT equivalent, excluding autocatalytic reactiv-
ity effects, according to estimates. This negative reactivity effect due to 
expansion thus terminates the runaway, limiting it to a much less violent 
explosion—about 1000 lbs. TNT equivalent for the assumed reactivity 
condition in an LMFBR. This phenomenon of exponential growth of 
the fission rate is called a “nuclear runaway,” which can produce a burst 
of explosive energy.
Given such hypothetical reactor behavior, the reactor would 
not be controllable, since a slight increase in the reactivity, which a 
reactor operator would normally want to make in order to raise the 
power level from shutdown to full power level, for example, would 
lead instantly (within a millisecond) to reactor destruction before the 
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control equipment could respond. This is because the mechanical reac-
tor control equipment couldn’t make the super-fine changes in reactiv-
ity that would be needed to raise the reactor power level at a controlled 
rate for our hypothetical reactor. That is, the nuclear runaway would 
be over within a millisecond, before the control rods would move any 
appreciable amount.
Fortunately, for control purposes, a small fraction of the fission-
released neutrons (about .3% to .7%) in a real reactor do not appear 
promptly with the fissions, but are emitted by the fission fragments with 
about a one second delay. The fraction of the fission neutrons which 
are delayed is called the “delayed neutron fraction.” If a reactor was 
made supercritical, but with the reactivity kept below the delayed neutron 
fraction, the delayed neutrons would have the effect of suppressing the 
growth rate of the fissioning, enabling one to control the reactor. To 
understand why, consider again our hypothetical supercritical reactor 
with no delayed neutrons.
With the reactivity positive, there would be more fission-released 
neutrons to cause further fissioning than would be needed to sustain the 
fission rate at a constant level. But by not being delayed, the extra neu-
trons would cause the extra fissioning within the short neutron lifetime. 
Hence, the fission rate would rise extremely rapidly in an exponential, 
runaway fashion. But if the extra neutrons were delayed by about one 
second, then the extra fissioning, caused by these extra neutrons, would 
be correspondingly delayed. The result is that the fissioning rate, or reac-
tor power level, in a real reactor would grow slowly, over the time scale 
of seconds instead of 1/10 of a millionth of a second (i.e., instead of in 
the runaway fashion, if the reactivity is less than the delayed neutron 
fraction). In this state the reactor is still said to be “supercritical.” This 
neutron delay, then, provides enough time for the reactor control system 
to maneuver the power level during normal operation. When the desired 
power level is reached, the reactivity is returned to zero, so that the reac-
tor will be made critical—i.e., producing power at a constant level.
However, if the reactivity is raised to exceed the delayed neutron frac-
tion, then there will be an excess of prompt neutrons available for extra 
fissioning. The growth of fissioning will then occur over the short time 
period of the “neutron lifetime,” instead of over a long delayed period. 
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Hence, when the reactivity exceeds the delayed neutron fraction (about 
.35% in an LMFBR), a nuclear runaway will ensue in the fashion of 
our “hypothetical” reactor previously discussed. In this runaway condi-
tion, the reactor is then said to be “super-prompt-critical.” When the 
reactivity equals the delayed neutron fraction, the reactor is said to be 
“prompt critical,” which is the threshold for nuclear runaway. The crux 
of reactor control is to keep the reactivity below prompt critical, or else an 
explosive nuclear runaway will occur. But this is not always possible, as 
an accident could make the reactor super-prompt-critical.
Next, we shall summarize the phenomena which can change the 
reactivity, as these reactivity effects are crucial to the control and the 
accident behavior of the LMFBR. These phenomena are as follows:
• Reducing the neutron leakage increases the reactivity.
 This is accomplished by bringing fuel together (compacting fuel 
or adding more fuel) so that the neutrons have a better chance of 
interaction with the fuel atoms, rather than being lost due to leak-
age. A special case of compaction is implosion; e.g., when the fuel 
explodes into a hollow, interior cavity, while being essentially con-
fined from exploding outward. A fuel meltdown could produce core 
compaction.
• Increasing the neutron leakage decreases reactivity.
 This is accomplished by moving fuel apart: expansion as with explo-
sion; fuel falling away from the core; or fuel from the core being 
removed mechanically or carried away by the flowing coolant.
• Increasing the neutron absorption by non-fuel material decreases reactiv-
ity; conversely, reducing such absorption increases reactivity.
 This phenomenon is used to control the reactor once enough fuel 
is assembled to make the reactor critical. The control is effected by 
inserting or withdrawing “control rods” into and out of the reactor 
core. These control rods are made of non-fuel, neutron-absorbing 
material. Thus inserting them into the core robs neutrons that would 
otherwise cause fission, and thereby, decreases the reactivity. With-
drawing the control rods reduces the non-fuel absorption of neutrons 
and increases the neutrons available for fissioning, and thus increases 
the reactivity. In general, the reactor is designed so that the neutron 
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balance is achieved when the control rods are withdrawn to the “criti-
cal height” position that is part way out of the core. When the control 
rods are withdrawn to this height, the reactor will be critical. Further 
withdrawal will make the reactivity positive, and the reactor will be 
supercritical. If the control rods are withdrawn too far, the reactiv-
ity can increase beyond the delayed neutron fraction, and the reactor 
will be made super-prompt-critical, and then a nuclear runaway will 
ensue. These control rods are regulated so as to raise and lower the 
reactor power level for normal operation while keeping the reactivity 
below prompt critical. Also, as the fuel “burns-up” with use (each fis-
sion destroys a fuel atom), the reactivity would tend to become negative 
(i.e., make the reactor subcritical) since fuel burn-up has the effect of 
removing fuel. (A subcritical reactor could not produce power because 
the power level would decay to practically zero.) To compensate for this 
burn-up effect, the control rods are withdrawn slowly over the period of 
months as the fuel is depleted to keep the reactor critical and produc-
ing power. The fuel will continue to be depleted with reactor operation 
until the control rods are fully withdrawn from the core, in which case 
the reactor power level could not be sustained for normal operations 
(end of life), and the reactor would have to be “refueled.” However, if 
the reactor suffered fuel meltdown in the “end-of-life” condition, there 
is still the reactivity rise potential due to core compaction and, there-
fore, the potential for nuclear runaway accidents. The control rods also 
have a crucial safety function. In the event that the reactor should reach 
a dangerous reactivity condition (near prompt critical) the “protection 
system” is designed to rapidly insert or “scram” the control rods to ren-
der the reactor subcritical. This safety action is called “reactor scram.”
• Increasing the fuel temperature decreases the reactivity.
 This is an inherent safety mechanism called “Doppler feedback,” which 
is being designed into LMFBR’s in the United States. It is designed to 
act during a nuclear runaway to limit the energy burst, when a con-
trol rod scram would be too slow to have any mitigating effect. More 
specifically, as the temperature rapidly increases in the fuel during a 
nuclear runaway, the Doppler effect promptly subtracts reactivity to 
slow the runaway and, in some mild runaway cases, can render the 
reactor safely subcritical until the control rod scram can permanently 
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shut down the reactor without the generation of excessive tempera-
tures (i.e., explosive pressures). However, in most runaway accidents, 
the source of the initial reactivity increase which caused the runaway 
will persist to override the negative Doppler reactivity. Other sources 
of positive reactivity may occur as well. So Doppler feedback is not 
sufficient to stop most accidents. Also, the Doppler reactivity reduc-
tion potential is limited practically to about 1% of negative reactivity. 
Thus Doppler is not enough to cope with the potential for accidental 
positive reactivity addition. (The negative reactivity of overall core 
expansion is being counted on as the main shutdown mechanism 
for terminating a nuclear runaway.) The chief role of the Doppler, 
then, is to slow down the nuclear runaway long enough to enable the 
expansion process and make subcritical. This mitigating effect of the 
Doppler can be strong.
• Sodium coolant (liquid metal) expulsion from the core can increase or 
decrease reactivity, depending on which regions of the core are made 
devoid of coolant.
 This effect is due to a trade-off between increased neutron leak-
age and increased neutron absorption by the fuel when coolant is 
“voided” from the core. The net reactivity change can be positive if 
the sodium coolant is expelled (voided) from the inner regions of the 
core, where neutron leakage from the core is lowest.
Having now described the basic reactivity change mechanisms, let 
us learn how these mechanisms can be called into play in an LMFBR 
accident to bring about a nuclear runaway and explosion.
The fuel in the LMFBR is arranged in bundles of fuel rods spaced 
somewhat apart for coolant passage (heat removal). Therefore the fuel 
is not arranged in its most reactive state, since the coolant passages 
provide space for fuel compaction. However, the reactor fuel rods are 
designed to be fairly rigid so that they won’t bow inward or slump 
(compact) during normal operations and add excessive reactivity. 
However, if the fuel should over-heat, either by unchecked control rod 
withdrawal, which adds reactivity and causes the power level to rise to 
excessive levels, or by a loss-of-coolant, the fuel will melt, lose its rigid-
ity, and could then collapse onto itself as the molten fuel moves into 
the coolant passage space. The result of core meltdown, then, could be 
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core compaction, which can cause an excessive rise in reactivity. Keep 
in mind that it takes only slight compaction to raise the reactivity to 
prompt critical—about 2% volume reduction of the core; and then 
slightly more compaction to trigger the nuclear runaway. That is, slight 
fuel movement either way can have either a serious positive reactivity 
effect, or a strong negative reactivity, shutdown effect. Actually, after 
the reactor has operated a while, intense radioactivity builds up, so 
that even if the reactor was made subcritical and the fission power level 
dropped to feeble levels, the heat from the decaying radioactivity called 
“decay heat,” which is substantial, will persist. This decay heating can 
by itself melt the fuel and could bring about core compaction.
Besides fuel meltdown, sodium coolant voiding can trigger a 
nuclear runaway as well. For example, a loss-of-coolant flow accident or 
over-power accident can lead to coolant overheating, boiling, and then 
expulsion or voiding of the coolant from the core. This sodium voiding 
can then add reactivity past prompt critical to produce a nuclear run-
away. This is an example of autocatalytic behavior, where an LMFBR 
accident feeds itself a dose of positive reactivity by overheating to pro-
duce a nuclear runaway, which then worsens the accident.
The central concern in LMFBR accident analyses is the behavior 
of the reactivity during the accident. From the foregoing it is clear that 
besides coolant voiding we must be able to accurately predict fuel motion 
during an LMFBR accident situation to determine whether the explo-
sion process itself can compact part of the core to a sufficient degree to 
increase the reactivity before overall core expansion permanently renders 
the reactor subcritical or shutdown. If sufficient fuel compaction occurs 
during an explosion to offset the negative reactivity due to Doppler and 
overall core expansion, then the net reactivity can increase, instead of 
decrease during the nuclear runaway, and the runaway will become 
worse (faster), instead of being terminated; or if the nuclear runaway 
had already been terminated, a second one could occur. As we’ve seen at 
the outset, the energy can build up very quickly to dangerous, explosive 
levels when the nuclear runaway condition is prolonged. The behavior 
of the reactor when reactivity rises instead of falls during the accident is 
called “autocatalytic,” meaning that the core is its own catalyst—speed-
ing up its own fission reaction rate. Conceivably, autocatalytic reactivity 
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effects could even exhaust the Doppler negative reactivity effect, which 
would make an explosion all the more severe. Eventually, however, 
overall core expansion (explosion) would take over and drive the core 
subcritical. The question is, though, how much energy can the nuclear 
runaway(s) generate before being finally terminated—the energy being 
then correlated with the size of the resultant explosion.
The energy yield of an LMFBR nuclear runaway accident, which is 
the measure of the force of the explosion, is related to the rate at which 
the reactivity rises above prompt critical, i.e., the “reactivity insertion 
rate.” If the rate is low, the nuclear runaway will proceed less rapidly 
than otherwise, giving the fuel material time to accelerate outward 
(expand) and provide the offsetting negative reactivity before too much 
reactivity builds up to generate a stronger runaway. If the rate of reac-
tivity increase is high, then more reactivity can be “inserted” before 
the expansion occurs, and a stronger runaway occurs. Remember, it 
takes time for fuel material to accelerate and expand, which allows for 
reactivity insertion. Initial meltdown events are characterized by upper 
limits of reactivity insertion rates of about 200% per second, which 
when mitigated by the Doppler effect, yields the 500 lb. TNT-order 
explosion, assuming no autocatalysis. But autocatalytic reactivity effects 
such as explosive compaction could conceivably yield insertion rates 
in excess of 1000% per second. Therefore, fuel motion is the primary 
object of study in LMFBR analyses, and must be fully understood to 
establish the maximum explosion potential of the LMFBR.
Complicating the nuclear runaway problem is the amount of fuel 
concentrated in an LMFBR, which is enough to make somewhere 
between 10 to 40 separate critical reactors, if the fuel is fully compacted 
(fully dense). Thus for example a nuclear runaway could be terminated 
by slight expansion of core materials during the initial phase of a nuclear 
runaway explosion, only to compact enough fuel later on to return the 
core, or a part of it, to super-prompt-critical; i.e., to trigger second-
ary nuclear runaways. However, with explosive compaction, the rate at 
which the reactivity would increase would be great, and the momentum 
of the compacting fuel would have to be overcome, which delays the 
shutdown reactivity and conceivably could enable the runaway to grow 
to very dangerous levels.
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These factors, then, make explosive compaction a matter of grave 
concern. (Indeed, the atomic bomb is produced by explosive com-
paction [the compaction is affected by detonating a TNT charge].) 
Whether an LMFBR can be made to explode like an atomic bomb 
is a question I honestly don’t know the answer for. All I can say is 
that I have seen no analyses which rule out the possibility; and that 
I’m prevented from learning the physics of the atomic bomb, since the 
information is kept secret. My best judgment, though, is that the worst 
autocatalytic nuclear runaway in an LMFBR would not produce an 
atomic-bomb-like explosion, but that it may produce a severe enough 
explosion to “blow-up” the reactor and allow the escape of the radio-
activity to the environment (the worst conceivable LMFBR explosions 
mentioned in this rebuttal range from 500 lb. TNT equivalent to the 
order of 20,000 lb. TNT, which compares with a 20,000 tons of TNT 
equivalent for the first A-bomb).
It is useful to compare the commercial, water-cooled reactors now 
being operated—the so-called light water reactors (LWRs)—with the 
LMFBR. The concentration of fissionable fuel in an LMFBR core is 
much greater than the LWR. In fact, the LWR fuel concentration is 
so low that without the water coolant, the fuel probably cannot be 
made critical even if the fuel is fully compacted. It turns out that 
the LWR fuel can only be made critical if the fuel is spaced apart 
in the form of fuel rods with water in between. Unlike the sodium 
coolant in an LMFBR, the water in an LWR greatly slows down the 
neutrons, which are released at high speeds by the fissioning. A slow 
neutron has a much better chance for splitting atoms than a fast neu-
tron. Hence, a lesser fuel concentration is needed in an LWR. But 
if the water coolant should be expelled or drained from the core of 
an LWR, the reactor would be rendered subcritical, since the fission 
neutrons could not be slowed down, and without the slow neutrons 
the low fuel concentration could not sustain the fissioning. In con-
trast, the loss-of-coolant accident in an LWR presents the danger of 
a core meltdown, and the associated possible disaster of the built-up 
radioactivity escaping to the environment (due to the meltdown caus-
ing a breach in the reactor container). But because the LWR has a low 
fuel concentration, it does not have nearly the reactivity or nuclear 
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runaway problem associated with fuel meltdown or coolant expulsion 
in an LMFBR.
Further, the Doppler effect is stronger in the LWR, and the neutron 
lifetime is longer by a factor 1000. These facts make a nuclear runaway 
in an LWR less severe compared to an LMFBR for the same initial 
reactivity condition. (However, the LWR still has a serious potential 
for nuclear runaway; but this fact is beyond the scope of this LMFBR 
safety review.) Finally, the LMFBR has a power density in the core that 
is about ten times higher than that of an LWR. The power density 
is the amount of heat (power) generated in a given volume of core. 
This higher power density means that core meltdown occurs more vig-
orously, should adequate cooling be lost, than in an LWR. Also, the 
“decay heat” in an LMFBR is correspondingly stronger, which makes 
core meltdown worse than in an LWR without adequate cooling. This 
decay heat is troublesome for a number of reasons, one of which is that 
even if the LMFBR had shutdown (subcritical) after suffering a melt-
down, the fuel might freeze into an uncoolable mass, which could soon 
melt again, generating the possibility of re-assembly back into a “critical 
mass” and nuclear runaway.
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Between the time at which positive reactivity is inserted and control 
rods begin to move, the reactor behavior depends primarily on the 
Doppler effect to limit the severity of the accident.
The integrated negative Doppler reactivity from operating power 
level to the point of fuel rupture is required to be large compared to 
credible outside sources of rapid reactivity insertion.
. . . Accidents in which the control system does not function are 
considered hypothetical. In such accidents, the core will be destroyed, 
and the question of primary interest is the containability of the 
accompanying energy release.
K. P. Cohen, General Electric Company
It is, in our view, unlikely that one will be able to design for the  
worst accident permitted by the laws of nature and end up with 
an economically interesting system, even after extensive additional 
research and development has been carried out.
P. M. Murphy, General Electric Company
As K. P. Cohen and P. M. Murphy were two of General Electric Com-
pany’s principal officers in charge of the LMFBR program, it appears 
that GE had no illusions about the risks that the SEFOR project 
involved. SEFOR was an experimental reactor; it was never intended 
to suggest a reactor design that would be an “economically interesting 
c h a p t e r 
6 Tickling the SEFOR Dragon
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system.” The scientists and engineers at GE appear to have designed it 
with three principal performance features in mind:
• As there were a number of ways that positive (or negative) reactiv-
ity could be added to the reactor core by intention or accidentally, 
SEFOR was designed to minimize the potential for all known positive 
and negative reactivity additions save two: a planned intentional posi-
tive reactivity addition that could be accurately controlled in magni-
tude and limited to a specified time period, and the theory-predicted 
Doppler effect negative reactivity provided by the plutonium-oxide 
fuel. These design features were required to eliminate, as carefully as 
possible, all of the effects of reactivity changes in the core, save these 
two, in order to allow an accurate measurement of the Doppler effect.
• The reactor was designed so that a highly controlled and accurately 
specified amount of positive reactivity could be “inserted” into the 
fuel core. This task was performed with the Fast Reactivity Excur-
sion Device (FRED).1
• The design was intended to minimize the possibility that the positive 
reactivity intentionally added to the reactor could exceed the amount 
of inherent negative reactivity that was predicted to occur due to the 
Doppler effect. This feature was critical; the design sought to ensure 
that the positive reactivity added could not override the negative 
reactivity provided by the Doppler effect.
The primary goal of the SEFOR program was to quantitatively 
demonstrate the Doppler effect without suffering a damaging explo-
sion. A principal design goal was to ensure that the fuel temperature 
increase that would result from the planned reactivity addition would 
not result in any fuel melting.
Reactivity Effects Important in the SEFOR Experiments
Reactivity: The excess (positive or negative) in the number of 
neutrons produced per neutron lost during an average lifetime 
in a fast reactor—about one 10-millionth of a second.2
• The primary fission reaction of plutonium results in “splitting” of the 
239 isotope into two parts with the production (typically) of either 
two or three neutrons.
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• The fission of one atom generates 207.1 million electron-volts, or 
0.00000000003318 joules of energy.
• 1 gram of plutonium contains about 2.52 billion trillion atoms.
• 1 gram of plutonium fissioned produces, if neutron production 
per fission is assumed to be exactly two, 2.52 billion trillion (new) 
 neutrons—accompanied by an energy release of approximately 
20 tons (40,000 pounds) of TNT. It follows that 1 kilogram of 
plutonium fissioned releases energy equivalent to approximately 
20,000 tons of TNT (Nagasaki bomb yield).
• During normal reactor operation, a slight excess of neutrons is pro-
duced by fission above the combined number of neutrons that are 
absorbed by the fuel or lost through the surface of the fuel. This 
“reactivity” determines the chain-fission-reaction rate in the fuel.
• Depending on the type of reactor, the excess neutrons can be of two 
general types: slow and fast; the former having velocities (on average) 
of approximately 2 km/s (~4,500 miles per hour) and the latter hav-
ing velocities (on average) thousands of times higher.
• The reactor is normally controlled by adjusting (inserting or remov-
ing) neutron-absorbing “rods” that effect a reduction or increase as 
necessary in the reactivity to maintain the desired operating power 
level (number of fissions per unit time).
• So-called “transient” increases in reactivity, which can be caused by 
normal variations in the chain reaction rate as well as by accidental 
occurrences, are normally automatically controlled by positioning 
slow-acting control rods in the reactor fuel or, as in SEFOR, posi-
tioning a reflector “curtain” surrounding the reactor core.
• If accidental increases in reactivity occur beyond these “normal” 
increases, a separate, automatic, fast-acting SCRAM control system 
is provided to shut the reactor down before the core is damaged by 
overheating.
• If the number of fast neutrons in the core become sufficient to main-
tain the reactor fuel in a supercritical reactive condition (fissioning 
by fast neutrons only), such “prompt” neutron chain reaction rates 
can increase by a factor of several thousand, producing nuclear fis-
sion bomb explosion intensities.
• In the event that such a “super-prompt-critical” condition is reached, 
the only resort is to SCRAM as quickly as possible.
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• Enter the Doppler effect. The Doppler effect, a prompt-negative-
reactivity-effect, was designed into the SEFOR reactor by using (as 
fuel) the oxide of plutonium, rather than pure metal plutonium as 
normally required for nuclear weapons explosion yields. The Dop-
pler prompt-negative-reactivity addition occurs as the temperature 
of the fuel increases; if sufficiently strong, the Doppler effect will 
slow (cancel out) a positive super-prompt-critical reactivity addition, 
providing critical time for movement of the SCRAM rods.
Quoting GE’s Dr. Cohen: “The integrated negative Doppler reac-
tivity from operating power level to the point of fuel rupture is required 
to be large compared to credible outside sources of rapid reactivity 
insertion,” and, “Accidents in which the control system does not func-
tion are considered hypothetical. In such accidents, the core will be 
destroyed, and the question of primary interest is the containability of 
the accompanying energy release.”
In lay terms, Cohen’s statements mean that the amount of explosive 
“reactivity” introduced into the reactor core must, at a minimum, be 
sufficiently compensated for by the amount of reactivity removed by 
the Doppler effect in order to prevent the fuel temperature reaching its 
melting point. The fuel melting point limit is to be avoided to obviate 
the possibility that melting could alter its spatial arrangement in such 
a way as to cause the reactivity to increase as a result of autocatalytic 
effects discussed by Dr. Webb in chapter 5. Finally, Cohen is stating 
that if the Doppler effect is not sufficiently strong to effectively cancel 
the positive reactivity addition, the only result is to activate the emer-
gency SCRAM system. If the emergency SCRAM does not function in 
these circumstances, the core will be destroyed, and the question of pri-
mary interest is whether the containment provided for the reactor can 
withstand the energy released to prevent failure of the containment—
resulting in a worst-case accident that could cause massive releases of 
radioactivity to the environment.
The What If Question
We repeat the statement from chapter 2 that considered SEFOR Prompt 
Critical Transient Experiment No. 6 conducted during the last week of 
December 1971.
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If, in Test No. 6, the increase in SEFOR’s power level caused by 
the positive reactivity insertion had not hesitated (as predicted 
by the Doppler effect); if the reactivity insertion had been 
 accidentally maintained longer than the planned 0.1-second 
duration; and if the SCRAM procedure had failed—there was 
the real possibility that the power level might have increased to 
levels with the potential to rupture the containment.
We note that Test No. 6 left two critical questions unanswered:
• The experiments did not address the potential hazard of nuclear 
explosions that might be possible if sufficiently large amounts of 
prompt-critical reactivity were “inserted” into the core by accident 
or as a result of natural disaster that could override the Doppler 
effect. Dr. Webb’s principal concern, the possibility of unpredictable 
autocatalytic reactivity additions, was not addressed.
• The possibility of such autocatalytic effects occurring made all the 
more critical the reliability of the SCRAM mechanisms provided for 
the reactor. It appears that the reliability of the SCRAM mechanism 
was effectively assumed.
During the last year given to drafting this book, while continuing 
research into the general subject of nuclear safety regulation and fast 
nuclear reactor safety science, we found the following statement written 
by Dr. David Okrent, now deceased. Dr. Okrent was a leading author-
ity on nuclear safety research and regulation and long-term influential 
member of the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards:
The Staff report references various experts who have estimated 
an unreliability of SCRAM from 10-3 to 10-4 per demand. At 
the ACRS Subcommittee meeting on August 26, 1970, General 
Electric stated that experience with GE reactors led to a failure 
probability of 8 x 10-4 with a 95% probability. It was stated that 
to demonstrate empirically an unreliability of 10-7, approxi-
mately 300,000 reactor years with a zero failure history would 
be required. . . . In fact, during the recent past, another failure 
has actually been experienced at Hanford and a partial failure 
at SEFOR thereby reinforcing the Staff position.3
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The SEFOR SCRAM System
SEFOR was controlled by movable radial reflector segments that 
surrounded the reactor core outside of the reactor vessel. The reflec-
tor was divided into ten segments that could be raised or lowered 
vertically to give the desired control. Reflector control was feasible 
in SEFOR because the core was relatively small with a large radial 
neutron leakage component (about 21% of all neutrons). This type 
of control was desirable for SEFOR for several reasons, the primary 
one probably being maximum safety during the super-prompt-critical 
experiments that were a part of the planned experimental program—
placing the primary reactor control and shutdown system in a less 
vulnerable location outside of the reactor vessel provided an added 
margin of safety.
The 6-inch-thick, 34-inch-high nickel alloy cylindrical reflector 
was divided by radial cuts into equal sectors. Each sector comprises the 
active portion which was raised and positioned by its drive between the 
core and the poison blanket that surrounded it.
The reactor was scrammed by simultaneously dropping the reflec-
tor segments to a position that placed them below the bottom edge of 
the core.
The reflector guide extended from the top of the core down to the 
ceiling of the drive cell. It was composed of two concentric shells joined 
by radial webs that supported the segment guide rails and formed the 
channel within which the reflector segments were moved.
Two types of drive mechanisms were used to position and scram-
control the reflector segments, two for fine and the other eight for coarse 
control. The coarse control drive normally fixed its control rod at either 
end of its stroke, although the rod segment could be interrupted at 
any intermediate point. The fine drive was continuously and accurately 
positionable throughout its stroke.
The SEFOR Partial SCRAM Event
Quoting from the SEFOR Sixth Quarterly Plant Operation Report:4
Reactor operation at Five MW for Test Procedure Group III, 
Static Tests was in progress. Tests with main primary and main 
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secondary flow rates of 800 gpm had been completed and the 
main secondary flow rate was being increased by movement of the 
flow controller setpoint when a reactor scram occurred at 1355 on 
September 12, 1970. (emphasis added) Main secondary flow at 
the time of scram was approximately 1400 gpm. Flow fluctua-
tions were about +/-25 gpm. The reflectors dropped approxi-
mately 5 cm, carriage separation occurred on the fine drives, 
power dropped to approximately 3 MW, when an automatic 
scram reset occurred. An annunciator alarm and the scram 
event recorder indicated “Low Flow Main Secondary.” No other 
event was recorded or observed before or during the scram.
The operator immediately pushed the manual scram button, 
and the scram was completed. A low pressure freon header trip 
had been inserted previously in the safety system since one 
freon unit was not required for the 5 MW operation. The short 
duration trip from the low flow-main secondary completed 
the two-out-of-three logic for scram. Subsequent investigation 
revealed that the main contacts on the K1 (scram solenoid) 
contactor were opening a noticeable time before the “Hold-
in” (or auxiliary) contacts (through which the contactor coil 
current flows). With this relative opening of contacts on the 
contactor, if a trip signal consisting of a short duration pulse 
were received by the scram relay (mercury wetted contacts 
with time to open of 3 to 4 milliseconds), the voltage could be 
removed from the scram bus, the main contacts could open, 
the scram bus voltage restored, and the main contacts reclosed 
before the auxiliary contacts opened. Measurements on the 12 
contactors in the Safety System with an ohmmeter revealed 
that in 9 of the contactors the auxiliary contacts opened after 
the main contacts.
Notes
1. GEAP-13649, Design and Testing of the Sefor Fast Reactivity Excursion Device 
(FRED), AEC Research and Development Report, January 1, 1970.
2. Richard E. Webb, “Some Autocatalytic Effects during Explosive Power Tran-
sients in Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast Breeder Nuclear Power Reactors (LMFBRs)” 
(PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1971).
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3. David Okrent, Nuclear Reactor Safety—On the History of the Regulatory Process, 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1981. The same material, under the title On the His-
tory of the Evolution of Light Water Reactor Safety in the United States, appears on the 
internet at fissilematerials.org/library/OkrentReactorSafety.pdf.
4. Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor. Quarterly Plant Operations Report 
No. 6, August 1–October 31, 1970.
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Circle (added by authors)
designates evidence of positive 
reactivity (FRED) strength 
overriding negative Doppler 
reactivity.
The graph shows the reactor power during a 0.55-second period
for the prompt-critical transient test with the highest-magnitude
positive reaction insertion (FRED) conducted during the SEFOR
program. The time periods for the reactivity insertion, the
Doppler negative reactivity response, and the automatic (delayed)
SCRAM at 0.35 second quantitatively appear to address the
principal questions raised by Dr. Webb in his testimony to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
The FRED Insertion began at 0 seconds and ended at 0.1 second.
(text added by authors)
c h a p t e r 
7 A Picture is Worth a  Thousand Words
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The “picture” (graph) shown in chapter 7 is remarkable. The mea-
sured reactor power rose from its starting value at the beginning of 
the test of 2 megawatts, as a result of the FRED reactivity insertion, to 
approximately 9,000 megawatts, before it was turned around and began 
decreasing as a result of the Doppler effect. Had the fuel been metallic 
rather than the oxide form, and if the fuel fissile concentration had been 
enriched to LMFBR levels, the Doppler effect would have been very 
much less than it was in the SEFOR (oxide) core, and core reactivity 
could have reached nuclear bomb damaging power. Instead, the Dop-
pler effect stopped the acceleration of the power increase and caused it 
to immediately begin decreasing, which it continued to do until the 
reactor was SCRAMMED. The intentional SCRAM was purposely 
delayed for an additional period of 0.25 seconds (past the 0.1-second 
duration reactivity addition) in order to demonstrate the capability of 
the Doppler effect to turn around the power excursion.
Quoting from the General Electric report SEFOR Core I Transients,1 
“Eight super-prompt critical transients were performed in the Core 1 
experimental program. The tests were initiated from nominal power lev-
els of 2, 5, and 8 MW and resulted in peak power levels in excess of 9000 
MW. . . . The small secondary power peak on the 1.25$ transient occurs as 
additional positive reactivity insertion from the FRED overrides the initial 
Doppler feedback. (emphasis added) The FRED rod reactivity insertion 
terminated at 120 msec, thus limiting the magnitude of the second peak.”
This statement that the FRED positive reactivity insertion over-
rode the initial Doppler feedback appears to confirm Dr. Webb’s warn-
ings to the AEC that the ability of the Doppler effect to prevent a 
runaway power excursion was not unlimited. Indeed, it suggests that 
for the SEFOR reactor design, the upper limit of the Doppler capability 
c h a p t e r 
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was exceeded, if only slightly, in the highest positive reactivity inser-
tions conducted at SEFOR.
Quoting from the General Electric report SEFOR Experimental 
Results and Applications to LMFBR’S,2 “The SEFOR results aptly demon-
strate the effectiveness of the Doppler effect in providing inherent stabil-
ity and safety to LMFMR’s. A particularly convincing demonstration was 
provided by the super-prompt transient tests in which poison rods worth 
up to 1.3$ in reactivity were ejected from the core from initial power lev-
els up to 8 MW. In these tests the power quickly rose to ~10,000 MW as 
a result of the rapid reactivity of ~15 cents/second; however, even before 
all of the reactivity was inserted, the Doppler effect stopped the rapid power 
rise and brought the reactor power to a level at which a delayed scram of 
~350 msec could safely terminate the test. (emphasis added) These results 
are in excellent agreement with predicted results based on pre-experimen-
tal analysis. . . . The good agreement between the SEFOR predicted and 
experimental results for both static power measurements and transient 
tests indicates that the Doppler theory as applied to LMFBR’s is sound. 
The results of the various tests, therefore, may be used to provide a cali-
bration of Doppler calculations for other reactor systems, taking care to 
use consistent data and analysis techniques throughout the analysis of the 
SEFOR results and the calculation of LMFBR power transients.” This 
statement further confirms that the inherent safety provided by the Doppler 
effect, however limited, is important because it allows time for the activation 
of the SCRAM mechanism to stop the runaway.
In chapter 2, we made the following statement:
If, in Test No. 6, the increase in SEFOR’s power level caused by 
the positive reactivity insertion had not hesitated as predicted 
by the Doppler effect; if the reactivity insertion had been 
accidentally maintained longer than the planned 0.1-second 
duration; and if the SCRAM procedure had accidentally 
failed—there was the real possibility that the power level 
might have increased to levels with the potential to rupture the 
containment.
A failure of the FRED system resulting in the poison rod suffering 
delayed reentry to the core beyond the planned 0.1-second duration 
was a risk factor that we cannot determine. In any case, we have no 
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record that there was any such failure during any of the prompt-critical 
transient tests that we are considering. The possibility that the power 
increase would not hesitate as predicted was effectively made unlikely 
by the nearly two-year-duration experimental study of the reactor to 
determine, check, and double-check the calculation of the reactor core’s 
Doppler Coefficient. The agreement between the measured and calcu-
lated performance of the reactor shown in the “picture” beginning this 
final chapter speaks powerfully to the expertise and care provided by 
the General Electric Company’s design and experimental evaluation 
of the reactor before advancing to the conduct of the prompt-critical 
transient tests. Indeed, the agreement shown between all of the prompt-
critical transient test measurements and the calculated values made 
before the experiments were conducted is conclusive evidence that the 
General Electric personnel conducting the tests had carefully examined 
the reactor’s performance over a two-year period to verify and build 
confidence in the value of the Doppler coefficient in the two different 
SEFOR cores tested. It also appears to indicate that GE demonstrated the 
maximum limits of the Doppler effect’s capability to turn around a poten-
tial runaway explosion by intentionally bumping up against the limiting 
values they were confirming.
If the reactivity experiments had for any reason exceeded the reac-
tor’s capability of turning the excursion around with the Doppler effect, 
the last resort would have been the SCRAM system. Our study of the 
extensive reports available to us indicated that the SCRAM system 
was well conceived and designed for its purpose, and it was extensively 
tested before the prompt-critical transient tests were undertaken. How-
ever, we learned that SEFOR suffered at least one partial-SCRAM failure 
during its operation. That failure did not occur during a prompt-critical 
transient test. We have not had the resources to calculate what the effect 
would have been if there had been a serious SCRAM failure during the 
prompt-critical transient tests such as the one depicted at the beginning 
of the chapter.
We do know the total hours the reactor was critical during its 
 lifetime—3,895. If only one SCRAM failure had occurred during that 
operation, the failure frequency would be one in 3,895 hours or two 
per operating year. Such a frequency is not comforting considering the 
possible consequences.
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If any of the accidental occurrences we have posited had occurred 
during the test considered in this final chapter, it seems highly probable 
that the SEFOR fuel temperature would have exceeded the melting 
temperature. Even partial liquefaction of the core could cause rearrange-
ments of the enriched plutonium fuel, potentially resulting in powerful 
autocatalytic reactivity increases. If that had happened during the test 
“pictured,” the chances that the resulting explosive overpressures would 
have ensured that the primary containment would not fail seem slim to 
us, as the SEFOR steel-reinforced concrete containment was designed 
to withstand an explosion of just 200 pounds TNT equivalent.
Notes
1. GEAP-13837, SEFOR Core I Transients, Breeder Reactor Department, General 
Electric Company, Sunnyvale, California, August 1972.
2. GEAP-13929, SEFOR Experimental Results and Applications to LMFBR’S, 




Nuclear energy offers a Faustian bargain. It offers the World an inex-
haustible source of energy. But in return, it demands a vigilance and 
longevity of our social sciences to which we are quite unaccustomed.
Alvin M. Weinberg, 1915–2006
The SEFOR project was conceived in the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury during the period when the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor 
(LMFBR) was the AEC’s highest priority. But the LMFBR program 
had strong opposition on economic grounds as well as concerns that 
fast reactors had the potential to suffer nuclear explosions that could 
not be economically contained to ensure against catastrophic releases 
of radioactive products, including the fissile fuel itself, in the form of 
aerosols to the environment. The purpose of the SEFOR program was 
to demonstrate the Doppler effect in an LMFBR fueled with plutonium 
oxide. That demonstration was successfully completed.
This book began to provide an accurate history of SEFOR. But 
our research quickly led us to the knowledge that the final experiments 
conducted at SEFOR for the Atomic Energy Commission prior to its 
closure in early 1972 involved intentional insertion of reactivity into the 
SEFOR core sufficient to change the nuclear reaction process from a 
state in which the chain reaction fission rate was controlled by slow neu-
trons with average velocities of about 4,500 miles per hour to a chain 
reaction state driven by “fast” neutrons with average velocities at least 
a thousand times greater. Such fast-neutron fission can very quickly 
drive the reaction at rates that are not controllable; this is nuclear fis-
sion explosion territory. But the AEC was confident that science had 
predicted a nuclear reaction effect, herein called the Doppler effect, that 
could result in a slowing of such “runaway” rates if the plutonium used 
as fuel was of the oxide form, PuO2. As our country is now considering 
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the expanded use of fast-fission reactors for electricity generation, driven 
powerfully by a motivation to provide an important solution to the 
looming climate change threat—we added an additional purpose: the 
provision of an accurate account of the risks that were taken in complet-
ing these experiments in the foothills of Arkansas’s Ozark Mountains.
Also, we hoped to provide some closure to the questions of the 
residents in the neighborhood of the reactor. There is widespread fear 
of anything radioactive, and misconceptions about what occurred at 
SEFOR abound. At least for this group of people, though, we feel con-
fident that this book provides information that will alleviate most of the 
concerns we are aware of. To complete a clean-slate assessment of the 
dangers that could potentially remain at the site, there are two principal 
questions about the disposition of the hazardous materials that were 
involved.
Sodium
In our review of the literature to determine where the sodium was dis-
posed of shortly after the closure of SEFOR in early 1972, we found 
indications that ninety-some-odd barrels of sodium had been trans-
ported to the Nevada Low-Level Radioactive Waste Site near Beatty, 
Nevada. But our visit to the site failed to disclose any written records 
of verification.
Just before this book went to press in 2020, we discovered on the 
internet a report dated December 30, 2015, by the Nevada Department 
of Public Safety entitled: Report on the October 18, 2015 Industrial Fire 
Incident at the Closed State of Nevada Low-Level Radioactive Waste Site.1
Quoting from the Executive Summary of the report:
On October 18, 2015, an industrial fire incident occurred at the 
closed State of Nevada low-level radioactive waste disposal site 
located approximately 12 miles south of Beatty, Nye County, 
Nevada on US Highway 95 near milepost NY 48. . . .
The State of Nevada acquired this site in 1961 to receive 
low-level radioactive waste materials. These materials were 
buried for disposal at this site from 1962 until the site was 
closed in 1992. Materials were buried in numbered trenches 
and covered by an earth fill. This incident occurred at the east 
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end of Trench 14 near the east perimeter of the closed waste 
disposal site.
Waste materials were buried in a variety of containers and 
packaging, including steel drums, cardboard boxes and wood 
crates. Over multiple decades of burial, the packaging mate-
rials have deteriorated and collapsed causing void spaces and 
the resulting settlement of the fill and cover material in several 
areas at the site.
Metallic sodium, packed in oil-filled steel drums, was 
received from at least three sources for burial at the east end of 
Trench 14 at this site. The sources included two (2) drums from 
a US Bureau of Mines Research Center in Boulder City, closed 
by that agency in the early 1970’s; twenty-two (22) drums 
from Gulf-United Nuclear, Elmsford, New York, and ninety-
two (92) drums from GE Nuclear Energy Division-SEFOR, 
Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Corrosion of the steel drums containing the metallic sodium 
over time allowed the packing fluid to drain out, leaving the 
metallic sodium exposed to the underground elements.
Approximately two weeks prior to the event, Desert Research 
Institute (DRI) instrumentation at the site reported 1.29 inches 
of rainfall on October 4 through 6, inclusive. On the day of 
the incident DRI instruments recorded an additional 0.57 inch 
of precipitation.
Although the original cover was designed and sloped to 
drain rainwater, there was evidence to indicate that portions 
of the cover were compromised due to settling and collapse 
of underlying waste containers and resulting subsidence and 
cracking of the cover, allowing the migration of rainwater into 
these areas.
The heavy precipitation prior to and on the day of the event 
saturated the earthen cover of the buried waste. Rainwater 
seeping through the compromised earth cover reached the 
metallic sodium causing an exothermic reaction between the 
water and the metallic sodium.
The reaction produced a large amount of heat and gener-
ated quantities of hydrogen gas. The volume of gas produced 
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caused the eruption of the ground, expelling dirt, buried and 
corroded drums, and the products of the sodium-water reac-
tion, primarily sodium hydroxide.
The heat generated by the sodium water reaction ignited 
combustible metals at the immediate site, resulting in a fire.
The fire continued to burn into the evening and early 
morning hours of the following day until all fuel had been 
consumed. At that point the fire extinguished itself.
The incident resulted in no injuries to personnel, the effects 
of the fire were contained to the immediate site, and there was 
no release of radioactive materials.
So much for the sodium.
Plutonium
This is a bit more uncertain, but we can be confident that dangerous 
amounts of plutonium do not remain near Strickler either. The brief 
documents describing the decommissioning of the SEFOR site when it 
was closed in 1972 indicated that the spent fuel from the reactor, which 
would have almost certainly included the plutonium remaining on the 
site, was transported by truck to Hanford.
We have identified only one other report that deals with the fate of 
the SEFOR plutonium, entitled Processing of Non-PFP Plutonium Oxide 
in Hanford Plants.2 Quoting from that report:
The SEFOR campaigns at PUREX in December 1966 and 
April-May separated plutonium to produce plutonium nitrate 
solutions were shipped off site for use in production of SEFOR 
MOX fuel. There were some SEFOR returns of irradiated 
fuel as waste to the 200 Area burial grounds. The bulk of the 
SEFOR fuel reprocessing appears to have been conducted at 
Savannah River between 7/84 and 12/84. The fuel may have 
been sent to Savannah River rather than Hanford because the 
Hanford PUREX plant shut down at about the same time the 
SEFOR reactor was deactivated.
In short, aside from the account in the overview of Gerber,3 quoted 
below, no written evidence for the processing of SEFOR MOX at Han-
ford was found in the technical literature.
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In the later years of REDOX operation (1963–1967), Pluto-
nium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR) and Shippingport (Pennsyl-
vania) Reactor fuels were processed. PUREX also reprocessed 
some PRTR fuel in 1972, as well as some Southeast Experi-
mental Fast Oxide Reactor (SEFOR) fuel. Core dissolving of 
these mixed oxide fuels involved the use of a highly corrosive 
mixture of nitric acid and hydrofluoric acid, with the dissolver 
solution then blended with recycled uranium to achieve criti-
cality control.
Instead, it seems that the supporting documents that described 
reprocessing campaigns to recover plutonium from relatively high burn-
up Hanford fuel for use in preparing SEFOR MOX were misinterpreted 
to draw the conclusion that the reprocessing of irradiated SEFOR fuel 
occurred at Hanford. The dates of the processing reports (1963–1967) 
alone indicate that reprocessing of irradiated SEFOR fuel did not occur 
at Hanford because SEFOR did not go critical until April 1969. In any 
case, the spent fuel, including the plutonium, is most likely at Hanford 
or Savannah River, or further used for other purposes—it is no longer 
near Strickler.
Final Thoughts
While the residents near the SEFOR site can be confident, we believe, 
that the site no longer harbors dangers, there is a very important leg-
acy of the SEFOR super-prompt-critical experiments that must not be 
forgotten.
Today, as the site resumes an essentially greenfield condition, there 
is a strong push by the current federal government to adopt fast-reactor 
generation of electrical power in order to alleviate the climate change 
problem that is resulting because of the increasing carbon dioxide con-
centration in our atmosphere.
We believe the important legacy of SEFOR is the knowledge 
described in this book about the conduct at the site of super-prompt-
critical experiments. We acknowledge the apparent extreme caring 
effort that seems to have been insisted upon by the General Electric 
Company in the successful and safely conducted experiments that 
demonstrated the important physics of the Doppler effect for the safe 
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operation of fast reactors fueled with mixed-oxide fuels containing plu-
tonium and uranium.
But most importantly, we believe that there is a danger that the 
Doppler effect demonstration completed at SEFOR could leave the 
public with a false sense of security. While the Doppler effect is now 
demonstrated to be real and accurately predictable, we believe that any 
suggestion that it is any guarantee of safety regarding the possibility of 
nuclear explosions is not correct.
Instead, we believe that from the beginning of the SEFOR effort, 
there have existed real concerns by competent scientists and engineers 
that there are unpredictable effects that could attend rearrangement of 
the fissile material caused by accident or natural disasters that might 
override the Doppler effect.
In our judgment, this leaves us, at least presently, in the situation 
of being unable to confidently design a commercial fast reactor for 
electricity generation that will contain a worst-case accident explosion, 
ensuring against a catastrophic release of extremely dangerous radioac-
tive materials to the environment. It seems to us that this predicament 
is foretold in the admonition provided at the beginning of this post-
script by Alvin Weinberg.
Notes
1. Report on the October 18, 2015 Industrial Fire Incident at the Closed State of 
Nevada Low-Level Radioactive Waste Site, Nevada Department of Safety, Carson City, 
Nevada, December 30, 2015.
2. S. A. Jones and C. H. Delegard, Processing of NON-PFP Plutonium Oxide in 
Hanford Plants, PNNL-20246, WTP-RPT-211, March 2011.
3. M. S. Gerber, The Plutonium Production Story at the Hanford Site; Processes 




acceptability of risks, 52, 53
Accident Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, 
The (Webb), 5, 41, 58–59
Advisory Committee for Reactor 
Safeguards, 113
AEC. See Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC)
American Nuclear Society, 2
Appendix C of Webb’s rebuttal (Joint 
Commission), 95, 96–107
Argonne National Laboratory, 85
Argonne National Laboratory Conference, 
82
“assembly” discovery, 62
atomic bomb, 19–20, 44–45
atomic bomb attacks on Japan, 64
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 
1; abolishment, 5, 77; attempt to 
minimize concerns of the public, 52; 
“Environmental Statement” (WASH-
1509), 79; failing to give serious 
consideration to Webb’s advice to 
Congress, 5; hazards of accidental 
releases of fission products, 53; 
LMFBRs, 3, 14; production reactors, 
40; Proposed Final Environmental 
Statement for the LMFBR program, 
46; quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA), 52; response to Webb’s 
Statement on LMFBR Demonstration 
Plant, 85–86; SEFOR, 1, 5, 7; 
WASH-740. See WASH-740; WASH-
1509, 79
atoms: chemical reaction explosions, 18; 
constant motion, 16; diameter of 
nucleus, 17; elementary particles, 17; 




autocatalytic reactivity effects, 90, 91, 
104–5
barium, 18
“Basic Theory of LMFBR Nuclear 
Runaway in More Detail,” 95, 96–107
Bethe-Tait theory, 80, 81
blast damage, 30
boiling water reactor (BWR), 41, 44
BORAX-I reactor accident, 82
breeder reactor, 40
breeding, 27, 87
“Breeding, Economics and Safety in Large 
Fast Power Reactors,” 82




BWR. See boiling water reactor (BWR)
cancer, 43
catastrophic release of radioactive materials, 
49–65; Accident Hazards of Nuclear 
Power Plants (Webb), 58–59; 
explosion containment, 64–65; fallout 
problem, 64; fast-reactor explosion 
hazards, 63–64; plutonium fuel, 
60–63; WASH-740. See WASH-740
chemical energy, 15
chemical reaction explosion, 18
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, 6
climate change/global warming, 78
When photographs and figures are referenced in this index, the entry is denoted with p or f 
respectively.
130 | Index
Clinch River (Tennessee) Breeder Reactor 
(CRBR), 3, 5, 75
Cochran, T. B., 43
Cohen, Karl P., 71p, 109, 112
containment vessel, 1, 66f, 122
contamination limit, 43
control rod scram function, 93. See also 
SCRAM
control rods, 39, 87, 88, 91, 101–2
coolant vapor explosion, 42
coolant voiding, 104
core disassembly, 45, 95
core meltdown, 80
core vaporization process, 42
CRBR. See Clinch River (Tennessee) 
Breeder Reactor (CRBR)
“critical,” 87, 97
critical mass, 28, 29
critical size, 28
damage produced by nuclear fission  
bomb, 30
damages caused by nuclear incident, 56, 59
“daughter” products, 64
decay heat, 94, 104, 107
delayed neutron fraction, 100
delayed neutrons, 88
destructive radius of bomb, 30
Detroit Edison, 4
dirty (radioactive) bomb, 3
disassembly, 38
disposal of hazardous materials, 124–27; 
industrial fire (Nevada low-level waste 
disposal site), 124–26; plutonium, 
126–27; sodium, 124–26
Doppler effect, 74p, 93, 102–3, 112, 119, 128
Doppler feedback, 82, 102
Doppler temperature effect, 89
doubling time, 19
E = mc2 (Einstein’s famous equation), 19, 29
EBR-I experimental breeder reactor, 41
EBR-I fast-breeder experimental reactor 
accident, 4, 82, 86
effective explosion, 23
efficiency, 31
Einstein, Albert, 17, 19




“Environment Statement” (WASH-1509), 
79





explosive compaction, 92, 105–6
exponential rise (growth rate of fissioning), 
98, 100
fail the containment, 16
fallout problem, 64
false sense of security, 128
Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), 41
fast neutron fission chain reaction, 19
fast neutron fission reactor, 16
Fast Reactivity Excursion Device (FRED), 
68f, 70p, 110, 117f, 119
fast reactor explosion hazards, 63–64
FERMI-1 fast-breeder demonstration 
reactor, 4, 59
FFTF. See Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF)
firing, 32
first plutonium atomic bomb, 35, 35p
fission bombs, 20. See also Los Alamos 
Primer (Serber)
fission cross section, 24–25
fission products, 18
fissioning (splitting), 18, 98, 110
fizzle, 32, 33
FRED. See Fast Reactivity Excursion 
Device (FRED)
FRED positive reactivity insertion, 119
fuel compaction, 44, 45, 97
fuel expansion, 97
fuel motion, 92, 95, 104, 105
Fukushima multiple-reactor shutdown, 6
“Gadget,” 31, 35, 35p
“Gadget” design and explosion potential 
in fast reactors, 37–41; accidental 
“rearrangements” of fuel, 40; 
effecting an explosion, 37; expansion 
process, 37; fissile material assembled 
as supercritical mass, 38; super-
criticality, 37
Geesaman hypothesis, 43
General Electric (GE), 1, 11, 109, 110, 113, 
119–21, 127
Gerber, M. S., 126, 128n3
Index | 131
global warming/climate change, 7, 8
gravity compaction, 45
Hahn, Otto, 18
half-life of plutonium, 28, 42
Hanford PUREX plant, 126
Hanford Reservation, 61, 113, 126
Hirakawa, N., 80, 107n3
Hiroshima bomb, 32
hot particle theory of lung cancer 
induction, 43
Idaho Falls: The Untold Story of America’s 





in-pile meltdown tests, 86
industrial fire (Nevada low-level waste 
disposal site), 124–26
“interesting extent,” 24
International Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy, 54
Jankus, V. Z., 81, 107n5
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
75–108; AEC’s response to Webb’s 
Statement on LMFBR Demonstration 
Plant, 85–86; Appendix C of Webb’s 
rebuttal, 95, 96–107; autocatalytic 
effects, 90, 104–5; burn-up effect, 102; 
control rods, 87, 88, 91, 101–2; core 
disassembly, 45, 95; decay heat, 94, 
104, 107; Doppler effect, 93, 102–3; 
Doppler feedback, 82, 102; explosive 
compaction, 92; fuel motion, 92, 
95, 104–5; implosion, 92; negative 
reactivity effect, 99; neutron lifetime, 
97, 100; nuclear runaway, 87–95, 99, 
101, 102, 104; overpower accident, 
90, 104; reactivity, 89–89, 91, 97, 98; 
reactivity insertion rate, 89, 91, 92, 
105; reactor scram, 93, 102; sodium 
coolant expulsion, 103; Webb’s 
rebuttal, 86–95; Webb’s Statement 
on LMFBR Demonstration Plant, 
78–83, 84
KIWI-TNT power excursion experiment, 
80, 81
Klickman, A. E., 80, 107n3
krypton, 18
Laver, F. J. M., 15
light water reactor (LWR), 94, 106–7
liquid metal-cooled fast neutron breeder 
reactor (LMFBR): AEC’s projection 
of one thousand large LMFBRs, 41; 
autocatalytic reactivity accidents, 
44; central concern in LMFBR 
accident analysis, 104; decay heat, 
107; explosion hazard (Webb), 
41–46; fuel compaction, 44, 45; 
gravity compaction, 45; light water 
reactor (LWR), compared, 94, 
106–7; negative Doppler reactivity 
effect, 44; objective, 41; opposition 
to LMFBR program on economic 
grounds, 123; power density, 107; 
pressurized water reactor (PWR), 
compared, 44; purpose, 41; reactor 
scram function, 93
Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: An 
Environmental and Economic Critique, 
The (Cochran), 4
LMFBR. See liquid metal-cooled fast 
neutron breeder reactor (LMFBR)
LMFBR Demonstration Plant, 41, 78–83, 
85–86
LMFBR Program Plan, 83, 86
LMFBR safety program, 86
Los Alamos Primer (Serber): autocatalytic 
methods, 34; breeding, 27; code 
expressions for key words, 21; 
damage, 29–30; detonation, 31–32; 
effect of tamper on efficiency, 31; 
efficiency, 31; energy of fission 
process, 21–24; estimate of 
minimum size of bomb, 28–29; 
fission cross section, 24–25; fizzles, 
33; “Gadget,” 31; lecture notes for 
presentation to Manhattan Project, 
20; material 49, 27–28; neutron 
capture, 26–27; neutron number (v), 
26; neutron spectrum, 25–26; 
neutron speeds, 24, 25; object of the 
project, 21; ordinary U, 27; Serber’s 
conclusions, 34–35; tamper, 29, 31; 
twenty-one succinct parenthetical 
statements, 21
loss-of-coolant flow accident, 104
132 | Index
lung cancer, 43
LWR. See light water reactor (LWR)
MARS fast reactor excursion computer 
code, 80, 81
Material 49, 28
maximum economical containment 
capability, 42
maximum planned explosive containment, 33
MELT Accident Analysis Code, 86
Morris, Peter, 79
Murphy, P. M., 109
Nagasaki bomb, 36, 61
National Reactor Testing Station (NRTS), 
4, 40
natural uranium, 27
negative Doppler reactivity, 112, 117f




neutron lifetime, 97, 100
neutron number (v), 26
neutron properties of various materials, 34
neutron spectrum, 25–26
neutron speeds, 24, 25, 61
neutrons, 15, 17
Nevada Department of Public Safety, 124
Nevada Low-Level Radioactive Waste Site, 
124
Nims, J. B., 82, 83, 108n9
NRC. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC)





nuclear explosion, 42, 95
nuclear fission, 18
nuclear fission bomb, 38
nuclear fission chain reaction, 18
nuclear fission reactor, 38, 39, 39f
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 76
nuclear runaway, 87–95, 99, 101, 102, 104
nuclear waste disposal dilemma, 63
nuclear weapons, 60–61, 62
Okrent, David, 113
150,000 square-mile ground contamination, 
42, 43
open-air weapons testing, 64
ordinary U, 27
ordnance problem, 34
overpower accident, 90, 104
partial SCRAM failure, 13, 114–15
periodic table, 17
photographs. See SEFOR photographs/
drawings
plutonium: additional hazards, 60–63; 
choice material for construction 
of nuclear weapons, 51; disposal of 
hazardous materials, 126–27; half-life, 
28, 42; historical overview, 60–61; 
hot particle theory of lung cancer 
induction, 43; neutron number, 26; 
nuclear weapons production, 60–61; 
Processing of Non-PFP Plutonium 
Oxide in Hanford Plants, 126; 
radiotoxic material, 51, 61; use of 
plutonium as fuel, 59
plutonium atomic bomb, 35–36
plutonium dust, 42




preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR), 
79
pressurized water reactor (PWR), 41, 44
Processing of Non-PFP Plutonium Oxide in 
Hanford Plants, 126
“production” reactors, 40, 61
“prompt critical,” 87, 101
prompt-critical transient tests, 12–13, 117, 
121
protons, 15, 17
PSAR. See preliminary safety analysis 
report (PSAR)
public opinion, 52, 62, 128
PUREX, 126
PWR. See pressurized water reactor (PWR)
quantitative risk assessment (QRA), 52
radiation hazards of nuclear weapons, 30
radioactive decay, 64
radioactive decay processes, 63
ramp reactivity insertion, 12
Rasmussen Report, 43
reactivity, 87–89, 91, 97, 98, 110
reactivity insertion rate, 89, 91, 92, 105
Index | 133
reactor core, 96
reactor insertion rate, 89
reactor scram, 93, 102. See also SCRAM
“rearrangement” of fissile mass, 32, 36
REDOX operation (1963–1967), 127
Report on the October 18, 2015 Industrial 
Fire Incident at the Closed State of 
Nevada Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Site, 124
reverse reactivity effect, 44
risks: acceptability of risks by public, 53; 
adoption of fast-neutron reactor power 
program, 6–7; disposal of hazardous 
materials, 124–27; nuclear electric 
energy industry, 51
Russian Disaster: A Survival Handbook for 
the Nuclear Age, The (Crossfield),  
69p
SAEA. See Southwest Atomic Energy 
Association (SAEA)
SAFSTOR condition, 2, 13
SAS, 86
SCRAM, 93, 102, 112, 114, 121
Seaborg, Glenn, 65p
SEFOR: closing of SEFOR reactor, 1; 
containment vessel, 1, 66f, 122; 
dangers of nuclear incident, 11–12; 
designated a nuclear historic 
landmark, 2; disposal of hazardous 
materials, 124–27; experimental 
reactor, 109; experiments (six 
successive, completed in December 
1971), 12, 81, 112–13; fast reactor 
operating with enriched plutonium 
fuel, 49, 59; first large fast neutron 
reactor, 60; greenfield condition, 2, 
127; importance of research project, 
5; important legacy of SEFOR, 127; 
intermittent operation, 49; location 
of reactor, 1, 50; minimal security 
provided for control of access, 
50; neutron speeds, 61; no longer 
harbors dangers, 127; not designed 
to contain severe explosions, 
81; operating period, 50; partial 
SCRAM event, 114–15; photographs. 
See SEFOR photographs/
drawings; power excursion tests, 
81, 82, 112–13; primary goal, 
110; principal design goal, 110; 
principal performance features, 110; 
purpose, 2, 6, 11, 16, 123; reactivity 
effects, 110–12; reflector control, 
114; research project resulted 
from international agreements, 5; 
SAFSTOR condition, 13; SCRAM, 
93, 102, 112, 114, 121; SCRAM 
system failure, 13; size, 49, 50; total 
hours reactor was critical during its 
lifetime, 121; transfer of ownership 
to University of Arkansas, 1; “What 
If ” question, 112–13; what was 
accomplished?, 16
SEFOR Core I Transients, 119
SEFOR Experimental Results and 
Applications to LMFBR’S, 120
SEFOR MOX, 126, 127
SEFOR photographs/drawings: abandoned 
reactor, 72p; Arkansas Gazette 
photo (Welch, Wolf, Cohen), 71p; 
containment vessel, 66f; en route to 
disposal site, 73p; extracting reactor 
from steel containment cylinder, 73p; 
FRED, 68f, 70p; photo taken from 
overhead SEFOR reactor in refueling 
cell, 69p; plaque commemorating 
resolution of key LMFBR safety issue, 
74p; refueling cell atop reactor, 67f; 
SEFOR, operational, about 1970, 
Strickler, Arkansas, 65p; view through 
containment door, 67p
SEFOR Sixth Quarterly Plant Operation 
Report, 114–15
Serber, Robert, 15. See also Los Alamos 
Primer (Serber)
“shooting” method, 32, 34
significant amounts, 64
SL-1 fast reactor accident, 4
slow neutron fission reactor, 16
SNR-300 breeder reactor, 5
sodium, disposal of, 126–27
sodium coolant voiding, 104
“Some Autocatalytic Effects during 
Explosive Power Transients in 
Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast Breeder, 
Nuclear Power Reactors (LMFBRs)” 
(Webb), 79
Southwest Atomic Energy Association 
(SAEA), 1
SPERT-I reactor accident, 82
spherical-shaped plutonium mass, 35
splitting (fissioning), 18, 110
“squeezing” process, 36
134 | Index
“Statement on the Liquid Metal Cooled, 
Fast Breeder Reactor Demonstration 





“supercritical,” 87, 97, 100
supercritical assembly of fissile material 
(plutonium sphere), 36
tamper, 29, 31
Tamplin, A. R., 43
Taylor, Theodore B., 43
Teller, Edward, 49, 75
thermal damage, 30
thermal level, 25
thermal (slowed) neutron fission reactor, 16
Thin Safety Margin (Havens/Geren), 6–7; 
additional purpose of book, 124; 
appealing to three very different 
groups, 8; final thoughts, 122, 127–28; 
primary hazard considered in book, 
19; primary safety problem considered 
in book, 52; principal focus of book, 
63; principal purpose of book, 7, 40; 
risks attending use of fast-neutron 
reactors, 8; “technical” material, 8; 
“What if” questions, 13
time-delayed negative-reactivity insertion, 
12
TREAT reactor, 86
Trinity test, 35, 35f, 61
University of Arkansas, 1, 2
uranium, 26
uranium fission event, 18
uranium isotopes, 25
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. See 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
v. See neutron number (v)
VENUS reactor disassembly code, 80, 85
WASH-740: accidents with experimental 
reactor installations, 55; atmospheric 
dispersal fallout calculation, 42, 43; 
chance of major accidents occurring, 
54, 57; consequences/damages caused 
by nuclear incident, 56; hypothetical 
scenario, 56; letter of transmitted to 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
53–58; never updated, 58; participants 
in the study, 54, 58; perfect record of 
safety of regularly operating reactors, 
55; potential hazard of nuclear 
industry recognized in advance of 
its development, 57; probabilities of 
major reactor accidents, 56; purpose 
of report, 57; steering committee, 
55; unsettling picture to public, 58; 
Webb’s book, 58; worst-case credible 
accidental release of radioactive 
products, 52, 54
WASH-1509, 79
waste disposal. See disposal of hazardous 
materials
water-cooled reactor, 42, 44
We Almost Lost Detroit (Fuller), 4, 8n2
Webb, Richard E., 75–108; Accident 
Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, 5, 
41, 58–59; Appendix C of Webb’s 
rebuttal (Joint Commission), 95, 
96–107; background and expertise, 
77–78; “Basic Theory of LMFBR 
Nuclear Runaway in More Detail,” 
95, 96–107; “Explosion Hazard 
of the Advanced Breeder Reactor 
(LMFBR),” 41–46; maximum 
conceivable consequences of worst 
accident, 58–59; Ph. D. dissertation, 
79; picture is worth a thousand words, 
117f; principal concern with respect to 
SEFOR experiments, 113; rebuttal to 
AEC’s review of his Statement to Joint 
Commission, 86–95; Statement on 
LMFBR Demonstration Plant, 78–83, 
84; updated predictions of WASH-
740, 58–59
Weinberg, Alvin M., 1, 123
Welch, J. Robert, 71p
“What If” questions, 13, 112–13
Willrich, Mason, 43
Wolfe, Bert, 71p
